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THE
CAMPAIGN
OF
SANTIAGO
DE CUBA



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
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Vol. I

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CHICAGO

THE CAMPAIGN
OF
SANTIAGO DE CUBA



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THE
CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA
VOLUME I

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CHICAGO

THE CAMPAIGN
OF
SANTIAGO DE CUBA

BY *outland*
HERBERT H. SARGENT

CAPTAIN SECOND CAVALRY, UNITED STATES ARMY; COLONEL FIFTH UNITED
STATES VOLUNTEER INFANTRY DURING SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR;
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL TWENTY-NINTH UNITED STATES
VOLUNTEER INFANTRY DURING OPERATIONS
IN THE PHILIPPINES;
MEMBER OF THE MILITARY HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AUTHOR OF "NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S FIRST CAMPAIGN"
AND "THE CAMPAIGN OF MARENGO"

WITH MAPS

IN THREE VOLUME
VOL. I



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1907

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1907

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1893
C. 27 May 1893

TO
ELIHU ROOT

THIS WORK IS DEDICATED IN ADMIRATION OF WHAT
HE DID FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR
LITTLE ARMY WHEN HE WAS
SECRETARY OF WAR

192734

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THE recent Spanish-American War, while possessing, as every war does, characteristics of its own, nevertheless, in its broad analogies, falls into line with its predecessors, evidencing that unity of teaching which pervades the art from its beginning unto this day. It has, moreover, the special value of illustrating the reciprocal needs and offices of the army and navy, than which no lesson is more valuable to a nation situated as ours is. — MAHAN.

AFTER a war one ought to write not only the history of what has taken place, but also the history of what was intended. — VON DER GOLTZ.

FOOLS say that you can only gain experience at your own expense, but I have always contrived to gain my experience at the expense of others. — BISMARCK.

WAR is a business of positions. — NAPOLEON.

PREFACE

THOUGH the War and State departments have kindly aided me in obtaining from the Spanish government valuable data (See Appendix A.) as to the number of the Spanish troops in Cuba and at Santiago during the campaign, this history is in no sense an official utterance of the United States government. It is simply an honest expression of my personal views.

The seventh clause of the "Terms of the Military Convention of the Capitulation at Santiago de Cuba" allowed the commander of the Spanish forces, upon his departure for Spain, to take with him all military archives and records pertaining to the Spanish forces of eastern Cuba. This has made it very difficult for American writers to obtain accurate information as to the number of men in the Spanish army at Santiago, and especially as to the number in the companies of each organization. Without these records it has been possible to obtain only a few of the orders issued by the Spanish commanders. From the Spanish government's statement (See Appendix A.) I have been able to obtain accurate information as to the number and distribution of the Spanish soldiers in the theatre

of operations; but not having had access to the military archives and records of the Spanish army of eastern Cuba, I have found it impossible to ascertain, except in few cases, the exact number of men in the companies of the various organizations at Santiago. But, after all, history at its best can never be more than an approximation to the truth. No history is accurate in all details; no historian can describe events precisely as they occurred. "It is," says Blume, "only possible partly to lift the veil which covers the records of war."

My thanks are due to Lieutenant Colonel E. J. McClernand, First Cavalry, U. S. Army, and to Lieutenant Commander John M. Ellicott, U. S. Navy, for criticisms of the text of this history before publication; and they are especially due to Charles P. Fountain, Professor of English at the Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas, who has read critically the entire manuscript of this work. His constant encouragement during the three years I have been engaged in writing this history; his advice, suggestions, and criticisms; and his discussion of points in English construction have been exceedingly helpful and valuable.

H. H. S.

COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS
January 1, 1907

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THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA

VOLUME ONE

CHAPTER I

THE CUBAN INSURRECTION¹

DURING the latter part of the nineteenth century there were two insurrections in Cuba against the Spanish government. The first began on October 10, 1868. On that date Carlos Cespedes, at the head of one hundred and forty Cubans, raised the standard of revolt in the province of Santiago and proclaimed a republic. Though this insurrection, through good leadership and the sympathy of the Cuban people, was prolonged for nearly ten years, its military history is insignificant. The insurgents never had more than a few thousand men in the field at any one time, and their operations consisted merely of a series of guerilla combats, none of which produced any decisive effect. This insurrection, known as the Ten Years' War, was brought to an end by the conciliatory efforts of the commander-in-chief of the

¹ See Map 1.

Spanish forces in Cuba, General Martinez Campos, who succeeded in effecting, on February 10, 1878, a compromise with the insurgents. This compromise is known as the treaty of Zanjón.

The second insurrection, which resulted in the freedom of Cuba, began on February 24, 1895. On that date, in the provinces of Matanzas and Santiago, several Cuban leaders with small bands of followers rose in revolt against Spanish authority. In the province of Matanzas the insurgents were speedily crushed or forced to surrender, but in the province of Santiago they were successful. They were soon joined by several thousand recruits; and, having obtained arms, they were able to begin a guerilla warfare against the Spanish troops. When it became known that the struggle for independence was being resumed in Cuba, several of the Cuban leaders, who had been prominent in the Ten Years' War and had sought safety in exile, at once returned to the island to aid the insurgents. José Martí, Maximo Gomez, and Antonio Maceo were among the number. They became the new leaders. José Martí assumed the administration of governmental affairs, Maximo Gomez was made commander-in-chief, and Antonio Maceo received a high command in the army. A little later Calixto Garcia, another prominent Cuban patriot, who was also an exile of the Ten Years' War, returned and was appointed to command the forces in Santiago Province. In a short

time the seriousness of the situation became apparent even to the home government, and Captain-General Martinez Campos, who had been successful in pacifying the Cubans in the Ten Years' War, was sent to Cuba to put down the insurrection.

General Campos tried to confine the insurrection to the eastern end of the island by a cordon of soldiers stationed along the western border of the Santiago Province. He was, however, unsuccessful. Though he received within a few months reënforcements to the number of eighty thousand, which increased the total strength of his army to more than one hundred and forty thousand, and though the insurgents sustained a great loss in the death of José Martí, who was killed in one of the first fights, nevertheless, Generals Gomez and Maceo were able to break through the cordon and push westward with their forces. General Campos then fell back and attempted to stop the enemy by fortifying a line across the island from Jucaro on the south side to Moron on the north, a distance of about fifty miles. Although he stationed thousands of troops along the line, it was impossible to hold it against the enemy. With little difficulty Gomez and Maceo were able to cross it, and, as the Spanish troops were acting almost entirely on the defensive and making scarcely any effort to attack and follow the insurgents, the operations of the Cuban generals met with considerable success. By dividing their forces, which consisted of

about twenty-five thousand men, into small parties, they were able to intercept convoys, to ambush detachments, and to carry on a very destructive guerilla warfare. In short, the campaign conducted by General Campos was a failure. Accordingly, at the beginning of the following year he was superseded by Captain-General Valeriano Weyler, who arrived in Havana on February 10, 1896.

Before describing the operations of General Weyler, it will not be out of place to note briefly the methods and policy pursued by the insurgents during the insurrection. Theirs was an essentially guerilla warfare. They did little real fighting and had little respect for the rules of war. Their operations consisted mostly in burning sugar-cane, sugar-mills, and other property, in annoying and harassing the Spanish soldiers, and in making levies upon Spanish sympathizers and men of wealth. Their policy was to burn and destroy. Gomez himself issued the orders; and in the name of liberty and independence the torch was applied, and the destruction of property carried on with relentless bitterness.¹

Upon General Weyler's arrival at Havana, it became evident that he intended to prosecute the war with vigour. He adopted strict disciplinary measures. By proclamations and in other ways he soon made it plain to the Cuban people that

¹ See Appendix E.

the death penalty would be the punishment for such treasonable acts as furnishing aid, arms, or provisions to the enemy. Having received a large number of reinforcements, he immediately began operations against the insurgents. His plans, with few exceptions, were similar to those of his predecessor. He adopted the cordon system. By stringing out his troops, he attempted to occupy and hold lines entirely across the island. These lines were strengthened by field works,—trenches were dug, wire entanglements were placed in front of them, and blockhouses built at intervals. These fortified lines were known as *trochas*. By means of them General Weyler hoped to confine the insurgents to the eastern part of the island. He attempted to move from west to east, building *trochas* as he advanced, in order to prevent the insurgents from invading the pacified provinces in his rear. Though on several occasions he took the offensive for a short time with a few thousand soldiers, his tactics were essentially defensive,—his main efforts being confined almost exclusively to the defence of the cities, towns, and *trochas*.

The struggle at this time continued to be simply a series of confused guerilla combats. The operations were destructive but not decisive. The insurgents continued to roam about in detachments; but they gained no decisive victory. General Weyler's forces numbered approximately one hundred and

ninety-six thousand men,¹ of whom about eight thousand were cavalry and about five thousand artillery, while the number of insurgents probably never at any one time exceeded twenty-five thousand.² All these troops were greatly scattered. The Spanish cavalry especially was divided into many detachments and widely dispersed³ throughout the several provinces of the island.

This overwhelming superiority in numbers gave General Weyler a great advantage and brought him some success. During the Summer of 1896 the forces of General Maceo were hemmed in in

¹ At the beginning of the Spanish-American War there were in Cuba 196,820 officers and men. See statement of Spanish government, Appendix A. Between the end of General Weyler's operations and the outbreak of the Spanish-American War there was but little if any change in the number of Spanish troops in the island. For further statements and discussion as to the number, see Appendix B.

² The total number of officers and men in the Cuban army at one time and another during the insurrection was 53,774. (See Appendix D.) Not all of these soldiers, however, possessed fire arms, and only a small portion of them had continuous service. The Spanish War Department estimated the total number of armed insurgents at the beginning of the Spanish-American War at fifteen thousand, of whom five thousand were in the province of Santiago. (See Appendix A.) Though it is almost certain that at several times during the insurrection the number of insurgents exceeded these figures, yet I doubt very much whether there were at any one time more than twenty-five thousand actually on duty under arms.

"There is no reason to believe," says "Harper's Weekly" in its issue of March 14, 1903, "that from February, 1895, up to the evacuation of Cuba by the Spanish troops, there were twenty-six thousand Cubans under arms, or anything like that number."

³ See Appendix C.

the western part of the island, and in December of that year Maceo himself was killed in a chance encounter while attempting to cross a *trocha* with a few followers. In the following March his successor in command of the insurgents in the western part of the island, General Rius Rivera, was captured and deported. General Gomez, too, who had been successful in the first year of the war, was compelled to fall back and confine his operations to a smaller area. And even in Santiago Province, where the outlook appeared most favourable to the insurgents, General Garcia was unable to capture any of the fortified towns, or to defeat in battle any part of the Spanish forces. In fact, the hopelessness of the insurgent cause was daily becoming more evident.

Meanwhile the situation in Cuba was growing desperate. The guerilla warfare, the burning of crops and buildings, the confiscation of stock, money, and provisions, had brought many people on the island to the verge of starvation. There was no security for property, and little opportunity for the Cuban labourer to earn his daily bread. Discontent, suffering, disease, famine, and death were everywhere. Yet, notwithstanding the destructive policy inaugurated and relentlessly carried forward by the insurgents, the Cuban people were in full sympathy with them. The desire for independence and the hatred of the Spanish government were so firmly fixed in the hearts of these people that they

were ready to endure almost any hardship rather than yield.

The vigorous, severe, and retaliatory measures of General Weyler greatly intensified the desperate-ness of the situation. When he found that all the rural population were in sympathy with the insurgents and were giving them aid and comfort at every opportunity, he closed the country stores, and in this way prevented, throughout the rural districts, any accumulations of supplies for the insurgents. And finally, when he found the country people acting as spies upon the Spaniards, aiding the insurgents in every way possible, and carrying them information of every Spanish movement, he issued his celebrated reconcentration order. By this order the country people throughout certain districts were required to leave their homes and concentrate in the fortified towns. As the majority of these people were poor and as no means of feeding them had been provided, this severe military measure caused much hardship and suffering, and greatly increased the deaths from starvation.

Throughout this insurrection the friction between the United States and Spain continually increased. The American people, who had not forgotten that the independence of their own country had been gained through revolution, sympathized strongly with the Cuban people and felt that a helpful hand should be extended to them. Though the

government of the United States endeavoured to maintain, even at great expense to itself, a strict neutrality in regard to Cuban affairs, yet so great was the activity of Cuban agents and sympathizers in the United States that the Spanish people found it impossible to resist the belief that the American government was secretly giving aid and comfort to the insurgents. On the other hand, the United States was greatly irritated at the treatment received by a number of American citizens in the island. Notwithstanding the well-known fact that American citizenship had been acquired by many Cubans with the deliberate purpose of invoking its protection in case of a conflict with Spain, the United States felt bound to intercede in behalf of her citizens and to defend them in their rights. These acts and many others, which were often misunderstood through exaggeration and misrepresentation, continued to be a fruitful source of trouble between the two powers.


Meanwhile, the cost of the war to Spain, in men and money, already enormous, was rapidly growing larger. Though reënforcements numbering 217,282 men¹ had been sent into the island during this insurrection, the Cuban leaders were so hopeful that the United States would help them, and the Cuban people themselves so determined not to yield even in the face of starvation and death, that there seemed to be little prospect of peace.

¹ See Appendix G.

Thus matters went from bad to worse until, finally, in the latter part of General Weyler's administration, the conditions in the island became so dreadful that the United States government itself determined to intervene. Accordingly, it demanded of Spain the revocation of the reconcentration edict and the recall of General Weyler. The result was that early in October, 1897, the Spanish Cabinet decided upon a change of policy in Cuban affairs. They offered Cuba a new constitution, which gave the inhabitants a local parliament and a fairly liberal measure of autonomy. They also recalled Captain-General Weyler, and appointed Captain-General Ramón Blanco his successor.

The new captain-general, upon his arrival at Havana, began to carry out the Spanish Cabinet's new policy. He at once revoked General Weyler's reconcentration order and offered amnesty to all political offenders. But these conciliatory measures came too late. The Cubans no longer had faith in the promises of Spain. The offer of autonomy was spurned. There was now no possibility of a compromise. The time for conciliation and compromise had passed. Independence alone would now satisfy the Cuban people.

Such, in brief, was the situation when, on the night of February 15, 1898, the blowing up of the United States battleship *Maine* in Havana Harbour suddenly brought matters to a crisis. This act



meant war between the United States and Spain. It meant the destruction of Spanish power in the West India Islands. It meant, for the Cuban people, the dawn of a new era and the realization of hopes long deferred.

COMMENTS

BEFORE describing more fully the general situation, it is the purpose here to note briefly the distinguishing peculiarities of the struggle between Spain and the insurgents prior to the Spanish-American War, and to point out the principal reasons why the results were not more decisive.

It seems remarkable that war should have continued on the island for three years with such unsatisfactory results. It would seem that on an island shaped like Cuba, whose average width is only eighty miles, and whose total area is considerably less than that of the State of Illinois, a Spanish army, numbering from one hundred and forty to one hundred and ninety-six thousand men, should have made short work of an army of twenty-five thousand insurgents. It would seem that this Spanish army, within a year at most, should have destroyed the armed insurgents or have driven them into the sea. Why was this not done? A brief discussion of the methods of warfare employed by the Spaniards will, it is believed, give us a clear and satisfactory answer to this question.

First: The cordon system of making war which was adopted by the Spaniards was faulty. The Spanish army was greatly weakened in strength and fighting power by being scattered, and by attempting to occupy and hold a line entirely across the island. With a little skill it was easy for the enemy to mass his forces at some point of the line and break through it before reënforcements could arrive. The fact that the line was nearly always fortified did not in any way remedy the faults of the system. Indeed, the stronger the line the less likely were the troops to leave it in order to unite for offensive warfare against the enemy. This system not only resulted in scattering the Spanish troops, but it kept them scattered. After a *trocha* was built at great expense, it was deemed necessary, of course, to occupy it and be ready to defend its entire length, even though it might never be attacked.

This system is directly opposed to the true system — that of concentration. To concentrate your forces and be stronger than your enemy at the vital point; to act offensively and in force against him; to outnumber him upon the battlefield; to manœuvre so as to make him fight at a disadvantage, these principles constitute the true system — the system that brings results whatever may be the character of your adversary.

Secondly: The Spaniards followed the defensive method of warfare. Having built their *trochas*,

they occupied them and awaited developments. Instead of hunting up the enemy and pursuing him vigorously as they should have done, they waited for him to attack them. They were too indolent to take the offensive, and too well satisfied with their own methods to appreciate the fact that only by aggressive and energetic warfare can insurrections be crushed.

They should have taken the field against the insurgents; sought for them everywhere; followed them when found; attacked, routed, annihilated, or driven them into the sea. This plan could easily have been followed during the dry season from October to June; and it is safe to say that with their superiority in numbers and their well-known courage, the Spaniards should have crushed out the insurrection in less than a year.

The cordon system of the Spaniards, combined with their defensive tactics, gave to the insurgents many advantages. Though the latter were never able, because of military inefficiency and lack of organization, to take full advantage of their adversary's faulty method, yet it continually offered them opportunities for accomplishing great results. Had they been able to profit by it, they might have massed overwhelming numbers at a weak point of the Spanish line, and by attacking and crushing the enemy there, they might have divided his forces and defeated, subsequently, the fractional parts in detail. In short, this method of

warfare permitted the insurgents to choose their own battlefield, and to bring thereon superior numbers whenever they so desired. "Bonaparte's art of war — namely, of concentrating forces on the point of attack," says Emerson, "must always be theirs who have the choice of the battlefield."

Thirdly: The cavalry force of the Spaniards was too small. The oppressive heat and unhealthful climate of the island made active campaigning there very debilitating for dismounted troops. Mounted troops would have been much more suitable for aggressive warfare. Cavalry was needed to scout the country thoroughly, to hunt out the insurgents from their hiding-places, and to attack and crush them when found. There never was a time during the insurrection when the insurgents, with their lack of organization, poor discipline, and disinclination to concentrate and fight, could have prevented a single brigade¹ of United States cavalry from marching victoriously anywhere on the island. Such being the case, it is plain that if Spain had possessed twenty or twenty-five good cavalry regiments in Cuba, and had energetically taken the offensive and overrun the rebellious parts of the island, she could hardly have failed to conquer. Undoubtedly such tactics would not only have resulted in the speedy destruction of the armed insurgents, but would have produced upon the Cuban people the greatest moral effect.

¹ A brigade consists of three regiments numbering approximately three thousand men.

It will perhaps not be amiss to point out the fact that in thus dividing forces in order to wage war against the divided and scattered parts of the enemy's army there is no violation of the principle of concentration so long as each fraction of the attacking army is sufficiently strong to meet and overcome any opposition of the enemy. Or, to state the matter more in detail: if the enemy abandons the regular methods of making war and divides his army into detachments for the purpose of waging guerilla warfare, it is allowable, indeed, it may often become necessary for a commander who has superior forces and is waging offensive warfare to divide and scatter his own forces in order to attack and crush separately the enemy's scattered detachments; but in so doing he should ever bear in mind that good strategy requires that each fraction of the attacking force should be stronger than that of the enemy at the point of attack; and, furthermore, that the enemy should not be permitted to concentrate his forces in succession against the fractional parts of the attacking army.

From the foregoing comments there may be obtained a fairly clear idea of what the military policy of Spain should have been in Cuba. It is not the purpose in this discussion to point out the general policy which Spain should have followed in her treatment of the Cuban people. That, indeed, is largely a moral question, involving the

government of colonies and the rights of man, with which, however interesting, we are not now concerned. But the purely military question, how in the shortest time and with the least expense Spain could have crushed out the armed resistance in the island, does concern us.

The Spanish army of one hundred and ninety-six thousand men in Cuba was too large. An army of sixty thousand, organized with the proper proportion of mounted troops, would have been much more effective. The Spanish government seemed to think that in order to gain victories in Cuba it was necessary to overrun the island with foot soldiers. So many troops were sent there that they were actually in one another's way; and the difficulty of supplying them with arms, food, clothing, and medicine increased, of course, in proportion to their numbers. Suppose Spain had taken the money spent upon the subsistence, equipment, and transportation of the 217,282 men sent to Cuba during the insurrection, and had spent it economically and judiciously, or as much of it as was needed, upon an army of sixty thousand soldiers, composed of thirty thousand infantry, twenty-five thousand cavalry, and five thousand artillery; suppose that Spain had given this army better food, better hospital service, more transportation, better forage for the animals, all the ammunition needed for target practice, thorough drill in target shooting; suppose, in short, that she had

spared no pains and no expense to make this army as nearly perfect as possible, and had then inaugurated a vigorous and aggressive campaign against the insurgents,—who can doubt what the result would have been? Such an army would have been much better able to stand the hardships of a tropical climate. Such an army would have outnumbered the insurgents nearly three to one, and would have possessed sufficient cavalry to overrun the island and crush out the enemy while the infantry and artillery held the towns and cities and gave protection to the loyal people. Spain wasted her means in transporting more men to and from Cuba than were necessary. She wasted her means in arming and equipping more dismounted troops than she had any need of. She wasted her means in building *trochas* and in defending them when their defence did little or nothing towards defeating the insurgents. She failed, because she did not grasp the situation; because she adopted a faulty system of making war; because she did not appreciate the fact that insurrections can be crushed only by aggressive and energetic warfare; and because she did not have, among the captain-generals who commanded her troops in Cuba, a single one who showed any generalship worthy of the name.

CHAPTER II

THE DECLARATION OF WAR

THE blowing up of the battleship *Maine* was not immediately followed by a declaration of war. Time was taken for an investigation of the disaster, and for preparation for the impending struggle; but the delay only added to the feeling of bitterness between the two peoples. It was the lull before the storm—the pause of silent wrath preceding the clash of arms. The American people and their representatives in Congress believed that Spanish officials were responsible for the destruction of the *Maine*, and they were determined that Spain should atone for the act, and that her rule in Cuba should end. Accordingly, on April 19, 1898, the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States passed the following resolutions:

“Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian civilization, culminating as they have in the destruction of a United States battleship, with two hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on a

friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and cannot longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, upon which action of Congress was invited: Therefore,

“Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

“First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

“Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

“Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

“Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the Government and control of the island to its people.”

These resolutions, approved by the President on April 20, were equivalent to a declaration of war. Almost immediately Spain severed diplomatic relations with the United States, and on April 24

made a formal declaration of war. On April 25 the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States passed an act declaring that war existed, and had existed between the United States and the kingdom of Spain since April 21, 1898.

COMMENTS

To begin hostilities prior to a formal declaration of war has not been an unusual occurrence since the middle of the eighteenth century. The reason for this departure from the custom of making declarations of war has grown out of the greater facilities with which in modern times information can be disseminated. Nations now have ambassadors at the capitals of civilized countries who are generally accurately informed as to the probabilities of war and can forewarn their countrymen. For the most part, too, war now comes at the end of a long series of negotiations. Hence formal declarations prior to the beginning of hostilities are at the present time seldom necessary. Moreover, under a government like that of the United States, in which an Act of Congress is necessary to create a state of war, a formal declaration is needless; for discussions leading to the passage of legislative acts creating war enable all powers concerned to keep themselves accurately informed as to the probable outcome.

CHAPTER III

THE THEATRES OF OPERATIONS ¹

THE islands of Cuba and Porto Rico and their adjacent waters were the principal theatres of operations during the Spanish-American War; but the operations of the Santiago campaign, which will be described in this history, were in large measure confined exclusively to Cuba and its waters.

Cuba is the largest of the West India Islands. It lies southeast of the United States, at the outlet of the Gulf of Mexico. It is long and narrow, having the shape of an immense lizard, with the convex side of its curved tail towards the north. Its greatest length is seven hundred and sixty miles, its greatest breadth one hundred and thirty-five miles, and its average breadth eighty miles. It has a number of good harbours, the chief of which are Bahia-Honda, Mariel, Havana, Matanzas, Cardenas, Nuevitas, Nipe, and Baracoa on the north coast; and Guantanamo, Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos on the south coast. The principal cities lie on or near these harbours. They are Havana, Matanzas, Cardenas, Puerto Principe, Holguin,

¹ See Maps 1 and 3.

Baracoa, Guantanamo, Santiago, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos. The railroad mileage of the island is not extensive. At the outbreak of the war the principal railroads were two short lines extending out of Santiago, and the lines connecting Havana, Matanzas, Cardenas, and Sagua la Grande on the north coast with Cienfuegos on the south coast. Through nearly the entire length of the island there extends an irregular ridge of mountains and hills. This ridge in some parts of the island is hardly noticeable; in others its highest points rise several thousand feet above sea level. In the southeastern part, near Santiago, is the Cobre range of mountains, the highest in the island, one peak of which reaches an elevation of seventy-six hundred and seventy feet. The climate of Cuba, except in the higher altitudes, is tropical. The average annual rainfall is 51.7 inches, of which nearly two-thirds is precipitated during the rainy season, which begins with June and ends with October.


Porto Rico, the fourth in size of the West India Islands, lies five hundred miles east and a hundred miles south of Cuba, and on the east side of Hayti, which occupies the greater part of the intervening space between Cuba and Porto Rico. Its shape is that of an irregular parallelogram one hundred and eight miles long and thirty-seven miles wide. Its principal harbour, San Juan, one of the best in the West Indies, is a large bay on the north coast shut in from the Atlantic by a long narrow island, which

at its eastern end is separated from the mainland by only a little surf-covered inlet. The city of San Juan, containing about thirty thousand inhabitants, is situated at the western end of this island. This city faces inward towards the bay, and is sheltered from the ocean by a ridge about sixty feet high, which rises abruptly along the shore behind the city. The defences of the ridge were two batteries and an old fortification extending along the crest. On the westernmost point of the ridge overlooking and commanding the entrance of the harbour is an antiquated stone fortress known as Morro Castle. Across the mouth of the harbour, on a sand bar near the point of land opposite the castle, is Fort Canuelo, and directly in front of the mouth is Cabras Island.

San Juan, Porto Rico, was the nearest Spanish port to Spain in western waters. It is 2354¹ miles from the Cape Verde Islands, 984 miles from Havana, 960 from Key West, 1187 from Tampa, Florida, and 1245 from Hampton Roads, Virginia.

The prevalence of yellow fever and pernicious malarial fever has made campaigning very dangerous in the West Indies. In 1741 an English expedition was formed in Jamaica to attempt the capture of Santiago de Cuba. It consisted of a fleet of eight ships-of-the-line, twelve frigates, and about forty transports. The fleet was commanded

¹ In this work all distances across water are expressed in nautical miles, and all distances across land in statute miles.



by Vice-Admiral Vernon,¹ and the army aboard the transports, numbering thirty-four hundred men, was under the command of General Thomas Wentworth.

As the entrance to Santiago Bay was closed by a boom, a direct attack upon the city of Santiago was deemed impracticable. Accordingly, Guantanamo Bay,² forty miles east of Santiago, was selected as a base of operations for prosecuting the campaign. The plan was for a part of the fleet, stationed at the entrance of Guantanamo Bay, to cover and protect the transports anchored within; a second part to take position off Santiago Harbour and blockade that port; and a third, consisting of the fastest vessels, to go to Havana to watch the Spanish fleet there, while the land forces marched overland and attacked the city of Santiago. As Santiago was but four days' march from Guantanamo Bay and known to be almost defenceless on the land side, this plan seemed to offer good chances of success.

About the middle of July General Wentworth disembarked his forces and began active operations. But as he advanced towards Santiago, he committed the mistake of exhausting the energies

¹ With this land force were some American troops. One of the Washingtons accompanied the expedition, and Mount Vernon owes its name to the naval commander-in-chief, Vice-Admiral Vernon.

² At that time Guantanamo Bay was known as "Walthenam Harbour" and was renamed by Vernon "Cumberland Harbour."

50 100 200 300
SCALE OF STATUTE MILES



of his soldiers in making and repairing roads. The delay was fatal to the success of the undertaking. In about three weeks such a large number of the English troops became suddenly ill that the forward movement had to be stopped within sixteen miles of Santiago, though practically no opposition was offered by the Spaniards. For several months this illness prevented any further effort to capture the city; and in the latter part of November the English army, after losing about fifty per cent of its original strength, returned to the landing and was reëmbarked on the transports.

In 1762 an English expedition, consisting of a fleet of forty war vessels and one hundred and fifty-six storeships and transports, commanded by Sir George Pollock, and an army of 14,041 soldiers, commanded by Lord Albemarle, was sent to take Havana. The expedition arrived off Havana June 6, and on the following day the army was landed. Operations were at once begun against the city. The Spanish fleet, which was in the harbour, consisted of about forty war vessels, and the Spanish military forces numbered 27,610 men. The defence was exceedingly obstinate; but owing to perfect harmony of action between the British fleet and army, good progress was made. On July 30 Morro Castle was taken; and on August 13 the capitulation of the city and the surrender of the Spanish fleet were agreed upon and duly signed. Though the conquest was a valuable one, it was attended by great

loss of life. On July 3 no less than five thousand soldiers, or more than one-third the entire army, were sick with fever; and at the end of the campaign 2754 soldiers had died, of which number less than four hundred had been killed or had died of wounds.

Out of an army of thirty-two thousand soldiers sent to San Domingo by Napoleon at different times during the year 1802, "fifteen thousand men at least," says Thiers, "perished in two months." Yellow fever was the main, but not the sole, cause of this frightful mortality. Though great care was given to the sanitary condition of the camps, death swept away the soldiers with awful rapidity; even those who survived the diseases were for months afterwards so reduced in strength that they were utterly unfit for military duty.

COMMENTS

IN a war between the United States and Spain it was evident that the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico and their adjacent waters, on account of their proximity to the United States and their occupation by the military and naval forces of Spain, would become the principal theatres of operations. Inasmuch, however, as the overthrow of Spanish rule in Cuba was the main issue, and as it was the larger and wealthier of the two islands, and nearer

the United States, it followed that this island and its contiguous waters would most probably be the scene of the chief military and naval operations of the war.

The fact, too, that the Cuban people were engaged in insurrection against the Spanish government, made it easier for the United States to make a landing and gain a foothold in Cuba. But no considerable part of the United States army could be transported to the island with safety until the United States navy should obtain, at least for a time, command of the sea in Cuban waters. As both belligerents had respectable navies, not very unequal in fighting power, as will appear later, it seemed most probable that each navy would strive early in the struggle to cripple, defeat, or destroy the other.

It was evident, then, that the part which the land forces of the United States would take in the fight for the island would depend in great measure upon the outcome of the naval struggle. If Spain should be victorious, she would undoubtedly assert herself in Cuban waters and prevent American troops from landing on the island. If, on the other hand, the United States should be victorious, she could despatch her troops to the island for the purpose of entering upon a campaign against the Spanish troops there.

The most important strategical point of the island was Havana, the capital city. This city,

situated on a fortified harbour, connected by rail with Matanzas, Cardenas, and Sagua la Grande on the north coast, and with Cienfuegos on the south coast, was the chief seat of Spanish power in the West Indies. The presence of large numbers of Spanish troops at or near the capital indicated its importance, and its railroad connections added greatly to its strength. In order to cut off the commerce of the city it would be necessary to blockade not only Havana Harbour, but likewise the other points connected with it by rail. This would necessitate the division of the blockading forces into two fleets, — one to close the ports of Havana, Matanzas, Cardenas, and Sagua la Grande on the north coast, and the other to close the port of Cienfuegos on the south coast.

The knowledge derived from the histories of wars in the West Indies could not fail to be of inestimable value to any one responsible for the conduct of a campaign in Cuba. No matter what precautions were taken, it was plain that invading armies could not long keep their health in the island. As a rule, when an army landed, not much sickness developed before the end of the third or fourth week; then suddenly probably a quarter of the command would become ill and continue ill for several weeks, with new cases arising daily, until practically every soldier of the command had passed through a serious spell of sickness. Malarial fever, dysentery, and yellow fever were the

prevailing diseases; and at times, especially when the sanitary condition of the troops was bad, the mortality was appalling. When not fatal, so enervating were these tropical diseases that their victims would lose all ambition and energy; and upon convalescence many would be left in such a weak and emaciated condition that they were no longer fit to bear the hardships of an active campaign. In truth, it may be said without any disparagement of the well-known fighting qualities of the Spanish soldiers, that these diseases were more to be feared than the enemy's bullets.

Past experiences all indicated that the most favourable time for making war in Cuba was from October to June. A campaign begun in October, if prosecuted with vigour, might be decided before the arrival of the summer months, or might continue for nineteen months without passing through more than one rainy season. It was plain, too, that if it became necessary to begin military operations in Cuba during the rainy season, the decisive effort should be made before the fevers had weakened the fighting forces and destroyed the chances of victory.

CHAPTER IV

THE TWO NAVIES

AT the outset of the war it was evident that a large part of the fighting would take place on the sea, and that the result would depend in a great measure upon the relative naval strength of the two contending powers. A comparison of the two navies will therefore be instructive. A fairly correct estimate of their relative strength may be obtained by considering separately the different kinds of war vessels: first, the battleships and armoured cruisers; secondly, the monitors; thirdly, the protected cruisers; fourthly, the torpedo boats and torpedo-boat destroyers.

Modern armoured men-of-war comprise battleships and armoured cruisers. They are the fighters—the ships that bear the brunt of battle. Of these each power had seven. Those of the United States were the battleships *Iowa*, *Indiana*, *Massachusetts*, and *Oregon*; the armoured cruisers, *New York* and *Brooklyn*; and the second-class battleship *Texas*. Those of Spain were the battleship *Pelayo*, and the armoured cruisers, *Emperador Carlos V*, *Almirante Oquendo*, *Infanta Maria Teresa*, *Princesa de Asturias*, *Vizcaya*, and *Cristobal Colon*.

The following tables give the displacement, the speed per hour, and the principal armament¹ of each vessel.

UNITED STATES

BATTLESHIPS.			
Name of vessel.	Displacement (tons).	Speed ² (knots).	Armament (guns).
Iowa	11,340	16.5	18
Indiana	10,288	15.5	16
Massachusetts . . .	10,288	16.0	16
Oregon	10,288	16.5	16
ARMoured CRUISERS.			
Brooklyn	9,215	21	20
New York	8,200	21	18
BATTLESHIP, SECOND CLASS.			
Texas	6,315	17	8

¹ In the tables the guns of the main batteries only are given; the smaller guns, under three inches in calibre, are omitted.

² The speeds of the vessels are taken from Clowe's Naval Pocket Book of 1898. It says: "The speeds given are in most cases trial speeds, or, in the case of vessels not yet tried, estimated speeds. They are not, with very few exceptions, speeds which can be obtained under service conditions; and, as a rule, they may be thus discounted: Extreme service speed about seven-eighths of the speed indicated (and even this cannot generally be maintained for many hours); extreme speed for a continuance, without risk

SPAIN

BATTLESHIP.			
Name of vessel.	Displacement (tons).	Speed (knots).	Armament (guns).
Pelayo	9,900	16	13
ARMoured CRUISERS.			
Emperador Carlos V.	9,090	20	14
Almirante Oquendo .	7,000	20	12
Infanta Maria Teresa.	7,000	20	12
Princesa de Asturias.	7,000	20	12
Vizcaya	7,000	20	12
Cristobal Colon . .	6,840	20	14

It should be noted that the armoured cruiser *Princesa de Asturias* took no part in the war; in April she had not received even her boilers and engines, nor had the battleship *Pelayo* and the armoured cruisers, *Emperador Carlos V* and *Cris-*

to boilers or engines, about four-fifths of the speed indicated. Thus, the average so-called 21-knot ship may be regarded as good, provided that she be moderately clean, for a spurt, without serious risk of breaking down, at about 18.4 knots; and for a continuous chase, lasting several days, at about 16.8 knots. There are, of course, exceptions, particularly among new vessels, and vessels not fitted for forced draught; but the actually attainable speeds are more often than not rather under than over the proportions designated."

tobal Colon, received their entire armament at the outbreak of hostilities.

The monitors are light-draft turret vessels of low speed and scarcely any freeboard, with thick armour and large guns, and are designed for harbour and coast defence. Of this class the United States had six; Spain had none.

UNITED STATES

MONITORS.			
Name of vessel.	Displacement (tons).	Speed (knots).	Armament (guns).
Puritan	6,060	10	10
Monterey	4,084	12.5	4
Miantonomoh	3,990	10	4
Amphitrite	3,990	10	6
Monadnock	3,990	12.5	6
Terror	3,990	10	4

The *Monterey* and *Monadnock* took no part in the Santiago campaign. At the beginning of hostilities they were stationed on the Pacific coast, and shortly afterwards were sent to the Philippines.

The protected cruisers are the scouts, the eyes and ears of the navy. Of this class the United States had fourteen; Spain had only five that could be classed with them.

UNITED STATES

PROTECTED CRUISERS.			
Name of vessel.	Displacement (tons)	Speed (knots).	Armament (guns).
Columbia	7,375	23	11
Minneapolis	7,375	23	11
Olympia	5,870	21	14
Chicago	4,500	18	18
Baltimore	4,413	20	10
Philadelphia	4,324	19	12
San Francisco	4,098	19	12
Newark	4,098	19	12
Charleston	3,730	18	8
New Orleans	3,600	20	10
Cincinnati	3,213	19	11
Raleigh	3,213	19	11
Atlanta	3,000	15	8
Boston	3,000	15	8

SPAIN

PROTECTED CRUISERS.			
Name of vessel.	Displacement (tons).	Speed (knots).	Armament (guns).
Alfonso XIII	5,000	20	11
Lepanto	5,000	20	11
Reina Cristina . . .	3,090	17	6
Reina Mercedes . . .	3,090	17	6
Alfonso XII	3,090	17	6

In the United States navy there were fifteen torpedo boats; in the Spanish navy there were nineteen torpedo boats, ten torpedo gunboats, and six torpedo-boat destroyers.

Besides the warships and torpedo craft already enumerated, there were in the United States navy fifteen small cruisers, one large wooden cruiser, one despatch boat, thirteen single turreted monitors, sixteen gunboats, one harbour defence ram, and one dynamite gun vessel; and in the Spanish navy, two old armoured iron cruisers, two large wooden cruisers, eleven small cruisers, two despatch boats, six gun vessels, and twenty-three gunboats. Each belligerent also owned, chartered, or controlled a number of auxiliary cruisers, and numerous yachts, tugs, colliers, transports, and supply ships.

At the beginning of the war the personnel of the United States navy, including nearly four thousand naval militia that had been organized in the seaboard and lake States, numbered about nineteen thousand five hundred officers and men; and that of the Spanish navy about twenty-five thousand. But the American sailors, though outnumbered by those of Spain, were more thoroughly drilled in target practice and squadron manœuvres.

COMMENTS

BEFORE commenting upon the relative strength of the American and Spanish navies, it will not be

out of place to point out a few principles applicable to naval warfare.

All results in war are produced by the application of force; and the indispensable requisite for success is to be superior to the enemy at the point of contact in numbers, weapons, or position. The purpose of the science of war is to effect this superiority, which can be obtained only by concentration of forces. To concentrate one's forces and thus be superior to the enemy on the battlefield is the correct system on land or sea for winning victories. This principle, confined to no element, limited to no time, applicable everywhere and forever, is the foundation of all successful military operations.

If the war vessels of a navy were each to act independently, the enemy's fleet would be able to defeat and destroy separately each vessel encountered. Inasmuch, therefore, as good strategy always requires that the attacking force shall be stronger than the enemy on the battlefield, it has come to be the rule for the more powerful warships to manœuvre and fight in fleets. The less powerful generally act as scouts, singly or in pairs, or as commerce destroyers, or as auxiliaries to the main fleets. But though they are sometimes combined into a fleet to meet an opposing fleet composed practically of the same kind of vessels, yet they seldom play a determining part in a maritime war; the real power is centred in the fleets of

armoured warships that are built for defensive as well as offensive action. The object is so to combine and manœuvre these as to be stronger than the enemy when the battle hour arrives. This superior strength may consist in better armaments, as, for instance, in larger or better guns, or in heavier vessels and thicker armour, or in greater numbers.

The strength of a modern warship is in her guns, armour protection, and motive power. By means of her motive power she carries her guns to any part of the world. The motive power of a warship in the present age is self-contained; it resides in the fuel on board, which acts through the boilers and engines. This self-sustaining capacity of a warship to produce motion may be termed her *endurance*. It means the capacity of the ship for maintaining her motion by means of the fuel supplies carried or furnished. The *coal endurance* of a ship, as ordinarily understood, means her steaming radius, — the number of miles she would steam without recoaling. For different warships the coal endurance varies with the type, size, and individual peculiarities of each vessel; for monitors it is much smaller than for battleships; for battleships, generally smaller than for cruisers.

Inasmuch as the coal supply on board a ship is necessarily limited, her self-sustaining power to produce motion is also limited. In order, therefore, that ships or fleets may for an unlimited time

maintain their fighting power, fresh fuel supplies must be obtained from colliers or coaling stations. Hence is seen the importance of having coaling stations in different seas where fleets are intended to operate; or, in case no coaling stations exist, the importance of supplying the fleets by means of colliers sent out for that purpose.

In estimating the strength of a fleet the speed of the vessels composing it is a factor of prime importance; for the speed of a fleet as a whole is necessarily regulated by the speed of its slowest vessel. Thus, a fleet pursuing an enemy or fleeing from him faster than its slowest vessel destroys its unity for concentrated action and weakens considerably its fighting power. Hence it follows that if fleets are formed of vessels of varying speed, the speed of each in excess of the slowest is useless for unity of action; and consequently such a fleet has no greater military value than if each vessel composing it had no higher speed than the slowest. When practicable, therefore, fleets should as a rule be composed of vessels of nearly uniform speed. Slow-going monitors should not be combined with battleships or armoured cruisers, unless other conditions than those of utilizing the speed make such combinations temporarily necessary.

In the organization of battle fleets the principle of concentration might be carried too far, were it not for certain influences which constantly tend to limit the size of such fleets. As battle fleets

increase in size beyond a certain point, they become unwieldy and difficult to handle. Indeed, they may even become so large as to extend beyond the limits of command of one man. And, moreover, their increase in size nearly always results in a decrease in speed; for the more numerous the additions to a fleet, the greater the probability of slower vessels being among them. As on the land a fighting force of half a million or more men is divided into several armies that each may be better supplied and more easily manœuvred, and the whole be more effective, so on the sea, for like reasons, large navies are divided into several battle fleets. Another consideration, too, which necessitates a division of naval forces into fleets is the nature and extent of the country to be protected, and the number, situation, and importance of its colonial possessions. In a war, for instance, between the United States and a European power, it would be necessary for the United States to divide her naval forces; part would be needed to protect and defend the Philippines, while a much larger part would be needed for offensive and defensive purposes on the Atlantic coast. Again, the conditions of the coast defences of the United States and the distribution of the enemy's naval forces might be such that it would be necessary to divide the naval forces of the United States on the Atlantic coast into two or more fleets.

A comparison of navies is not generally an easy

matter, for the reason that each country classifies its warships according to its own methods, which are far from uniform and often very perplexing. And besides, another difficulty arises from there being so many different kinds of war vessels: vessels of steel and iron and wood; vessels with heavy armour and vessels without armour; vessels with large guns and vessels with small guns; vessels, too, of many sizes, from the gunboat of only one hundred tons' displacement, armed with a single machine gun, to the heavily armoured battleship of sixteen or eighteen thousand tons' displacement, armed with a dozen or more large guns of eight to thirteen-inch calibres.

But notwithstanding the difficulties of accurate classification and comparison, an examination of the data already set forth should give us a fairly correct idea of the powers and distinguishing peculiarities of the American and Spanish navies. By referring to the preceding tables it will be seen that the five American battleships and two armoured cruisers were apparently not unevenly matched by Spain's one battleship and six armoured cruisers. In tonnage and armaments the United States ships were somewhat superior; but six out of seven vessels in the Spanish battle fleet were much swifter than all but two of those of the United States. The latter, therefore, had the greater fighting power; the former the greater mobility. As to the monitors, and the dynamite

gunboat *Vesuvius*, Spain had no ships to compare with them. But her torpedo flotilla was greatly superior; she had nineteen torpedo boats, ten torpedo gunboats, and six torpedo-boat destroyers; and the United States had only fifteen torpedo boats.

By again referring to the tables it will be seen that the average trial speed of the American and Spanish armoured cruisers was 20.2 knots per hour, of the battleships 16.1 knots, and of the four monitors on the Atlantic coast 10 knots. But the speeds that must be taken into account in making or planning naval campaigns are not the trial speeds, but the uniform, sustained speeds that can be obtained under service conditions. Applying to the foregoing figures the rule given in the footnote on page 45 for determining the service speed, we obtain for the armoured cruisers an average service speed of 16.2 knots per hour, for the battleships 12.9 knots, and for the monitors 8 knots. In general these are the speeds that must be reckoned with; but at times even they are subject to a slight discount, for when the vessels of a fleet are not of uniform speed, the average service speed of the fleet would more properly be obtained by discounting the trial speed of the slowest vessel than by discounting the average trial speed of the fleet. Again, it may happen — in fact, often does happen — that some vessel of the fleet that cannot be left behind has so foul a bottom, or is injured in such a way, as to render its speed considerably

below the service speed of the slowest vessels. But for all practical purposes, bearing in mind that an exceptional circumstance may warrant a separate discussion and conclusion, these speeds may be taken as a correct basis for a comparison of the strategical and tactical manœuvres of these battle fleets.

In comparing the armoured fleets of the two belligerents, it will be observed that Spain had six fast armoured cruisers quite similar in armament and in nautical qualities and of uniform speed, and that the United States had but two of this class. This homogeneous group of six fast cruisers gave Spain a great advantage; or rather, would have given her a great advantage if they had all been in perfect condition, as they should have been, at the outbreak of hostilities. In order to bring a superior force against this fleet, the United States would have been obliged to unite all her armoured cruisers and battleships into a single fleet. As the *Oregon*, however, was not available for this purpose at the beginning of the war, the necessary superiority in fighting power could only have been supplied by adding monitors to the American fleet. But such a fleet of heterogeneous vessels would have been greatly handicapped. The swifter fleet would have had the choice of battle, and in a measure also the choice of the battlefield. Under these circumstances the Spanish commander would have been

able to fight or flee as the conditions seemed more or less propitious. Should he have chosen or been compelled to flee, only the armoured cruisers of the American fleet could have overtaken him, and he could then have turned upon them in the proportion of six to two. If, on the other hand, he should have been able to chase the American fleet, it could not have fled faster than the speed of its monitors without breaking up its unity as a fleet and subjecting its slower vessels to the danger of defeat in detail.

As to monitors, they are of little use in offensive war. Being of slow speed and having little coal endurance, and with their turrets awash even in a moderate ocean sea, their usefulness is confined almost exclusively to the defensive. They are intended for coast and harbour defence; diverting them from that object and making them a part of a battle fleet is merely a makeshift to supply the need of battleships or armoured cruisers. It is an attempt to bring a stronger force upon the battlefield at a great cost — an attempt to increase the fighting power of a fleet at the expense of its speed and mobility. "If you wish offensive war carried on vigorously upon the seas," says Captain Mahan, "rely exclusively upon ships that have the qualities of ships and not of floating batteries. We had in the recent hostilities twenty-six thousand tons of shipping sealed up in monitors, of comparatively recent construction, in the Atlantic

and Pacific. There was not an hour from first to last, I will venture to say, that we would not gladly have exchanged the whole six for two battleships of less aggregate displacement; and that although, from the weakness of the Spanish defences, we were able to hug pretty closely most parts of the Cuban coast. Had the Spanish guns at Santiago kept our fleet at a greater distance, we should have lamented still more bitterly the policy which gave us sluggish monitors for mobile battleships."

On the whole, then, taking into account displacement, speed, and armament, and the conditions of the two navies at the outbreak of the war, it would seem that the American navy was considerably better than the Spanish. But it is manifest that if Spain, before the outbreak of hostilities, had exercised a little more foresight and energy in the matter of armaments and drill and target practice, she could easily have had her armoured vessels and crews sufficiently well prepared to have had at least a good fighting chance against the navy of the United States. "The force of the Spanish Navy — on paper, as the expression goes — was so nearly equal to our own," says Captain Mahan, "that it was well within the limits of possibility that an unlucky incident — the loss, for example, of a battleship — might make the Spaniard decisively superior in nominal, or even in actual, available force. An excellent authority told the writer

that he considered that the loss of the *Maine* had changed the balance — that is, that whereas with the *Maine* our fleet had been slightly superior, so after her destruction the advantage, still nominal, was rather the other way. We had of course a well-founded confidence in the superior efficiency of our officers and men, and in the probable better condition of our ships and guns; but where so much is at stake as the result of a war, or even as the necessary prolongation of war, with its sufferings and anxieties, the only safe rule is to regard the apparent as the actual, until its reality has been tested."

CHAPTER V

THE SITUATION OF THE NAVAL FORCES AND THE OUTLOOK FROM A STRATEGICAL POINT OF VIEW¹

AS soon as war seemed probable the United States government selected the island of Key West, off the southern point of Florida, as a base of naval operations. Lying in the Gulf of Mexico opposite Havana and only ninety miles distant therefrom, it was admirably situated as a base of operations for a blockade of Cuba or an attack on the Cuban capital. Moreover, a fleet rendezvousing there was sufficiently near the gulf ports of the United States to shield them from attack.

At the outbreak of the war Acting Rear-Admiral William T. Sampson had under his command at Key West one of the most powerful fleets of war-ships that had ever floated in American waters. This fleet consisted of the armoured cruiser *New York*, the two battleships, *Iowa* and *Indiana*; the three monitors, *Amphitrite*, *Puritan*, and *Terror*; the four cruisers, *Cincinnati*, *Marblehead*, *Detroit*, and *Montgomery*; the six gunboats, *Wilmington*,

¹ See Map 2.

Nashville, Castine, Machias, Newport, and Helena; the despatch boat *Dolphin*; the converted yachts, *Eagle* and *Mayflower*; and the four torpedo boats, *Dupont, Foote, Porter, and Winslow*.

A second fleet, under the command of Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, was held in reserve at Hampton Roads, Virginia, for the purpose of giving a feeling of security to the people of the coast cities, of strengthening the incomplete coast defences of the Atlantic, and especially of meeting any move that might be made by the Spanish squadron lying at St. Vincent in the Cape Verde Islands. This fleet, known as the Flying Squadron, consisted of the armoured cruiser *Brooklyn*; the two battleships, *Massachusetts* and *Texas*; the two cruisers, *Columbia* and *Minneapolis*; and the collier *Merrimac*.


In addition to these two fleets a patrol squadron, commanded by Commodore John A. Howell, was hastily organized for the protection of the Atlantic coast cities northward from Hampton Roads. It consisted of the protected cruiser *San Francisco* and the four auxiliary cruisers, *Yankee, Dixie, Prairie, and Yosemite*.

The battleship *Oregon*, which was destined to play an important part in the war, must not be overlooked. She left San Francisco on March 19, 1898, *en route* for the West Indies by way of Cape Horn. After a remarkable voyage of fourteen thousand seven hundred miles, the greater part of

which was at high speed, she arrived off Jupiter Inlet, Florida, on May 24, in perfect condition.

The war vessels of Spain, not including those in the Philippines, were divided into two squadrons. The first, which remained in Spanish waters during the early part of the war, was commanded by Admiral Camara, and consisted of the battleship *Pelayo*; the armoured cruisers, *Emperador Carlos V* and *Princesa de Asturias*; the armed auxiliary cruisers, *Rapido* and *Patriota*; and a number of torpedo boats and torpedo-boat destroyers. The second, at the outbreak of the war, was at St. Vincent in the Cape Verde Islands, under the command of Admiral Pascual Cervera. The assembling of the second squadron had begun early in March, when the torpedo-boat destroyers, *Pluton*, *Furor*, and *Terror*, and a small flotilla of torpedo boats sailed from Cadiz to the Canary Islands, and thence on March 24 to St. Vincent in the Cape Verde Islands. At St. Vincent they were joined on April 14 by Admiral Cervera with the *Maria Teresa* and *Cristobal Colon* from Cadiz; and on April 19 by the *Viscaya* and *Almirante Oquendo* from Havana.

The war vessels of Cervera's squadron were not in first-class condition. Three of the cruisers had defective breech mechanism and poor ammunition for their five and a half inch guns; the *Colon* had never received her heavy guns; and the *Viscaya*, not having been recently docked and cleaned, was



far below her rated speed. Admiral Cervera had repeatedly reported the condition of his ships to the Spanish authorities; but nothing had been done to remedy the deficiencies. So convinced was he of what the result would be in an encounter with one or both of the powerful American fleets that he opposed the sending of his squadron to Cuba. He frankly declared that such an undertaking would be hazardous,—that it would probably result in his defeat, and perhaps in the bombardment of the home cities. As early as April 8 he wrote to his government as follows :

“ From the bulk of the telegrams received I think I see that the government persists in the idea of sending the flotilla to Cuba. That seems to me to be a very risky adventure which may cost us very dear ; for the loss of our flotilla and the defeat of our squadron in the Caribbean Sea may entail a great danger for the Canaries, and result, perhaps, in the bombardment of our coast cities. I do not mention the fate of the island of Cuba, because I have anticipated it long ago. I believe a naval defeat would only precipitate its ultimate loss, while if left to defend itself with its present means, perhaps it would give the Americans some annoyance.”

And on April 20 he suggested the plan of going to the Canaries, where he could protect these islands, and at the same time be in a position to hasten to the defence of the mother country, if the necessity should arise. The despatch setting forth this plan of operations was signed by Admiral

Cervera and all his captains. Nevertheless, the orders to sail for the West Indies were issued; and on April 22 Cervera, in acknowledging their receipt, wrote again as follows:

"It is impossible for me to give you an idea of the surprise and consternation experienced by all on the receipt of the order to sail. Indeed, that surprise is well justified, for nothing can be expected of this expedition except the total destruction of the fleet or its hasty and demoralized return; while if it should remain in Spain it might be the safeguard of the nation. . . . The *Colon* does not yet have her big guns, and I asked for the poor ones if there were no others. The 5.5-inch ammunition, with the exception of about three hundred rounds, is bad. The defective guns of the *Vizcaya* and *Oquendo* have not been changed. The cartridge cases of the *Colon* cannot be re-charged. We have not a single Bustamente torpedo. . . . But I will trouble you no more."

And on April 24 the Admiral wrote:

"I will try to sail to-morrow. As the act has been consummated I will not insist upon my opinion concerning it. May God grant that I be mistaken! . . . With a clear conscience I go to the sacrifice."

And Captain Villaamil, the second in command, who met shortly afterwards such an heroic death in the sea fight off Santiago, sent a private telegram to the Spanish premier, Sagasta, saying:

"In view of the importance to the country of the destination of this fleet, I deem it expedient that you

should know, through a friend that does not fear censure, that while as seamen we are all ready to meet an honourable death in the fulfilment of our duty, I think it undoubted that the sacrifice of these naval forces will be as certain as it will be fruitless and useless in terminating the war if the representations ¹ repeatedly made by the Admiral to the Minister of Marine are not taken into consideration."

COMMENTS

SINCE the navies of the United States and Spain were not so very unequal in fighting power, and each was divided into two fleets, it is evident that neither nation could have sent one of its fleets across the ocean without subjecting it to the danger of being attacked by the combined fleets of the adversary. As to the United States, she had no good reason at the beginning of hostilities for sending either of her fleets across the ocean, for an attack on Cuba offered a much better opportunity of injuring Spain. The proximity of the island to the naval base of operations at Key West, its wealth and importance, and its occupancy by a large Spanish army, made it, in fact, the natural objective of the naval as well as the military forces of the United States.

It was good strategy for the United States to attack Spain in Cuba, not only because the island

¹ For a further expression of the views of Admiral Cervera prior to the war, see Appendix O.

was the most vulnerable of the Spanish possessions, but because there was a strong probability that nearly all the armoured vessels of the American navy could be brought against any force sent thither by Spain. Thus, in following this plan, the strategical advantage of combination was with the United States. This was a great advantage, as it gave her the opportunity of crushing with superior forces any part of the Spanish navy sent into Cuban waters. Even had all the armoured vessels of Spain been sent to those waters, the opportunity of meeting them before they could have replenished their coal would still have been open to the United States.

On the other hand, had Spain elected to keep her fleet at home, and had the United States sent thither one of her fleets, the strategical advantage of combination would have been with Spain.

But under these or like conditions, the strategical advantage of combination is of little or no value to its possessor unless he has the ability to act with vigour and promptness in making use of the opportunities offered. By skilful combinations, by unforeseen circumstances, through the errors and perhaps the necessities of the enemy, through even the fortune of war, which sometimes favours the strong and sometimes the weak, the desired results may be reached. But so vast is the ocean, so numerous are the gulfs and bays and inlets of the sea, so strong are the fortified

harbours where fleets can obtain the protection of shore batteries, and so indeterminable are many of the factors of naval warfare, that the commander of the weaker naval force often has favourable chances for exercising his own skill and genius in thwarting the combinations of his more powerful adversary.

At the beginning of the war, pending the issue of the struggle for maritime supremacy, a blockade of the ports of Cuba offered the United States the best chance of injuring Spain. An effective blockade of the island would have destroyed its commerce, cut off the supplies and reinforcements of the Spanish army, and perhaps forced the Spanish navy to come to the relief of the blockaded ports. But as the United States navy was not sufficiently large to blockade effectively all the principal ports of the island, the best results could have been obtained by blockading Havana Harbour and the ports connected with it by rail. Even if the navy had been divided into two fleets for this purpose — one to blockade the ports of Havana, Matanzas, Cardenas, and Sagua la Grande, and the other the port of Cienfuegos — they would still have been sufficiently near each other to concentrate quickly for battle, should Cervera's squadron have appeared in Cuban waters.

With the armoured ships of the United States navy divided into two fleets as here suggested, and with a number of protected cruisers watching the

more distant ports of the island, and other swift cruisers acting as scouts on the lookout for the Spanish squadron, the situation would have been most favourable for decisive results. Thus situated, the United States navy could have cut off a large part of the commerce of the island and at the same time completely covered its base of operations at Key West. Thus situated, it could have inflicted great injury upon Spain without weakening its own power for future action, and yet have been ever ready to mass its warships for battle in an emergency. If the Spanish squadron had attempted to raise the blockade by advancing upon Cienfuegos, the fleet at Havana within thirty-six hours after receiving the news of such an attempt could have joined the fleet at Cienfuegos. If, on the other hand, the Spanish squadron had advanced upon Havana, the fleet at Cienfuegos could just as quickly have joined the one at Havana. Or, if either American fleet had been surprised and brought face to face with the enemy before the other could have united with it, it could either have fallen back upon the second fleet, or have fought with the assurance that the second fleet would join it in a few hours. In either case the chances were that if one of the American fleets had been defeated before the arrival of the other, the Spanish squadron would not have been in a condition, a few hours after the fight, even though victorious, to meet the second fleet successfully.

For the purpose of discussion the assumption has just been made that the Spanish squadron might have succeeded in surprising and attacking one of the American fleets before the other could unite with it. But this assumption is highly improbable, for the reason that the Spanish squadron, after crossing the Atlantic, would not have been in a condition to fight a battle successfully without first seeking some harbour near at hand where it could replenish its coal. And evidently the seeking for such a harbour would have soon become known to the American naval scouts, and been promptly communicated to the American fleets.

When maritime war between two belligerents cannot be brought to immediate issue, blockade is nearly always the first step taken for the mastery of the sea; and though it is often but a temporary expedient for bringing matters to an issue, it nearly always has a far-reaching effect upon the result of the campaign. And, moreover, there is much to be said in favour of this method of bringing pressure upon an adversary. "The stoppage of commerce, in whole or in part," says Captain Mahan, "exhausts without fighting. It compels peace without sacrificing life. It is the most scientific warfare, because the least sanguinary, and because, like the highest strategy, it is directed against the communications—the resources—not the persons of the enemy."

Thus far the discussion has been made from the point of view of doing the greatest injury to Spain. But there were other things that had to be considered, the chief of which were the safety of the coast cities of the Atlantic and the demand of the people of those cities for protection against a Spanish naval attack. Had the coast defences of the United States been completed and been occupied by sufficient coast artillery, all the armoured vessels of the United States could have been concentrated upon the western end of Cuba without endangering the safety of the chief seaboard cities of the Atlantic. The deficiencies in the coast armaments of the United States and the unreasonable clamour of the Atlantic seaport population for protection caused the armoured vessels of the United States to be divided into two fleets widely separated from each other. Thus the deficiencies in coast armaments neutralized for a time a large part of the United States naval forces. They were the means of keeping the Flying Squadron on the Atlantic coast, when, otherwise, its true position would have been to aid Admiral Sampson's fleet in the blockade of western Cuba. But it should be borne in mind that the protection of the Atlantic coast cities by the Flying Squadron was merely a temporary expedient. The important point to be determined was the destination of the Spanish naval forces; and this point was ever present in the minds of those who directed the

movements of the American fleets.¹ As long then as there seemed to be a probability that Cervera's fleet might strike at the Atlantic coast cities, there were some reasons — though in the opinion of the writer insufficient ones — for keeping the Flying Squadron in this position; but as soon as it was definitely determined that the destination of Cervera's squadron was the West Indies and not the coast cities, the strategical situation immediately demanded that the Flying Squadron should join Admiral Sampson's fleet, or, which practically amounted to the same thing, take position before Cienfuegos, where it could aid Admiral Sampson in blockading the western end of the island, and at the same time be ready to unite with him for the destruction of Admiral Cervera upon his arrival at any Spanish port in West Indian waters.

In view of these facts, what plan of operations was best for Spain to pursue? Had the Spanish navy been fully prepared for war; had it sailed boldly and rapidly for Porto Rico, made San Juan Harbour its base of operations, and used to advantage its superiority in torpedo boats and torpedo-boat destroyers, Spain certainly would have had

¹ In planning the naval strategy of the war, the President and Secretary of Navy were assisted by a naval war board. This board at first consisted of Theodore Roosevelt, Assistant Secretary of Navy; Montgomery Sicard, Rear-Admiral U. S. Navy; Albert S. Barker, Captain U. S. Navy; and A. S. Crowninshield, Captain U. S. Navy. In May Assistant Secretary Roosevelt and Captain Barker left the board, and Captain Alfred T. Mahan, U. S. Navy (retired), joined it.

a fair chance of victory. Had San Juan Harbour been properly supplied in advance with coal and provisions, it would have made a fairly good base of operations; and with the armoured vessels and torpedo craft of Spain concentrated there, the two fleets of the American navy would have been obliged to unite in order to meet them on anything like equal or superior terms. But inasmuch as the plan was to keep the Flying Squadron in the vicinity of Hampton Roads until the destination of the Spanish naval forces crossing the ocean was definitely ascertained not to be the Atlantic coast cities of the United States, there might have been offered the Spanish navy the opportunity of meeting the American fleets singly before they could have united. Again, inasmuch as the battleships, cruisers, and monitors of the United States navy were of such variable speed, the swift Spanish cruisers might possibly have sailed out of the harbour and met under most favourable conditions one or the other of the American fleets, while they were attempting to unite. In this connection it will be remembered that even the four armoured vessels of Cervera's squadron were, in the aggregate, superior in both speed and armament to the three armoured vessels of the Flying Squadron. Furthermore, Spain had a powerful weapon of destruction in her torpedo boats, and had she been able to use them to advantage, the results would most probably have been startling and tremendous.

It might seem that if this plan had been adopted, the coast of Spain would have been left unprotected; but such would not have been the case, for neither of the American fleets would have dared to cross the ocean so long as the Spanish navy remained undefeated in the vicinity of Porto Rico.

When two armies are manœuvring against each other's communications, it is a principle of strategy that the army whose communications are most easily threatened will abandon the initiative and conform to the movements of its adversary. This principle with slight modifications applies to naval warfare. On the sea the coast cities — the resources — take the place of the "communications" on the land. If, therefore, two navies are manœuvring against each other's coast cities, that navy whose coast cities are most immediately threatened will abandon the initiative and conform to the movement of its adversary. As a matter of fact, then, the mere presence of the Spanish naval forces in San Juan Harbour, menacing the coast cities of the United States, would have protected the coast cities of Spain from attack.

But however meritorious this plan seems to be, there would have been little or no use in attempting to follow it so long as several important vessels of the Spanish navy were lacking in munitions of war and deficient in armaments. War can never be carried on without taking great risks, even where the prospects for victory seem most encouraging;

but it would be the height of folly to adopt a plan of campaign and expect a favourable issue, when at the very outset the chances of success are clearly seen to be on the side of the adversary. The conditions being as they were, it is believed that the best plan of operations for Spain was the one pointed out by Admiral Cervera. It will be remembered that he advised sending his squadron to the Canary Islands. As these islands belonged to Spain and could have been easily supplied with coal and provisions, they would have afforded a secure and permanent base of operations. Such a base could not have been maintained in the Cape Verde Islands, where Cervera then was, because they belonged to Portugal. Stationed in the Canary Islands, his squadron would not only have been a constant menace to the Atlantic coast cities of the United States, and thus probably have prevented the Flying Squadron from leaving the vicinity of Hampton Roads to take part in the blockade of Cuba, but would also have been a protection to the coast cities of Spain, for no American naval commander would have been so unwise as to attempt an attack upon them without first defeating Admiral Cervera.

In deciding upon a plan of operations, the facts known to the Spanish authorities at the time should have received careful consideration. They knew that the Spanish navy was not properly prepared for war; that the armoured cruiser *Princesa de*

Asturias had not received her boilers and engines; that the battleship *Pelayo* and the armoured cruiser *Emperador Carlos V* had not received their entire armament; that even Cervera's squadron was not fully supplied with the necessary heavy guns, ammunition, and torpedoes; and that, owing to the foul bottom of the armoured cruiser *Vizcaya*, the speed of the squadron was far short of what it should have been.

On the other hand, they knew that Spain's regular army greatly outnumbered that of the United States; that there were under arms in Cuba and Porto Rico more than two hundred thousand Spanish soldiers, and that the total strength of the American army was only twenty-eight thousand.¹ It was apparent, too, that the United States would be compelled to organize and drill thousands of volunteers and transport them across an open sea at great risk—unless she could obtain and hold complete command of the sea in West Indian waters—before she could hope to make a successful invasion of Cuba or Porto Rico.

Clearly, then, in the face of these facts, Spain's best course in the beginning, until she could put her armoured vessels into proper condition, would have been to act strategically on the defensive—to leave her land forces in Cuba and Porto Rico to bear the brunt of the fighting in the earlier part

¹ See Appendix L.

of the war, and to take up a strong position with her navy, or the greater part of it, where she could protect her coast cities and at the same time threaten those of the enemy, and where she could have the strategical advantage of combination in case either American fleet crossed the ocean to attack her.

Furthermore, this plan would have offered Spain other advantages than those already mentioned. It would probably have enabled the first encounters of the war to take place on the land, where, at the beginning, Spain was strong and the United States weak. It would have given Spain time to equip properly and put in good fighting trim all, or nearly all, the armoured vessels of her navy. It would have allowed Cervera to sally forth with his swift cruisers at opportune times to threaten the coast cities of the United States, or to menace and perhaps destroy American transports bearing troops to Cuba. And, finally, it would have prevented the United States from obtaining unchallenged control of the sea without having first met and fought under disadvantageous conditions the Spanish naval forces in the Canaries; for an American fleet sent across the ocean would have had to run the risk of meeting superior forces, and of fighting far from its base of operations, with no coaling station near at hand.

It might seem that this plan would have precluded Spain from making any determined effort to

reënforce or supply the troops in Cuba, and offered practically no opposition to the blockade of the island. The reply is, that Cuba, already provided with as many troops as were necessary to hold the island, needed no reënforcements; that no plan which Spain could have adopted, under the existing conditions, would have been successful in raising, except temporarily, the blockade of western Cuba; and that all the vessels of the United States navy, had they been available for the purpose, could not have maintained against Cuba's long coast-line, with its numerous inlets, bays, and harbours, a close blockade. Consequently there would have been numerous opportunities offered for landing supplies, to say nothing of the favourable chances proffered for running the blockade. And besides, owing to the size of Cuba and the great fertility of its soil, there was, in truth, little or no danger of the Spanish soldiers suffering for the necessities of life.

It is nearly always good strategy not to do that which your enemy wishes you to do. But in this case Spain did the very thing which the naval authorities of the United States desired her to do. She despatched her most puissant fleet to the West Indies, and by so doing gave Admiral Sampson the opportunity of uniting both American fleets for its destruction.

That Spain should have insisted upon this course seems remarkable in the face of the fact

that Admiral Cervera and all his captains bitterly opposed it, and suggested instead the much better plan of taking up a position in the Canaries — in the face of the fact, too, that all these officers clearly pointed out that the sending of Cervera's squadron to the West Indies would surely result in its defeat and destruction, and that such destruction might endanger the Canaries, or even result in the bombardment of the home cities. Again and again did Admiral Cervera beg his government not to adopt this plan. Again and again did he call attention to the deficiencies and weaknesses of his squadron, and point out without fear or favour many unwelcome facts that must have pierced like daggers those responsible for the deplorable condition of the Spanish navy.

With prophetic vision this great man beheld the future. It was given him to see and foretell the end. And yet, with as brave a heart as ever beat in a human body this courageous sailor, this great soul, at the command of his superiors, pointed the prows of his vessels westward and sailed them unfalteringly to their doom. Fortunate is the country that is wise enough, when making war upon the sea, to adopt and follow the advice of its educated and trained naval officers. Spain was perishing for the want of a leader, yet she would not give heed to the wise counsels of one of her ablest, bravest, and most distinguished sons.

CHAPTER VI

THE RESOURCES, THE ARMIES, AND THE COAST DEFENCES¹

SPAIN'S population at the beginning of 1898 was estimated at eighteen million. Her manufactures were comparatively insignificant. Her government, burdened with debt, had scarcely any ready money and little credit. Indeed, her financial condition, compared with that of the United States, whose credit was unlimited and whose treasury was overflowing with gold and silver, was in itself a handicap that from the beginning almost predetermined the final result.

The strength of Spain's army as given in the "Anuario Militar de España" of 1898, including all regular and irregular troops, was 492,067² officers and men. There is good reason, however, for doubting the accuracy of these figures; they are probably about one hundred and fifty thousand in excess of the actual number. But, be that as it may, there were at the outbreak of the war one hundred and ninety-six thousand eight hundred

¹ See Maps 4 and 7.

² See Appendix K.

and twenty¹ trained Spanish soldiers on duty in Cuba, and about nine thousand in Porto Rico.

But at the time the American authorities did not know, even approximately, how many troops were in Cuba and Porto Rico. The number in Cuba was variously estimated by the commanding general, Major-General Nelson A. Miles, and others; but none of these estimates, it is believed, was equal to the actual number. On April 12 the Consul-General of Cuba, Fitzhugh Lee, testified before the Senate Committee of Foreign Affairs that there were probably ninety-seven or ninety-eight thousand Spanish soldiers then in the island, of whom only about fifty-five thousand were capable of bearing arms. General Miles estimated the number at one hundred and fifty thousand, which, though much nearer the truth, was still about forty-six thousand less than the actual number.

The Spanish soldiers in Cuba, having been engaged in war with the insurgents for three years, were acclimated, more or less experienced in campaigning, and well supplied with small arms and smokeless-powder cartridges. They were armed with the Mauser rifle, a modern, small calibre, magazine arm that had great range and penetrative power; but they were not, on the whole, good marksmen, for the reason that they had had scarcely any practice in target shooting.

¹ See Appendix A.

The city of Havana was strongly fortified¹ and well-defended; but little had been done towards

¹ Havana was fortified as follows :

1. Earthwork No. 1, about a mile and a half east of harbour entrance, sixty feet above sea level, armed with four Ordoñez 6-inch rifles, and two rapid-fire 2.3-inch guns.

2. Earthwork No. 2, about a mile east of harbour entrance, sixty feet above sea level, armed with two Krupp 12-inch rifles, four Ordoñez 8-inch rifles, and two rapid-fire 2.3-inch guns.

3. Velasco Battery, an earthwork just east of and a part of El Morro, one hundred and fifty feet above sea level, armed with three Krupp 11-inch guns, four Hontoria 4.7-inch guns, and one rapid-fire 2.3-inch gun.

4. El Morro, "Castillo del Morro," with water battery at its foot and flanking barbette batteries, situated on a projecting point at the east side of the harbour entrance, eighty-eight feet above sea level, armed with six 11-inch rifles, twelve 8-inch howitzers, and three 6-inch rifles.

5. La Cabaña, a large stone-bastioned work with both land and water front, in rear of El Morro and directly opposite the city, seventy-five feet above sea level, armed with fifteen 6.2-inch guns.

6. La Pastora, an old stone work lying south of El Morro near north end of La Cabaña, armed with twelve 8-inch howitzers.

7. San Diego, a small stone-bastioned work with only land fronts, on hill east of La Cabaña, one hundred and ninety feet above sea level, armed with four 6.2-inch rifles.

8. Atarés, a small stone-bastioned work on hill at southwestern extremity of Havana Bay, one hundred and eleven feet above sea level, armed with six 6.2-inch rifles.

9. La Fuerza, an old stone fort on west side of channel opposite south end of La Cabaña, fifteen feet above sea level, armed with four 11-inch rifles.

10. La Punta, a stone-bastioned work with a small detached work and batteries on west side of harbour entrance, twelve feet above sea level, armed with five 11-inch rifles, three 6.2-inch rifles, and five 6-inch rifles. Across the channel just in rear of this work were several lines of torpedoes.

11. La Reina, a stone work and battery on seashore about a mile west of harbour entrance, thirty feet above sea level, armed with seven 8-inch howitzers and three Hontoria 6.2-inch rifles.

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erecting modern fortifications for the defence of the other ports of Cuba, and practically nothing

12. Santa Clara, a small but powerful work of stone and earth, on seashore, about a mile and a half west of harbour entrance forty-four feet above sea level, armed with two Ordoñez 12-inch rifles, three Krupp 11-inch rifles, four 8-inch howitzers, two rapid-fire 2.3-inch guns, and four Gatling guns.

13. Earthwork No. 3, a seashore battery, about two miles west of harbour entrance, twenty feet above sea level, armed with four Ordoñez 8-inch howitzers.

14. Earthwork No. 4, a seashore battery just westward of Earthwork No. 3, twenty feet above sea level, armed with two Ordoñez 9.5-inch rifles, and two Ordoñez 6-inch rifles.

15. Earthwork No. 5, a battery lying between Earthwork No. 4 and Chorrera Bay, twenty-three feet above sea level, armed with three Hontoria 6.2-inch rifles, four Ordoñez 6-inch rifles, and two rapid-fire 2.3-inch guns.

16. El Principe, a stone-bastioned redoubt just west of city, one hundred and eighty-seven feet above sea level, armed with nine 6.2-inch rifles and four 6-inch mortars.


17. Las Animas, an incompleated redoubt on a hillock in valley between El Principe and Atarés, armed with three 6.2-inch rifles.

18. Auxiliary batteries along seashore; one between Earthwork No. 2 and Velasco, armed with three 6-inch howitzers; one to the left of Santa Clara, armed with six 4.7-inch rifles and four 6-inch howitzers; one to the left of Earthwork No. 3, armed with six 12.6-inch mortars; and one to the left of Earthwork No. 5, armed with six 3.5-inch rifles.

In these fortifications more than one hundred serviceable guns could be directed against a hostile fleet attacking the city.

This account does not include the two hundred or more pieces of obsolete and useless cannon at El Morro, La Cabaña, El Principe, and other places.

On the land side of Havana, in commanding positions, there were a large number of carefully prepared entrenchments. They extended in a sort of irregular way from La Cabaña to Cojimar Bay east of the city, and thence around the harbour past the towns of Guanabacoa and Puentes Grandes to Chorrera Bay on the west side of the city. There were in these entrenchments three 12.6-inch



had been done towards strengthening and arming with modern guns the massive stone forts that for generations had stood like sentinels at the mouths of a number of important harbours. Plans had from time to time been submitted for the defence of the principal seaports and harbours of the island; but as the appropriations for this purpose were limited, practically all of the work done was confined to the port of Havana. On November 2, 1895, Captain-General Martinez Campos, Commander-in-chief of the Spanish army in Cuba, appointed a commission of artillery and engineer officers to devise a system of fortifications for the ports of Matanzas, Cienfuegos, Santiago de Cuba, and Guantanamo. But neither the plans submitted by this commission, nor any of those previously submitted for the defence of these seaports, were ever carried into effect.

Although the population of the United States had increased from 38,558,371 in 1870 to about 73,000,000 in 1898, the regular army had actually decreased. An Act of Congress passed in 1870 limited the enlisted strength of the army to thirty thousand, and by a similar Act in 1874 it was further limited to twenty-five thousand, and thus mortars, five 10.6-inch mortars, three 6-inch rifles, and six rapid-fire 2.3-inch guns in addition to the field-pieces with the troops.

In the fortifications of the city there were 4406 soldiers; and in the entrenched positions east, south, and west of the city, there were 24,116 soldiers with one hundred and four pieces of field artillery in addition to a division of infantry numbering 31,479 soldiers with thirty pieces of field artillery.

remained until March 8, just preceding the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, when it was increased by two regiments of artillery composed of one hundred officers and sixteen hundred enlisted men. On April 1, 1898, the regular army consisted of 2143 officers and 26,040 enlisted men, or in round numbers twenty-eight thousand¹ officers and men.

For a third of a century after the great Civil War this little army had been struggling on in the face of many difficulties. After the surrender at Appomattox the people, both North and South, being tired of war, turned their attention and energies to industrial pursuits, and to the development of the great resources of the country, taking little interest in military matters and devoting no thought to preparation for future war. Even though the necessity for the reorganization of the army in accordance with modern military ideas had been repeatedly and persistently pointed out by all the commanding generals since the Civil War, and many other far-seeing and able officers, no legislation was obtainable for this purpose until the beginning of the war with Spain.

But in spite of this indifference on the part of the people and Congress, the officers of the army did not become discouraged. Their zeal still remained; and they were determined that the army should at any rate be well disciplined and highly

¹ See Appendix L.

trained. Accordingly, it was carefully and persistently drilled; and, as far as circumstances would permit, practised in field manœuvres and tactical problems, under conditions resembling as nearly as possible those of actual war. In the single matter of appropriations for target practice Congress had been liberal; and consequently for a number of years such close attention had been given to target shooting that this small body of regulars had become practically an army of marksmen. The majority of the officers, too, impelled by a sense of duty, and a love for their profession, had through hard work become highly proficient in their duties. In short, the army had reached such a state of discipline and general excellence that from the lowest private to the highest in command it was pervaded by the feeling that it would not falter or be defeated on a fair field.

But not only in the smallness of her army was the United States ill prepared for war; her coast defences also were inadequate, and only partly supplied with guns, ammunition, and men. And, besides, she had practically no munitions of war on hand with which to arm and equip any increase in her forces.

To meet the land forces of Spain upon anything like equal terms, it was necessary to create quickly a large army — to organize, muster in, equip, and mobilize thousands of volunteers, to complete and man the coast defences, and to provide by

manufacture and purchase the needful munitions of war.

On April 21 the American Minister at Madrid was given his passports by the Spanish government. Congress, regarding this action as equivalent to a declaration of war, on the following day authorized the President to increase temporarily the military establishment by a call for volunteers; and at the same time empowered the Secretary of War to recruit from the nation at large three volunteer cavalry regiments. Four days later, April 26, Congress added two companies to each regular regiment of infantry, and by authorizing additional enlistments increased the regular army to 62,597 men. And on May 11 Congress authorized the Secretary of War to organize a volunteer brigade of engineers, to consist of not more than three regiments aggregating not more than thirty-five hundred men; the same act also authorized the organization of an additional volunteer force of ten thousand enlisted men, who were to possess "immunity from diseases incident to tropical climates." Under the provisions of these acts of April 22 and 26, and May 11, the regular army was increased and the volunteer army organized.

In accordance with the Act of April 22, President McKinley, on the following day, two days after the beginning of the war, issued a call for one hundred and twenty-five thousand volunteers. These volunteers were apportioned among the States according

to population. The country's response to the President's call was spontaneous and enthusiastic. Immediately the War Department was overwhelmed by tenders of service from all parts of the country. Many more than the number called for offered themselves. Even many of the veterans of the Civil War who had fought with Lee and Grant, "smelling the battle afar off," insisted upon claiming the privilege of fighting side by side for the honour of their country.

On May 25 the President issued a call for seventy-five thousand more volunteers, which was responded to with no less alacrity than the first call had been. The question with the authorities was not what States would be able to supply their quotas, but how many of the thousands of men offering themselves could be accepted.

With the first call for volunteers the organization and equipment of the large army of 1898 began. The State volunteers were organized into regiments or parts of regiments under officers appointed by the governors of the several States. The United States volunteers were organized into sixteen regiments — ten of infantry, three of cavalry, and three of engineers — by officers appointed by the President. About the regular army as a nucleus this large volunteer force was formed, and by the officers of the regular army it was mustered in, equipped, and mobilized.

A complete system of fortifications for the coast

cities of the United States had been provided for by the Endicott Board of 1885. Congress had favoured the system, but had supported it so feebly with appropriations that very little progress had been made in the work. The undertaking required the expenditure of \$100,000,000 for the construction and emplacement of 2362 heavy guns and mortars. In thirteen years less than one quarter of the amount called for had been appropriated. On April 1, 1898, only one hundred and fifty-one guns were in position. The War Department, having frequently pointed out the necessity for pushing the work to a conclusion, and having spent judiciously the small amounts appropriated from time to time, could do no more. With the failure of Congress to supply the needful funds the work necessarily came to a standstill.

On March 9, when war seemed almost certain, Congress, realizing the deficiencies and inadequateness of the coast defences, passed an act placing at the President's immediate disposal \$50,000,000 "for national defence." Accordingly, allotments were at once made to the different departments of the army for the purpose of pushing forward this work as rapidly as possible.

The burden of this task naturally fell upon the Ordnance Department and the Engineer Corps; and they, with the coöperation of the Quartermaster Department, went to work with extraordinary energy to meet the emergency. In a short

time the harbours of the Atlantic coast were comparatively safe against attack, although many of the guns that had to be used as a temporary expedient were old, of multifarious patterns, and mounted on carriages of every variety and age. By April 21 a number of emplacements and carriages for the heavy modern guns already built but not yet mounted had been constructed, and the guns themselves put permanently or temporarily into position. And within a few days after the declaration of war, 1535 torpedoes and mines with the electrical appliances for their operation had been placed in various harbours.

But up to this time the preparation for war had been confined almost exclusively to coast defences, for the reason that the only appropriation made before the outbreak of hostilities was for national defence, and not available for offensive preparations. Accordingly, between March 9 and April 23, the War Department was practically unable to do anything in the way of ordering or purchasing clothing, tentage, and commissary stores, or of accumulating material and equipments, for offensive war.

Furthermore, the officers of the Quartermaster, Commissary, and Medical departments, as well as those of the other departments, were too limited in number to do the work necessary for such an enormous increase in the military establishment. On April 23 only twenty-two trained officers were

in the Commissary Department; only one hundred and seventy-nine were ready for duty in the Medical Department; and only fifty-seven were allowed by law in the Quartermaster Department. These officers had been sufficient for the needs of the small regular army, but now that war had come and an army ten times the size of the regular force was about to be organized, it was necessary to increase immediately the personnel of all the departments, in order that the work of mustering in, equipping, supplying, and mobilizing the volunteers might be carried on in a systematic and successful manner.

It is not the purpose in this history to go into the details of the organization, mustering in, equipment, and mobilization of this large army, but only in a general way to outline and point out what was done, by whom, and when. ° It will suffice to say that no sooner had the call for volunteers been made and the necessary means been provided by Congress for creating and equipping this large army than each head of department of the regular army went to work to do his part with determination, energy, and enthusiasm.

The heads of the departments were: Brigadier-General H. C. Corbin, Adjutant-General; Brigadier-General John M. Wilson, Chief of Engineers; Brigadier-General M. I. Ludington, Quartermaster-General; Brigadier-General George M. Sternberg, Surgeon-General; Brigadier-General G. Norman

Lieber, Judge Advocate-General; Brigadier-General Thaddeus H. Stanton, Paymaster-General; Brigadier-General D. W. Flagler, Chief of Ordnance; Brigadier-General A. W. Greely, Chief Signal-Officer; Brigadier-General Charles P. Egan, Commissary-General; and Colonel George H. Burton, Acting¹ Inspector-General.

William McKinley was President of the United States, General R. A. Alger, Secretary of War, and Major-General Nelson A. Miles, Commander of the Army. Under the immediate direction of the President and Secretary of War, the Adjutant-General, Brigadier-General H. C. Corbin, performed his duties. Besides keeping in touch with the different departments and issuing in the name of the President, Secretary of War, or Commanding General, the necessary orders, he had immediate charge of the mustering in and preliminary mobilization of the State volunteer troops, of the organization and mustering in of the sixteen regiments of United States volunteers, and of the expansion of the regular army.

There was much to be done. Approximately a quarter of a million men had to be organized, mustered in, equipped, and mobilized. Nearly everything had to be created. Clothing, tentage,

¹ The Inspector-General, Brigadier-General J. C. Breckenridge, having been commissioned a major-general of volunteers by the President, and the officer next in rank in the Inspector-General's Department, having been commissioned a brigadier-general of volunteers, neither served in that department during the war.

wagons, ambulances, harness — in fact, almost everything in the way of uniform and equipment — had to be contracted for and manufactured; cannon, small arms, cartridges, and other munitions of war had to be made, supplies of all kinds to be bought, and the transportation of troops on land and sea to be provided for.

In the matter of arms the War Department had on hand a sufficient number of Krag Jorgensen 30-calibre magazine rifles and carbines, including those already in use, to arm the increased regular army and about two thousand volunteers; but the greater part of the army, more than two hundred thousand volunteers, had to be furnished with the 45-calibre Springfield rifles. Of these weapons there were 265,895 on hand. But there was no smokeless powder for them, nor was any obtainable. Though the Springfield was a little out of date, it had been in its day an excellent military rifle. In range and penetration it was slightly inferior to the Krag Jorgensen; and, being of larger calibre, fewer cartridges could be carried by the soldier. But the most serious objection to the arm arose not so much from any inherent inferiority as from the lack of smokeless-powder cartridges. The Krag Jorgensen, like the Mauser, was a modern small calibre magazine rifle, whose bullet had great range and penetrative power. In construction the two arms were very similar, and in power nearly equal; but the Mauser, as it gave

a greater muzzle velocity to the bullet, was slightly superior.

° Even with the abundant means at the disposal of the War Department, after the call for volunteers had been made, there were a few articles in addition to Krag Jorgensen rifles and smokeless-powder cartridges that could not be obtained or manufactured fast enough to supply the demand. Wagons and ambulances and harness could not be purchased immediately in sufficient number; great difficulty was experienced in obtaining sufficient canvas to supply the army with tents; and no khaki cloth for uniforms was to be had in the United States. All this resulted, of course, in great inconvenience to the troops. The volunteers had to accept an inferior rifle and use black powder; a number of regiments could obtain no tents; the entire army was short of transportation; and many soldiers had to go to the tropics and fight in winter clothing. But by the most energetic efforts these articles were soon manufactured, and in a short time practically all the volunteers were fully supplied and equipped with everything needed, except modern magazine rifles and smokeless-powder cartridges. There were complaints, of course; some of them just, but most of them were about things that could not be helped; not a few were made by colonels, quartermasters, or commissary officers of volunteer regiments, who, having had little or no previous experiences in their

duties, did not know how to obtain the equipments and supplies needed for their commands. Some mistakes were made, some confusion resulted; a few of the subordinate, newly appointed officers of the departments were not equal to the emergency; but in the end the work of preparation was quickly and systematically done.

In five weeks practically all the volunteers of the first call had been mustered into the service. By the end of May 163,626 new men had been added to the army. On May 25, less than five weeks after the first call for troops, an expedition sailed to the Philippines. This was followed by a second expedition on June 15, and by a third on June 27 and 29. And on June 14, less than seven weeks from the first call, the Fifth Corps, numbering approximately seventeen thousand men, sailed from Tampa, Florida, to Santiago de Cuba. In August the organization, mustering in, mobilization, and equipment of 274,717 officers and men, had been completed.¹

COMMENTS

THOUGH plans for fortifying Santiago de Cuba had been submitted by a commission of able

¹ "The successful accomplishment of this undertaking in such a comparatively brief period is in itself the greatest tribute that could be paid to the officers of the regular army by whom the work was done."—General R. A. Alger, in "The Spanish-American War."

"The rapid mobilization of the army proved the wonder of mankind"—Henry Watterson, in "History of the Spanish-American War."

Spanish officers appointed two years and a half before the outbreak of the war, and though the necessity for fortifying the port was apparent, nothing was done. This neglect on the part of the Spanish government is most interestingly commented upon by Major Severo Gómez Núñez of the Spanish army in his book, "*La Guerra Hispano-Americana*, Santiago de Cuba." He says :

"All the studies made by artillerists and engineers before the war with regard to Santiago de Cuba prove to have been prophetic. The hard fought and most decisive battles took place on the very spots pointed out by them as positions to be defended.

"An examination of the ground with a view to planning the defence of Santiago would unhesitatingly fix upon Daiquiri as the point where an enemy would land; and the piers, magazines, shops, and equipage of every kind located there and belonging to powerful American companies who were working the mines of Vinent and Juragua, these connected, too, by railway with Santiago, would have to be destroyed at once should an enemy plan the taking of that city.

"The inference was so certain that the conclusion was reached to use that part of the defence as a base for the establishment of a fortified camp for the protection of Santiago on the land side.

"This conclusion once formed, the locating of positions was for the purpose of closing the approaches by Sevilla, Aguadores, Lagunas, and El Caney roads, and the Juragua railway, as these routes would certainly be utilized by an enemy advancing on the city. The military


cordon which surrounds it with the old forts attached, together with the central redoubt of the military camp, were regarded as within the city proper; whilst Dos Caminos, Quintero, El Sueño, San Juan, Caridad, and Las Cruces would be advanced positions for the building of redoubts, and El Caney, La Redonda, Sevilla, El Pozo would be detached forts furnished with field guns. The mineral regions would be occupied by mobile detachments provided with artillery, so that the enemy could not approach the inlets to Aguadores, Sardinero, Jutici, Siboney, Juragua, and Daiquiri, especially the harbour and piers of this last place.

“This plan would require cannon, many of them and good ones, and our country was at this critical moment lacking in them, and they were scarce at Santiago. Had those redoubts been armed with howitzers and siege guns, and had those field works been provided with light cannon, any attack by land on the part of the Americans would have been checked, just as the feeble coast batteries of Morro Castle and Socapa prevented the Yankee squadron from entering the harbour in spite of the many and powerful guns it carried.

“It is sad, it is grievous to have to record these things, and our pain is augmented when we see that the actual facts have given us no wisdom. When a plan of defence is once decided upon, because that plan, that work is essential, is useful for the prestige and security of the state and its aims, it ought to be completed rapidly, tirelessly, without regard to cost, in the firm belief that it is right and indispensable to the life of the nation. . . . Still looking, as we are, for military aggrandizement, the hard lesson of the past would naturally serve as a chastisement for negligence, and as a warning for the future.”

MAP 7.

THEATRE OF OPERATIONS OF THE CAMPAIGN OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA



Several months after the suspension of hostilities, the commanding general, Nelson A. Miles, in his annual report to the Secretary of War, said : “ The experience of the last few months, I trust, will be valuable to the people and government of the United States. The value of proper defences for our ports, harbors, and seaport cities of inestimable wealth, has been demonstrated ; and I trust that the system already adopted for coast defences, the completion of which has been so long delayed, may be carried out without unnecessary delay. I have urged the importance of this in my annual reports for the last thirteen years.”

Had the fortifications defending the coast cities and principal harbours of the United States been completed at the outbreak of the war, the military strength of the nation would have been much greater. The lack of adequate coast defences not only left many important seaports of the Atlantic unprotected, but made it necessary for the Flying Squadron to be held on the Atlantic coast for the purpose of defending these seaports in case of attack, when correct strategy required that both American squadrons should be united in Cuban waters, or at least be within supporting distance of each other. Thus the delay in completing the coast defences not only weakened the United States on land, but was a constant hindrance to the carrying out of correct strategical movements on the sea, — preventing that concentration of effort, that

exclusiveness of purpose, which lies at the foundation of all military and naval success. This division of the American navy might have led to far-reaching and disastrous results, for, if other conditions had been favourable, it would have afforded the Spanish navy an opportunity of bringing a superior force against one or the other of the American squadrons.

The appropriation of \$50,000,000 for national defence, made only a few weeks before the opening of hostilities, enabled the Ordnance Department and the Engineer Corps by great exertions to add enormously to the strength of the coast fortifications, though much of the work was necessarily hurried and temporary.

It was a fortunate circumstance that in the early stages of the war the Spanish navy was not sufficiently strong to attack some of the poorly protected coast cities of the United States. Had the war been with a naval power strong enough to make a successful attack against one or more of the principal American seaports, the importance of careful and timely preparation would have been brought home to the American people in a manner never to be forgotten. Though experience is a wise teacher, yet it does seem that a great nation of virile, strenuous, and intellectual people ought to be able thoroughly to appreciate the meaning of the old proverb, "In time of peace prepare for war," without waiting to have the lesson impressed upon them by the humiliating experience of having

one or more of their large seacoast cities captured, sacked, or destroyed. "Fools," said Bismarck, "say that you can only gain experience at your own expense, but I have always contrived to gain my experience at the expense of others."

Had the Act of Congress appropriating \$50,000,000 for national defence been so worded as to allow a part of the sum to be used for offensive purposes, much could have been done prior to the declaration of war towards preparing for the impending conflict. But, with the exception of pushing to completion such small contracts for the regular army as the law had already authorized, no provision whatever could be made for furnishing great quantities of small arms, ammunition, harness, wagons, ambulances, tentage, clothing, and subsistence that became necessary as soon as war was declared. Though the entire nation and every representative in Congress felt that war was inevitable and would shortly come, though more than two hundred thousand trained Spanish soldiers were within a few hours' sail of the American shores, the great supply departments of the War Department had to waste many precious days—had to mark time, as it were, from the blowing up of the *Maine* on February 15 until the first call for volunteers on April 23.

When it is remembered that Cuba lies within one hundred and fifty miles of the coast of southern Florida, that one hundred and ninety-six thousand

Spanish troops were in the island at the beginning of the war, and only twenty-eight thousand American troops in the United States, and that Spain's navy was not greatly inferior to that of the United States in fighting power, and even superior to it in some respects, one can readily appreciate how serious the situation might have been, if the fortune of war in the earlier stages of hostilities had been favourable to Spain on the sea.

Let us suppose that by more skilful combinations on the sea, or the utilization of her superiority in torpedo boats and torpedo-boat destroyers, or through some fortuitous disaster to the American navy, Spain had at the start, or early in the struggle, gained control of the sea in Cuban waters, is it not possible that she might have then attempted, with some hope of success, an invasion of the United States with the troops occupying Cuba? Though, as a matter of course, owing to the great resources of the United States and the large number of volunteers that would in a few months have been ready for active duty, the Spanish forces would undoubtedly have been finally conquered or destroyed, nevertheless, with the United States officials ignorant as to where the Spanish troops would land, and having only the small regular army to meet them, and it scattered, or at least not concentrated at the landing place, is it not probable that Spain could have landed troops and possibly have captured some large seaport or important harbour?

It is never wise to underrate the fighting power of an adversary. Though the Spaniards are not given to making invasions and pushing with vigour offensive operations against an enemy, yet it is well to remember that they are, and have ever been, an extraordinarily brave people. Had they once made a landing and gained a foothold in the United States, they doubtless could not have been expelled without desperate fighting and much bloodshed. At El Caney, where they occupied a stone fort and a strong defensive position, they were defeated by the Americans; but not until forty-nine per cent of them had been killed or wounded in one of the most desperate struggles mentioned in history. In this battle the Spaniards numbered five hundred and twenty; the Americans, more than six thousand.

It has already been pointed out that prior to the declaration of war nothing was done by Congress in the way of reorganizing and increasing the regular forces, except the passing of an act adding to the regular establishment two artillery regiments. Had an act been passed prior to the destruction of the *Maine*, or immediately afterwards, similar to the one that has since passed and is now the law, reorganizing and augmenting the regular army, and allowing the President in an emergency to increase it from a peace footing of 59,657 enlisted men to a war footing of 100,000, the United States would have been in much better

condition to meet the situation at the outbreak of hostilities.

There was no good reason why the United States should not have been better prepared for war. The emergency did not suddenly arise. The coming conflict could be foreseen by all. For months prior to the destruction of the *Maine*, war with Spain was very probable; after that act, it was almost inevitable.

Looking at the situation from the point of view of ordinary precaution, we are not putting the matter too strongly to say that at least one hundred thousand trained troops were needed at the beginning of the war to meet with fair chances of success emergencies that might arise, while the volunteers were being enlisted and properly trained.

It is true that 14,350¹ regulars sailed to Cuba in General Shafter's expedition, and that they, with the small number of volunteers accompanying them, were sufficient to defeat the Spaniards in the critical and important battles of El Caney and San Juan. But it should be remembered that there were 196,820 Spanish soldiers in Cuba, of whom 36,582² were in the province of Santiago, 9430

¹ The strength of General Shafter's expedition, as given in his official report, was 16,887 officers and men. Only three volunteer regiments sailed with him, — 1st U. S. Volunteer Cavalry, 2d Mass. Volunteer Infantry, 71st N. Y. Volunteer Infantry. Their strength as given in return of June 20, made on board the transport, was 2537 officers and men.

² See Appendix F.

in and about Santiago and its harbour, not to mention 2666 occupying several inland towns within a few miles of Santiago, and 1000 marines in the city. Under these circumstances it was natural to suppose that General Shafter would have to meet superior forces on the battlefield. There was every reason to believe that the Spanish commander at Santiago, General Arsenio Linares, upon learning of the destination of General Shafter's expedition, would attempt immediately to concentrate¹ at Santiago a large proportion of the Spanish troops of the province for the purpose of crushing the American army. But only a small effort of this kind was made. Indeed, the most marvellous incompetency in strategy and generalship was everywhere manifested by the Spanish commander. If, then, it is argued that results prove that a larger number of trained American

¹ Referring to this matter, the "Revue Militaire" for January, 1900, said: "It is true that almost all the eastern part of Cuba was in possession of the insurgents, and that movements of troops were difficult because of lack of communications, but notwithstanding all this, it was possible to make a concentration of large numbers of troops that were scattered throughout the province; the success of Escario's column, which left Manzanillo and entered the evening before the city was invested by the Americans, demonstrates this. There were six thousand men in Guantanamo, twelve thousand in Holguin, and six thousand in Manzanillo; but all these forces remained inactive, and Lieutenant-General Linares, Governor of Santiago, had only the troops that formed the garrison of the city for its defence. Even these were scattered until the last moment among the widely separated positions that they occupied, and the only object of which was to hold the insurgent bands at a distance."

troops were not needed, the reply is that under ordinary circumstances, under usual strategical conditions, success would have been impossible without them.

Anticipating somewhat the history of these events, we may here point out that only about seventeen hundred Spanish soldiers and sailors were actually engaged on the fighting line in the battles of El Caney and San Juan on July 1, while General Shafter, out of a total force of 18,218¹ officers and men equipped and present for duty, brought upon these two battlefields 15,065. And even with these odds in favour of the Americans the strongly entrenched forts and defensive positions of the Spaniards made the American victory a dearly bought one. What would have been the result had the Spanish commander brought upon the battlefields of El Caney and San Juan as large a percentage of his total forces at Santiago as the American commander did of his forces? What would have been the result had he gone a step farther and concentrated at Santiago a large proportion of the Spanish troops of the province and overwhelmingly outnumbered the Americans? Thousands of Spanish soldiers as brave as the bravest were in the province, but they had no leader worthy of the name. "Of what avail are men," says Carlyle, "when we must needs have a man?"

¹ See Appendix R.

That the Spanish commander should not have brought on these two battlefields an aggregate force of soldiers numbering more than one to every hundred in the island seems marvellous. That General Shafter's small army should not, under so many unfavourable conditions, have been defeated, crushed, captured, or annihilated, seems hardly short of the miraculous. When it is remembered that in this campaign the United States won a glorious victory far-reaching in its results, in spite of a lack of proper and timely preparation, in spite of the small size of the invading army and the overwhelming numbers of the enemy, in spite of the tropical rains, the withering heat, the deadly fevers, and the desperate resistance offered by the Spaniards on the battlefield, one is almost tempted to exclaim with Bismarck that "God always looks after the fools and — and the United States."

Had General Shafter's army been destroyed, the United States would have had remaining only a handful of trained soldiers with which to prosecute the war in Cuba. Out of twenty-five regiments of infantry in the regular army, eighteen had sailed in General Shafter's expedition. Out of ten regiments of cavalry the greater part of six had sailed; and out of seven regiments of artillery, two of which had not yet been organized, the batteries of three had sailed. And, besides, the greater part of three regiments of regular infantry and four batteries of regular artillery had sailed to the Philippines.

It can be readily seen that with the regular forces practically eliminated, the prosecution of the campaign in Cuba to a successful termination would have cost the American people a frightful amount of blood and treasure. Undoubtedly the volunteers would in time have conquered the Spaniards in the island; but having been only recently organized, and having had no experience in campaigning, no instruction in how to care for themselves in the tropics, no practice in target shooting, and few opportunities for acquiring proficiency in drill and military manœuvres, they would not have been in proper condition to begin a campaign until Autumn, and even then they would have had to undergo many hardships, suffer great mortality, perhaps a number of defeats, in acquiring that discipline and proficiency necessary to win victories against trained troops.

In this connection it may be noted that soldiers cannot be made in a day, and that their training is more important now than ever before. In these days, when the weapons used in war are constantly changing and steadily increasing in effectiveness, the efficiency of a soldier is measured, not by his bravery, for nearly all men are brave, but by his military education and training. Especially must the soldier of to-day be instructed in target shooting. He must not only be taught to shoot, but to shoot accurately, and this proficiency cannot be acquired without painstaking care and persistent

practice. If with his rifle the soldier can hit his man at six or eight hundred, or a thousand yards, he becomes a power on the battlefield and is worth more than a dozen untrained men.

The Act of Congress of April 26 increasing the regular army temporarily to 62,597 men had the effect of practically doubling the enlisted strength of the regular forces; but as the Act was not passed until five days after the beginning of the war, the additional men authorized therein could not be got into shape in time to take part¹ in the earlier operations. Had the Act been passed two months earlier, much could have been done towards training and instructing these recruits previous to the sailing of General Shafter's expedition.

But though the increase of the regular army at the last moment added practically nothing to its strength in the active operations about to be entered upon, there was not in the entire army a single regiment, battalion, squadron, or company, nor a single officer, that was not eager to go to the front and take part in the earliest fighting. Many of the officers knew that the outlook was unfavourable, that the chances of success were doubtful.

¹ "The regular regiments went to Santiago with very few recruits received under the Act of April 26. The Second Infantry was an exception. That regiment had about two hundred of such recruits. I think no other regiment had any considerable number. The regimental commanders generally expressed themselves as not desiring to take recruits recently received, because of non-instruction and lack of equipment." — Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. McClernand, U. S. Army, in personal letter to the author.

Many of them knew that suffering and fever and death were in their pathway; but whatever difficulties and hardships had to be met, however fierce the fighting might be, there was ever present in that little band of brave men the feeling that they would give an account of themselves worthy the praise of the American people.

But after the passage of the Act of Congress declaring war, authorizing the calling forth of the volunteers, and increasing the regular army, there was no further delay. From that time on the work of putting the military forces of the United States into condition for active operations was pushed with the utmost energy.

At the outbreak of the war the first call for troops was made by the President on April 23, the second call on May 25; and by the end of May the records show that 163,626 enlisted men had been mustered into the service. At the beginning of the Civil War in 1861, the first call for volunteers was made by the President on April 15, the second call on May 3; and by the end of May only 16,161 enlisted men had been mustered into the service. In August, 1898, the military forces of the United States numbered 274,717 officers and men; in the Civil War that number was not reached until November, 1861.

The accomplishment of this great undertaking in so short a time, under such adverse circumstances, was due to the efficient heads of bureaus

of the War Department and their assistants, and to the line officers of the United States army, and especially was it due to the efficient Secretary of War, General R. A. Alger, and the able Adjutant-General of the Army, Brigadier-General H. C. Corbin, the greatest executive staff officer this country has ever known. Through their intelligence, patriotism, zeal, and ceaseless toil, this great army was speedily mustered in, equipped, and mobilized. Fortunate is the nation that can always in time of peril command the services of as able and highly trained officers as were those of the United States army at the beginning of the Spanish-American War.

CHAPTER VII

THE SITUATION OF THE MILITARY FORCES, THE PLANS OF CAMPAIGN, AND THE OUTLOOK FROM A STRATEGICAL POINT OF VIEW

ON April 1, 1898, the 28,183 officers and men composing the regular army of the United States were on garrison duty at the ninety-two military posts, East, West, North, and South throughout the country. Not more than a few hundred men were stationed at any one of these posts; indeed, since the Civil War only a few regiments had had, even for a short time, all their companies united.

On April 15 such of the regiments as could be spared from their stations were sent to New Orleans, Mobile, and Tampa, preparatory to an invasion of Cuba; but before this plan was fully carried into effect the military authorities determined to establish at Chickamauga Park, Georgia, a camp, to be known as Camp George H. Thomas, for the mobilization and instruction of the United States forces. Here, during the latter part of April and the early part of May, a large proportion of the regular army and a number of volunteer regiments were assembled. Later, for a like

purpose, Camp Alger, named in honour of the Secretary of War, was established at Falls Church, Virginia, near Washington. From Camp Thomas and other points troops were soon hurriedly pushed forward to Tampa, Jacksonville, and Fernandina, in Florida, with a view of having them near at hand and ready for an immediate movement on Cuba.

The purpose was to organize the regulars and volunteers into eight corps; and though, owing to the short duration of the war, this purpose was not entirely carried out, it was well along towards completion by the middle of the Summer. Each of these eight corps was to consist, as far as practicable, of three divisions; each division, of three brigades; each brigade, of three regiments. The corps were commanded by the following officers and were mobilized at the following places:

The First Army Corps, Major-General John R. Brooke, Camp George H. Thomas, Chickamauga Park, Georgia; the Second Army Corps, Major-General William M. Graham, Camp Alger, Falls Church, Virginia; the Third Army Corps, Major-General James S. Wade, Camp George H. Thomas, Georgia; the Fourth Army Corps, Major-General John J. Coppinger, Mobile, Alabama (this corps was subsequently sent to Tampa and Fernandina, Florida, and then to Huntsville, Alabama); the Fifth Army Corps, Major-General William R. Shafter, Tampa, Florida (this corps was sent to

Santiago de Cuba); the Sixth Army Corps, Major-General James H. Wilson, Camp George H. Thomas, Georgia (the organization of this corps was not completed); the Seventh Army Corps, Major-General Fitzhugh Lee, Tampa, Florida (this corps was subsequently sent to Jacksonville, Florida); the Eighth Army Corps, Major-General Wesley Merritt, San Francisco, California (this corps was sent to Manila, Philippine Islands).

Most of the regiments of the regular army that could be spared from their stations were finally concentrated at Tampa, and, with a few volunteer regiments, were organized into the Fifth Corps.

In addition to these eight corps, about twelve thousand volunteers were distributed along the seacoast from New Jersey to Maine; five regiments of United States volunteers were stationed at different points in the South; and one regiment of regular infantry, three of cavalry, and the greater part of the artillery, were left at the various army posts and seacoast forts of the United States.

Of the 274,717 officers and men in the American army in August, 1898, there had sailed to Manila 10,934, leaving 263,783, the greater part of whom, had they been needed, would have been available in the Autumn for active operations against Spain.

At the outbreak of the war there were in the West Indies about two hundred and five thousand

eight hundred and twenty Spanish soldiers, of whom one hundred and ninety-six thousand eight hundred and twenty were in Cuba, and about nine thousand in Porto Rico. Of those in Cuba 160,238 were widely distributed throughout the western and central provinces of the island, principally in and about Havana, Matanzas, Cardenas, and Cienfuegos, and on or near the railroads connecting these seaports; the remainder, numbering 36,582,¹ were widely scattered throughout the province of Santiago in the eastern part of the island.

As the rainy season in Cuba was near at hand and would probably last until October or November, the officials of the War Department believed that the wisest course would be to devote the Summer to organizing, equipping, and drilling the volunteers, and to defer the principal campaign against the Spaniards until Autumn, but in the meantime to keep the regulars at Tampa in a state of readiness for making into Cuba or Porto Rico any harassing incursions which might seem practicable, or which the march of events might seem to justify.

On the other hand, the Spaniards in Cuba had formulated no plans for a land campaign; nor had they made any special effort to concentrate their forces at or near the principal seaports of the island. They were awaiting events. They believed, however, that if an invasion were attempted,

¹ See Appendix F.

it would most probably be made in the vicinity of Havana; and as the city was strongly fortified, and a large number of troops were there, or within easy reach, they felt great confidence in their ability to defeat such a movement.

No sooner had war been declared than the officials of the War Department of the United States decided to send to Cuba an expedition composed of about five thousand of the regular troops encamped at Tampa. Major-General William R. Shafter, United States Volunteers, a brigadier-general in the regular army, who had gained in the Civil War a solid reputation as a hard fighter, was placed in command. This expedition was not intended as an extensive movement against the Spaniards in Cuba, but merely as a reconnoissance in force, for the purpose of gaining information, and furnishing supplies, arms, and ammunition to the insurgents. The expedition was to sail under convoy of the navy, and to make the first landing on the south coast of Cuba, where it was expected that General Shafter would be able to communicate with General Maximo Gomez, the Commander-in-chief of the Cuban insurgents, and supply him with arms, ammunition, and food. Having accomplished this object, General Shafter was to reëmbark his troops and proceed to the northwest coast of Cuba for the purpose of furnishing supplies and arms to the insurgents in that vicinity, unless the arrival of the Spanish squadron

should, in the meantime, render this movement hazardous; in which case the expedition was to return to the United States.

On April 29 orders were issued for this movement, but as information was received on the 30th that Cervera's squadron had sailed westward from Cape Verde Islands on the previous day, the Navy Department officials felt that ships could not then wisely be spared to convoy the expedition. Orders were therefore sent General Shafter to delay the movement. He was directed, however, to make inquiries with a view of learning whether it would be practicable, notwithstanding the probable approach of Cervera's squadron, for an expedition of six or seven thousand men to be convoyed to the vicinity of Mariel, on the northwest coast of Cuba.

This latter movement was pronounced feasible by Commodore Watson in command at Key West. Accordingly General Shafter, after some correspondence with the War Department, received orders on May 9 to transport the troops originally intended for the reconnoissance on the south coast of Cuba to the vicinity of Mariel, or some other important point on the north coast. He was expected to land, take up a strong defensive position, and occupy sufficient territory to give room for large reënforcements. The purpose was to form a nucleus with the troops first landed, and then to reënforce them as rapidly as possible by sending

forward the remaining available regular regiments, and the volunteers as fast as they could be made ready for active service, until there should be a sufficient force to undertake a campaign against Havana. But when it became known on the 10th that no convoy could be obtained for several days, the orders of the 9th were temporarily suspended; and at the same time instructions were given to send about twelve thousand of the infantry at Tampa to Key West, with a view of having them convoyed to Cuba at a later date. But on account of an insufficient water supply at Key West, this plan had also to be abandoned. Meanwhile, positive information having been received that Cervera's squadron had arrived off Martinique, West India Islands, on May 11, it became impracticable to carry out any of these plans for transporting troops to Cuba until the Spanish squadron should be met and vanquished.

But though the plans for an attack on Havana were on this account postponed, the organization of an invading army at Tampa was pushed as rapidly as possible. While the War Department was collecting a fleet of transports at that port during the latter part of May, word was received that Cervera's squadron had entered Santiago Harbour on May 19. Although at the time there was some little doubt as to the correctness of this information, General Shafter was ordered on May 26 to be prepared to place his troops on the

transports with the view of sailing to Santiago de Cuba.

Meanwhile, numerous conferences were held in Washington by the President with the Secretary of War, other members of the Cabinet, and General Miles, for the purpose of considering plans of campaign. As a result of these conferences, General Miles, having been directed to formulate a plan of operations, submitted the following:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D.C., May 26, 1898.

THE HONORABLE THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

SIR, . . . As you are aware, the available force of the regular army, numbering some seventeen thousand men, has been ready for the field from the day that the government decided to take war measures against the Spanish government, and, as it will be remembered, my first purpose was to form a junction with Gomez's troops on the south coast of Cuba, in Santa Clara Province. This movement was delayed, as the navy reported that it could not well furnish the convoys and desired all of their available ships to meet the Spanish fleet. When it was reported that the Spanish fleet had returned to Cadiz, transports were gathered in the Gulf to move a portion of the army to Cuba, and are now in readiness for that purpose.

In view of the fact that the volunteer army is neither equipped nor instructed, nor even supplied with ammunition sufficient to fight a battle, I deem it advisable to suggest the use of the available force now on the Gulf in the following manner:

According to all accounts, the Spanish fleet is divided,

a small portion being in Cuban waters and the remainder at Cadiz on the coast of Spain. If the ships and torpedo boats under the command of Admiral Cervera have been enclosed in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, I suggest that the military forces go at once to the assistance of the navy, and by landing fifteen miles east of Santiago de Cuba, at Daiquiri, move over the low mountains towards Santiago de Cuba, where, by placing the artillery in position, they can command the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, and with field and siege guns would be able to destroy the fleet by a plunging fire, or at least assist our navy in entering the harbor, thereby destroying or capturing the Spanish fleet as well as the garrison occupying that vicinity. We can also communicate with General Garcia, who has eight thousand men in Santiago de Cuba Province, which would assist in the capture of the garrison. This might be considered the first movement.

Second, if it should be found, before the above movements could be accomplished, that the Spanish fleet had escaped from Santiago de Cuba or shall have been captured by our fleet, it would be well, in my judgment, to capture the island of Porto Rico by a combined attack of the army and navy with the least possible delay. Twenty-five thousand men of the army, principally artillery and infantry, with the assistance of the fleet, will, in my judgment, be sufficient to capture that island. . . .

Of course our ships, which are necessary to accomplish the object specified, should at all times have the safe conveyance of the ships of the navy.

Very respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,

Major-General, Commanding.

And on the next day he again wrote the Secretary of War:

“Referring to my letter ¹ of yesterday and to our consultation since, I desire to submit the following:

“As we are now about to inaugurate active military operations in conjunction with the navy, I think it would be advisable to load the transports at Tampa with a strong force of infantry and artillery, move them to Key West, and thence along the northern coast of Cuba, where they would have the full protection of Admiral Sampson’s fleet until they reach Admiral Schley’s fleet at Santiago de Cuba, and then, by a combined effort of the army and navy, capture the harbor, garrison, and possibly the Spanish fleet at that point.

“If, before reaching Admiral Schley’s fleet, it shall be found that he has already accomplished the above object or that the Spanish fleet shall have escaped, I then urge the importance of a combined attack of the army and navy upon Porto Rico. We will be able to land a superior force, and I believe that a combined effort will result in capturing the island, with its garrison, provided it is done before it can be reënforced from Spain. The distance from Key West to Porto Rico is ten hundred and forty miles, and from Cadiz, Spain, to Porto Rico, it is four thousand miles. The possession of Porto Rico would be of great advantage to the military, as it would cripple the forces of Spain, giving us several thousand prisoners. It could be well fortified, the harbor mined, and would be a

¹ In these letters General Miles also submitted further plans; but as they had no immediate bearing upon the campaign, and were not to be carried out until the movement upon either Santiago de Cuba or Porto Rico was accomplished, they are omitted here.

most excellent port for our navy, which could be relieved from any responsibility in the charge of that port, as we could have a sufficient garrison to hold it against any force that might be sent against it."

On May 29 General Shafter was ordered to place his troops on board the transports, and on May 30 and 31 he received the following telegraphic orders:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D.C., May 30, 1898.

MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM R. SHAFTER, Tampa, Florida.

Referring to my telegram of last night, Admiral Schley reports that two cruisers and two torpedo boats have been seen in the harbor of Santiago. Go with your force to capture garrison at Santiago and assist in capturing harbor and fleet. Load your transports with effective force of infantry and artillery, both regular, and mortars and two or three field batteries. You can take any dismounted cavalry you desire. Limit the animals to the least number required for artillery and transportation, as it is not expected that you will go but a short distance inland. Your troops should have five hundred rounds of ammunition per man if possible, two months' supplies, and in addition you can load supplies to last six months. If practicable, take five thousand rifles with ammunition for insurgents. You can organize your command under Generals Arnold, Burt, Hawkins, Kent, Henry, Lawton, and Chaffee. Have your command embark as rapidly as possible, and telegraph when your expedition will be ready to sail. I leave for Tampa to-night.

MILES,
Major-General, Commanding.

WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON,

May 31, 1898—2.30 A.M.

MAJOR-GENERAL WILLIAM R. SHAFTER, Tampa, Florida.

With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are directed to take your command on transports, proceed under convoy of the navy to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that point as your judgment may dictate, under the protection of the navy, and move it on to the high ground and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior, as shall best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison there, and cover the navy as it sends its men in small boats to remove torpedoes, or, with the aid of the navy, capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago Harbor. You will use the utmost energy to accomplish this enterprise, and the government relies upon your good judgment as to the most judicious use of your command, but desires to impress upon you the importance of accomplishing this object with the least possible delay. You can call to your assistance any of the insurgent forces in that vicinity, and make use of such of them as you think advisable to assist you, especially as scouts, guides, etc. You are cautioned against putting too much confidence in any persons outside of your own troops. You will take every precaution against ambushes or surprises or positions that may have been mined or are commanded by the Spanish forces. You will coöperate most earnestly with the naval forces in every way, agreeing beforehand upon a code of signals. Communicate your instructions to Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. On completion of this enterprise, unless you receive other orders or

deem it advisable to remain in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, reëmbark your troops and proceed to the harbor of Puerto de Banes, reporting by the most favorable means for further orders and future important service — this with the understanding that your command has not sustained serious loss and that the above harbor is safe for your transports and convoy. When will you sail?

By command of Major-General Miles.

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

But affairs at Tampa were in such great confusion that many difficulties were encountered in getting the expedition ready to sail. When the regiments of the Fifth Corps, which were to compose the expedition, arrived at Tampa, the lack of an adequate supply of water and other sanitary requirements necessitated their being assigned to camps at considerable distance from each other, and from Port Tampa, where the embarkation was to take place. Not only was "the capacity of the place greatly exceeded," but the facilities for embarking the troops were inadequate. Only a single line of railroad connected Tampa with Port Tampa, nine miles away. The switching facilities were entirely too limited, and for miles the line was choked with freight-cars which could not be unloaded near the places where the regiments were encamped and the supplies needed. As the cars had no labels indicating their contents, consignments could not be found when wanted,

and as the little local post-office could not properly handle the mail, bills of lading were not promptly distributed. Thus it became impossible for receiving officers to supply and equip the troops expeditiously. The equipments and supplies needed were nearly all there, but to find them was the difficulty. An officer seeking clothing would open a car only to find cannon, or seeking bacon and beans would find shirts and shoes. The docking space, too, was inadequate. There was wharfage for only eight or nine of the thirty-five or more vessels that had to be loaded, and no storage facilities had been provided.

Naturally, in the midst of such a chaotic condition of affairs, delays were unavoidable and mistakes frequently made. But, nevertheless, General Shafter and his officers, working day and night with enthusiasm unabated and energy unsurpassed, succeeded in loading the transports and embarking the troops in eight days, although, through unforeseen and uncontrollable circumstances, which will be described later, the final departure of the expedition did not take place until June 14.

COMMENTS

IF the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico had not belonged to Spain, there would have been no serious thought in this war of either power's attempting to invade the territory of the other. The fighting

would have been almost exclusively on the sea, and almost the only use for land forces would have been to man the coast fortifications. But the proximity of Cuba to the United States and the fact that Spain had a large army there, made it advisable for the United States government to begin immediate preparations for striking Spain a fatal blow on Cuban soil and preventing a possible invasion of its own territory. How large an army would be necessary for the accomplishment of these purposes depended in a great measure upon the number of Spanish troops then in Cuba. But this number was not known to the United States authorities. General Miles had placed it at one hundred and fifty thousand, which was about forty-six thousand less than the actual number. But even if the actual number had been no larger than General Miles' estimate, there was ample reason for the belief on the part of military experts that the successful invasion of Cuba and the adequate manning of the coast fortifications of the United States would require the services of every man of the two hundred thousand volunteers called for by the President.

If it should be contended that, owing to tropical diseases and enervating climate, a large proportion of the Spanish troops in Cuba were unfit for active operations and therefore such a large American army was not necessary, the reply is, that in every invasion of the island a large percentage of the

invading forces have become unfit for active service within a few weeks after their arrival.

From a military point of view there were reasons that seemed conclusive for deferring until Autumn the main campaign against Cuba. The rainy season was near at hand and would probably last until October. Aside from the hindrances to active operations that would be caused by daily torrential rains, it would be impossible for the soldiers to escape the fatal diseases that were prevalent in that climate at that season of the year. Again, the volunteers were not ready for active service. Time was needed, not only for their equipment, instruction in drill, and target practice, but also for organizing them into brigades and corps. It was highly important for them to pass through some of the daily experiences of a soldier's life before being sent into a tropical climate on an active campaign against an army composed of men who had become accustomed to the hardships of actual warfare. Nor would the Spanish troops in Cuba be benefited in the least by this delay. On the contrary, with their supplies and reinforcements cut off as a result of the American blockade, they would be constantly diminishing in strength and numbers. Moreover, until the Spanish naval forces had been defeated, or securely blockaded in some West Indian port, an army could not be transported to Cuba without taking risks entirely unwarranted by the circumstances. The control

of the sea in West Indian waters was the first essential of a successful invasion of Cuba, and the fact that this would most probably be accomplished during the rainy and sickly season, while the volunteers were being put in a state of readiness for active service, was in itself, from a military point of view, a sufficient reason for deferring until Autumn the principal land campaign against Cuba.

But, on the other hand, there were strong reasons why the United States government desired to make an early movement on Cuba. A large proportion of the regular army, in a high state of discipline and ready for any active service, was assembled at Tampa. The Cuban insurgents needed arms, ammunition, and supplies, and especially encouragement in their waning warfare against the Spaniards. The Cuban people too, many of whom were in a state of destitution and starvation, needed immediate relief. Furthermore, the people of the United States, wrought up to a high pitch of excitement over these facts, were extremely anxious to have the campaign begin at the earliest possible moment. Had there been much delay, there would in all probability have arisen from the people, regardless of all military considerations, the cry of "On to Havana," just as at the beginning of the great Civil War McDowell's army, while yet in a state of unreadiness, was pushed forward to humiliation, disaster, and defeat by the cry of "On to Richmond."

This condition of affairs evidently had some weight in shaping the policy of the War Department. Orders for landing troops at Mariel were issued and on the point of being carried out before the control of the sea had been gained or even actively attempted. Indeed, Cervera's squadron had not yet reached West Indian waters. The intention was for these troops to form the nucleus of an army, which was to begin a campaign against Havana in the Autumn. It is almost needless to point out how hazardous the attempt to execute such a plan would have been. To say nothing of the danger of transporting the first troops of the expedition, there was no certainty, before the plans of the Spanish navy were known, that they could be strengthened by the reënforcements that would have been indispensable not only to their success, but to their very existence.

Moreover, the haste with which orders for an attack on Havana were changed or revoked seems to indicate very clearly that the War Department felt very sensibly the influence of popular sentiment, or that it had not duly considered the obstacles that would have to be met in any plan for the invasion of Cuba prior to the blockading or defeat of Cervera's squadron.

It was very fortunate for the United States that the plan of making a landing at Mariel was not carried out, for the only troops that were available for that purpose were the regulars, which were so

much needed shortly afterwards at Santiago de Cuba. If they had been landed at Mariel, they could not have been withdrawn without serious embarrassment; and if they had not been strongly reënforced, they could have been captured or annihilated by the powerful Spanish force which was in the vicinity of Havana.

It should be noted also that an invading army operating from Mariel with Havana as its objective would not in the slightest degree have affected the demand¹ for troops to assist in the capture of Cervera's squadron, whatever West Indian port it might have entered. Had the squadron been blockaded in the harbour of Cienfuegos, Cuba, or San Juan, Porto Rico, there would still have been an imperative need for an invading army to attack the Spanish land forces of the harbour, while the American admiral stood ready at its mouth to destroy the Spanish ships should they attempt to escape.

A landing at Mariel would have compelled the United States not only to divide the regular troops which were at Tampa, but also to maintain two armies in Cuba instead of one. This would have virtually amounted to an invasion of the island along two lines of operations, and would have

¹ On June 6 Admiral Sampson, in command of the blockading fleet off Santiago de Cuba, telegraphed the Secretary of the Navy: "Every consideration demands immediate army movement; if delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from the fleet."

created the necessity of keeping open two lines of water communications: one from Tampa to Santiago de Cuba, around the eastern end of the island, the other from Tampa to Key West and thence to Mariel. Such a division of the invading forces would have placed them at a great disadvantage, because it would have given the enemy the opportunity of massing overwhelming forces against one invading army while neglecting the other or holding it in check with a containing force.¹ "To invade a country," says Napoleon, "along a double line of operations is a faulty combination."

The adoption of a double line of operations, objectionable at any time, would have been particularly so at the beginning of the campaign, when the fourteen or fifteen thousand regulars at Tampa were practically the only troops in the United States available for active service. It was of the greatest importance to keep these troops united, either for the purpose of aiding the navy in the capture or destruction of any part of the Spanish naval forces that might appear in West Indian waters, or of invading Cuba or Porto Rico along a single line of operations after the Spanish naval forces had been disposed of. It was only by keeping them united that they were able shortly

¹ "Containing force. A body of troops charged with the duty of holding in check a body (generally numerically superior) of the enemy, while the main efforts of the army are directed against another portion of the hostile forces." — WAGNER.

afterwards at Santiago to strike the blow which produced such decisive results.

As the unchallenged control of the sea was essential to a successful land campaign on the island, it was necessary that the army should be in a state of readiness to respond promptly to any demand made by the navy for coöperation and assistance in destroying Cervera's squadron. In fact, it could be clearly foreseen that the destruction or serious disabling of this squadron meant not only the control of the sea but the speedy termination¹ of the war. To save her honour Spain might have prolonged the conflict for a time; by desperate fighting her armies might have won a few temporary victories; but at best such triumphs could have brightened but for a moment the dark clouds of humiliation and irretrievable disaster that were destined soon to cover in total eclipse the glory of a once proud and mighty empire.

From what has been said it might seem that only a small American army was needed, but such was not the case. It was important that the army should be large enough to meet any contingency. In the first place, it could not be known in advance how many troops would be needed to attack the

¹ "The war was the squadron, and nothing but the squadron. To suppose, as it was supposed at the time, that the hostilities could be continued after the loss of the ships shows a sad lack of knowledge of our military situation and of the meaning of modern squadrons." — Victor M. Concas, Captain Spanish Navy, Chief of Staff of Cervera's Squadron.

garrison of the port in which Cervera's squadron should take shelter. Had Cervera entered the harbour of Cienfuegos instead of the harbour of Santiago de Cuba, it can readily be seen that the railroad connections of Cienfuegos with Havana, Matanzas, and Cardenas would have permitted a quick concentration of a large number of Spanish troops at that port; or had Cervera succeeded in entering Havana Harbour, it is evident that a successful attack by the Americans against the fortifications of the city and the large Spanish force in the vicinity, would have necessitated the employment of the entire available strength of the United States army.

Secondly, if by greater skill on the sea, or by the fortunes of war, or by any other means, the Spaniards had gained control of West Indian waters, the American army ought to have been strong enough not only to defend the coast fortifications, but also to meet any attack that might have been made by Spanish troops sailing from Cuba to the United States.

Thirdly, if none of the Spanish naval forces had crossed the Atlantic, the American army ought to have been strong enough to make a successful invasion of Cuba by landing near Havana.

And lastly, it was not alone the destruction of Cervera's squadron and the unchallenged control of the sea in West Indian waters that brought the campaign to a speedy termination, but the additional

fact that more than a quarter of a million of American soldiers would have been available in the Autumn for active operations. Though the main purpose of armies and battle fleets is to fight, yet, even before the clash of arms, victories are not infrequently won by reason of readiness, strength, and favourable strategical positions; for, after all, the science of war is in great part the science of numbers and positions. And such victories are most to be desired, for they are obtained without bloodshed. Preparedness for war is an insurance against war; this fact, thoroughly recognized and acted upon, would do more towards bringing about an era of peace than all the arguments and resolutions of the peace societies of the world.

In this discussion there should constantly be kept in mind the fact that the best results were impossible without cordial coöperation between the army and navy. Harmony of action and unity of purpose were the ends to be sought. "Exclusiveness of purpose," says Napoleon, "is the secret of great successes and great operations."

Thus far this discussion has indicated that the best plan of campaign for the army was to hold itself in readiness to coöperate with the navy in the destruction of Cervera's squadron upon its arrival in West Indian waters. But other contingencies should be considered. What would have been the best plan for the army if Cervera's squadron, reënforced by the available armoured

vessels of Camara's squadron, had taken up a position in the Canary Islands? In that case the army should have coöperated with the navy in an attack upon either Havana or Porto Rico.

Inasmuch as Sampson's fleet was blockading Havana and the principal ports of western Cuba connected with Havana by railroad, and as there was nothing to cause any American warships to be withdrawn from this important work so long as the Spanish naval forces remained at the Canary Islands, it is evident that the whole of Sampson's fleet would have been available for coöperation with the army in an attack on Havana. But, on the other hand, if Porto Rico had been attacked, a number of the American warships would have had to be withdrawn from Cuba to assist the army in making a landing and in capturing San Juan. This would have weakened the blockading forces of Havana, and in a measure destroyed that unity of action which is so necessary to the accomplishment of great undertakings, and for the lack of which history records so many failures.

Secondly, the army could probably have landed at Mariel for an attack on Havana, or even at Matanzas, which was very weakly fortified, as easily as it could have landed at any port of Porto Rico.

Thirdly, as Havana was only ninety miles from the naval base of operations at Key West, and only three hundred and six miles from Tampa, an

army with its supplies, and the reënforcements that would have been necessary to maintain it in Cuba, could have been transported from Tampa to Havana with greater despatch and much less hazard than from Tampa to Porto Rico, which lies nine hundred and sixty miles from Key West and eleven hundred and eighty-seven miles from Tampa. Moreover, transports sailing from Tampa to Porto Rico would, during the latter part of the voyage, have incurred the danger of an attack by the Spanish squadron in the Canary Islands, while those sailing from Tampa to Havana would have been constantly under the protection of Sampson's warships at Key West and Havana.

And finally, inasmuch as Havana was the capital, and the largest and wealthiest city of Cuba, and the only strongly fortified city in the island, and inasmuch as the war was being fought for the overthrow of Spanish rule in Cuba, the defeat of the Spanish troops at Havana and the capture of that city would have resulted in the certain loss of the island. Indeed, the fall of Havana would almost certainly have ended the campaign; for Havana was the chief seat of Spanish power in the Spanish West Indian possessions.

But Porto Rico was so far distant from Cuba, and especially from the lines of communication leading from Tampa to Havana, that its occupation by the United States would not have aided to any appreciable extent the prosecution of the campaign

against Cuba. In fact, its situation was such that it neither protected these lines of communication when held by the United States, nor greatly endangered them when held by Spain; and though its occupation by the United States would have made much more difficult Spain's chance of bringing relief to the Spanish soldiers in Cuba, it would have produced no decisive effect upon the result of the campaign.

To sum up the strategy of the campaign in a sentence: an attack on Havana, if Cervera's squadron remained in the Canary Islands,¹ or an attack on Cervera's squadron, if it sailed to the West Indies, were the only plans that offered decisive results.

But though the plan of attacking Havana offered the only decisive results as long as the Spanish naval forces remained away from West Indian waters, its capture would have been very difficult of accomplishment, because the harbour and city were strongly fortified and defended by a large number of Spanish troops; because the railroad connections with the interior, and with

¹ In this discussion Cervera's squadron, reinforced by the available armoured vessels of Camara's squadron, has been assumed to be at the Canary Islands, because it is believed that this would have been its best position at the beginning of hostilities. It is hardly necessary to remark that the same conclusions would be reached were the assumption to be made that the armoured vessels of the Spanish navy, either united or divided, remained in any waters across the ocean from the West Indian Islands.

Matanzas, Cardenas, and Cienfuegos, afforded excellent facilities for a concentration of forces; because the Spaniards are an extraordinarily brave people with a predilection for defensive warfare; and because the transportation of the necessary reënforcements from Tampa to the scene of operations would have taxed almost to its utmost the transport service of the United States. That the city could not have been captured by the combined forces of the army and navy of the United States without furious fighting, severe hardships, and great loss of life, admits of little doubt.

But, on the other hand, as Porto Rico was not strongly fortified and was occupied by only about nine thousand soldiers, the seizure of that island could have been made with fewer troops and much smaller losses. Although the loss of Porto Rico would have deprived Spain of the harbour of San Juan as a naval base of operations, and thereby have made it much more difficult for her naval forces to come to the assistance of the Spanish army in Cuba, or to undertake a campaign against Sampson's forces in Cuban waters, yet it would have had little or no effect in hastening the termination of the war. Moreover, the invasion of Porto Rico would have caused the postponement of the final and decisive campaign against Cuba, and crippled the United States by wearing out the regular forces which would be needed in all

their original strength and vigour for an attack on Havana. In short, the United States could not afford to fritter away the strength of its best troops upon the occupation of Porto Rico and the capture of San Juan Harbour, when the strategical situation clearly indicated that, unless the Spanish naval forces should first be defeated, the capture of Havana alone would decide the fate of Cuba and bring the campaign to an end.

But, after the destruction of Cervera's squadron at Santiago, the best plan of campaign for the army was to invade and occupy Porto Rico; partly because it was important that the United States should be in possession of the island when hostilities terminated, in order that it might be retained when the treaty of peace was signed, and partly because the destruction of Cervera's squadron having already made certain the ultimate loss of Cuba, an attack on Havana, or any other Cuban city, would have been a mere waste of blood and treasure.

In a discussion of this subject Captain Mahan says:

"The character and the direction of the first movements of the United States in this conflict with Spain were determined by the occasion, and by the professed object, of the hostilities. As frequently happens, the latter began before any formal declaration of war had been made; and, as the avowed purpose and cause of our action were not primarily redress for grievances of the United States against

Spain, but to enforce the departure of the latter from Cuba, it followed logically that the island became the objective of our military movements, as its deliverance from oppression was the object of the war. Had a more general appreciation of the situation been adopted, a view embracing the undeniable injury to the United States, from the then existing conditions, and the general iniquitous character of the Spanish rule in the colonies, and had war for these reasons been declared, the objective of our operations might have been differently chosen for strategic reasons; for our leading object in such case would not have been to help Cuba, but to constrain Spain, and to compel her to such terms as we might demand. It would have been open, for instance, to urge that Puerto Rico, being between five and six hundred miles from the eastern end of Cuba and nearly double that distance from the two ports of the island most important to Spain,—Havana on the north and Cienfuegos on the south,—would be invaluable to the mother country as an intermediate naval station and as a base of supplies and reënforcements for both her fleet and army; that, if left in her undisturbed possession, it would enable her, practically, to enjoy the same advantage of nearness to the great scene of operations that the United States had in virtue of our geographical situation; and that, therefore, the first objective of the war should be the eastern island, and its reduction the first object. The effect of this would have been to throw Spain back upon her home territory for the support of any operations in Cuba, thus entailing upon her an extremely long line of communications, exposed everywhere through its course, but especially to the molestation of small cruisers issuing from the harbors of Puerto

Rico, which flank the routes, and which, upon the supposition, would have passed into our hands. This view of the matter was urged upon the writer, a few days before hostilities began, by a very old and intelligent naval officer who had served in our navy, and in that of the Confederate States. To a European nation the argument must have been quite decisive ; for to it, as distant or more distant than Spain from Cuba, such an intermediate station would have been an almost insurmountable obstacle while in an enemy's hands, and an equally valuable base if wrested from him. To the United States these considerations were applicable only in part ; for while the inconvenience to Spain would be the same, the gain to us would be but little, as our lines of communication to Cuba neither required the support of Puerto Rico, nor were by it particularly endangered."

The same author adds the following wise and timely words in regard to the strategical value of the island of Porto Rico to the United States :

"This estimate of the military importance of Puerto Rico should never be lost sight of by us as long as we have any responsibility, direct or indirect, for the safety or independence of Cuba. Puerto Rico considered militarily is to Cuba, to the future Isthmian Canal, and to our Pacific Coast, what Malta is, or may be, to Egypt and the beyond ; and there is for us the like necessity to hold and strengthen the one, in its entirety and in its immediate surroundings, that there is for Great Britain to hold the other for the security of her position in Egypt, for her use of the Suez Canal, and for the control of the

route to India. It would be extremely difficult for a European state to sustain operations in the eastern Mediterranean with a British fleet at Malta. Similarly, it would be extremely difficult for a transatlantic state to maintain operations in the western Caribbean with a United States fleet based upon Puerto Rico and the adjacent islands. The same reasons prompted Bonaparte to seize Malta in his expedition against Egypt and India in 1798. In his masterly eyes, as in those of Nelson, it was essential to the communications between France, Egypt, and India. His scheme failed, not because Malta was less than invaluable, but for want of adequate naval strength, without which no maritime position possesses value."

If the reasoning in the foregoing comments is sound, the following general plan expressed in the form of orders would have been strategically correct.

First: If Cervera's squadron does not cross the Atlantic, the American army and navy will attack Havana in the Autumn. Meanwhile, during the Summer, the regular troops at Tampa will be held in readiness to make brief incursions into Cuba for the purpose of supplying the insurgents with food, arms, and ammunition.

Secondly: If Cervera's squadron sails to West Indian waters, and is there blockaded in port, the American army will then immediately coöperate with the navy in bringing about the destruction of the Spanish squadron.

Thirdly: If Cervera's squadron is destroyed in

the West Indies, and hostilities do not immediately cease, the American army will then undertake the occupation of Porto Rico.

Probably it would not have been wise to plan further than this at the outset. At the beginning of a campaign no plan can be set forth in detail which will meet the varying emergencies and changing conditions that are bound to occur as the action progresses. Under ordinary circumstances it is sufficient to outline merely the general strategical plan, leaving the details to the admirals and generals. "It is a delusion to believe," says Count Von Moltke, "that a plan of war may be laid for a prolonged period and carried out in every point. The first collision with the enemy changes the situation entirely, according to the result. Some things decided upon will be impracticable; others, which originally seemed impossible, become feasible. All that the leader of an army can do is to get a clear view of the circumstances, to decide for the best for an unknown period and carry out his purpose unflinchingly."

But at the beginning of this war the President was the only official of the United States who had the authority to plan a campaign for the army and navy and issue the necessary orders for its execution. No one can study the strategy of this campaign without feeling that the President of the United States had need at the time of an advisory council composed of a few able officers of the army

and navy, who should have worked out in advance the best plans to follow in the contingencies that would most probably arise, not for the army alone, nor for the navy alone, but for both. The need for such a council has since been recognized by the United States government; in July, 1903, a Joint Board on National Defence, composed of four officers of the army and four officers of the navy, was created.¹ Previous to the creation of this board the necessity for something of the kind had been urged by a number of able officers. In April, 1903, Lieutenant-Commander Roy C. Smith, United States Navy, had prepared an article, which was published in the "North American Review," March, 1904, in which he strongly advocated the appointment of such a board, or council, and clearly indicated what its functions should be. In this article he says:

"A comprehensive view of war as affecting any country will take into account every circumstance that can be shown to have a bearing. Tactics, strategy, and personal qualities, in their broad aspects, all enter. It is not a naval question, nor a military question. The whole armed force of the nation, ashore and afloat, will be in demand. The grand strategy of the war reckons with everything. Incidentally, in our own country, some of the machinery is lacking for this comprehensive planning of wars. It has so long been the custom to regard the army and the navy as occupying entirely different spheres, that it is actually

¹ See Appendix P.

difficult to consider them as merely parts of one harmonious whole. They are really as essential to each other, and as much dependent on the fundamental principles of war, as are, for instance, infantry, cavalry, and artillery in the army, or battleships, cruisers, and torpedo boats in the navy. There is only one science of war, and this science includes a critical knowledge of the principles of action of all the branches of the national defence. Such knowledge is indispensable to the authority that controls the conduct of the war, that is, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, advised by his Cabinet officers. The President may, and will, seek also the advice of the senior officers of the army and navy; but this advice must, in the nature of things, often be one-sided and sometimes contradictory. However good a man may be President, and however able are his advisers, they are handicapped in time of national danger by the absence of a constituted body organized to perform these duties only, by the lack of a continuous study of war plans, and by a lack of files of such plans previously perfected. It would not do to call on the army and navy for their separate plans, which will lack comprehensiveness and unity. A supreme war council, superior to both army and navy, permanently organized, and advisory to the President, would seem to meet this want. It would be a National General Staff, drawing on the materials collected by the general staffs of the army and navy."

It is plain that at the outset Captain-General Blanco, in command of the Spanish troops in Cuba, was restricted to the strategical defensive; for, so long as the United States retained control of the

sea in Cuban waters, an invasion of the United States would have been entirely impracticable. What then would have been the best plan of campaign for the Spanish army in Cuba? As Havana was the most important city of the island and was connected by rail with Matanzas, Cardenas, and Cienfuegos, and as there was a probability that Cervera's squadron would sail to Cuba and attempt to enter the harbour of Cienfuegos, or of Havana, or, possibly, of Santiago de Cuba, it seemed most likely that the American army would attempt to make a landing at or near one of these important seaports. Hence the wisest plan would have been to concentrate near these cities as many troops from the interior as could be spared. Then the policy should have been to act offensively against the invading forces, in order to destroy them in detail as they landed, or, if this was not possible, to overwhelm them by superior forces afterwards. As a landing under the most favourable circumstances would have taken several days, and as a large American army could not have been transported across the sea at one time, an excellent opportunity would have been offered the Spaniards of bringing greatly superior numbers against their adversary; and as Havana and the cities connected with it by rail, and Santiago with its well-sheltered harbour, were practically the only points that had to be considered in forming a plan for repelling an invasion, the Captain-General of the Spanish forces could

easily have massed his troops beforehand at these important points. The way to hold Cuba was to grasp with a firm hand the important cities and harbours. In war, definiteness of purpose is always a great gain; a few strategic positions strongly held are better than many weakly defended.

The delay in the departure of the Fifth Corps from Tampa was of much concern to the people and government of the United States. But under the conditions existing at the time, this delay was practically unavoidable; not because there was any lack of energy and soldierly qualities on the part of General Shafter and his officers, but because the facilities at Tampa for the embarkation of such a large number of troops were totally inadequate. As Tampa lies on the west coast of Florida only two hundred and seventy miles from the naval base of operations at Key West, and is nearer Cuba than any other gulf port of importance, it was most favourably situated strategically for a base of operations for the invading land forces. And as no other gulf port offered any better facilities for the encampment and embarkation of the Fifth Corps, it is evident that the only way confusion and delay at Tampa could have been avoided would have been for the United States government to have anticipated events and made the necessary preparations beforehand for the proper encampment and speedy embarkation of an army at that place.

Had a large camp been laid out at Port Tampa

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and an ample supply of good water been provided for; had the switching facilities been greatly increased and the wharfage been extended; had warehouses been built and filled with clothing, provisions, ordnance, wagons, ambulances, harness, and hospital supplies; had the post-office been enlarged and arrangements been made to handle a greatly increased amount of mail matter; and had a garrison of United States troops been stationed at the port to guard the property and keep everything in perfect working order, — there would have resulted very little if any delay in the embarkation of General Shafter's army.

In this connection it will not be out of place to remark that a government ought to profit by past mistakes, and thereby strengthen itself for future conflicts. The lessons of history should be lessons of wisdom. Such confusion and delay as occurred at Tampa in the Spring of 1898 should not be allowed to occur again. One of the greatest military needs in this country to-day is a port in the Gulf of Mexico with ample facilities for the speedy embarkation of a corps of twenty or twenty-five thousand soldiers; for at any moment the need of troops in Panama, in Central or South America, or in the West Indies, may become a pressing necessity. For this purpose probably Tampa is better situated strategically than any other gulf port; but New Orleans, or Mobile, or Pensacola would each probably be found to have

some advantages that the others do not possess. But be that as it may, a board of officers, after taking into consideration the facilities offered by each port for encamping and embarking an army corps, and the strategical situation of each with respect to its defence against attack and its nearness to Key West, Panama, and the West Indies, should make the selection, and the improvement of the port should then be pushed forward with despatch. If this were done, troops could from time to time be assembled there, and be given practice¹ in embarkation with most beneficial results. When Napoleon was contemplating the invasion of England in 1804 and 1805, he found after many trials that he could embark an army of one hundred and thirty thousand soldiers in two hours. The astonishing result accomplished by this great master of war should at least be a reminder that with previous preparation and frequent practice even a large army can be embarked without the least confusion and delay.

The number of American land forces that will be needed in any future war with any other nation will depend in great measure upon the proximity of that nation's territory to the United States. In a war with Mexico nearly all the fighting would take place on the land, and in a war with Great Britain a large army would be necessary for the invasion

¹ An occasional practice of this kind might wisely be held in lieu of one of the annual army manœuvres.

of Canada; but with any other power the principal struggle would be on the sea, and the United States navy would be called upon to bear the brunt of the conflict. In that case the greatest need for the army would be to assist the navy. To close in on a harbour from the land side, to occupy some island in the West Indies, to aid or invade some South American country, to guard the Panama Canal — these are the duties that the army would mostly be called upon to perform. And these duties would require the embarking and sailing of troops from some American port, in most cases from some gulf port. The present and future interests of the United States in the West India Islands, in the Isthmian Canal, and in the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine will, as time advances, undoubtedly necessitate the sailing of many expeditions from the Gulf of Mexico. It is the part of wisdom to be prepared for these emergencies, for when they arise there will be an immediate and imperative demand for troops. A week's delay in embarking an expedition might have disastrous and far-reaching results. Victory is most often in the hands of him who can strike the first blow. Time is an element always of the greatest importance in war. "It is the quarter hours that win battles," says Napoleon.

In the next hundred years the Caribbean Sea is destined to become a great centre of commercial activity. The completion of the Panama Canal will

increase enormously the commerce in these waters, and as time advances the islands of the West Indies will become of much greater importance strategically as well as commercially. Wars will come, and the great nations of the world will strive with every means in their power to hold or acquire islands and coaling stations in this great strategical centre.

Since the world began, the desire for commercial advancement has been the principal cause of wars; and until there shall be a radical revolution in human nature the same cause will continue to array nation against nation in deadly conflict. As long as the powerful try to wrest concessions from the weak, as long as selfishness governs the actions of men and of nations, as long as material advantage is deemed of more importance than moral rectitude, just so long are wars destined to continue, and just so long will it be necessary for peaceably disposed nations to prepare for war.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BLOCKADE OF HAVANA AND THE EARLY NAVAL OPERATIONS¹

ADMIRAL SAMPSON believed that he could capture Havana by a direct attack upon its fortifications, and that its fall would result in the speedy termination of the war. He was strongly supported in this view by three of his leading officers,—Captains Robley D. Evans of the *Iowa*, Henry C. Taylor of the *Indiana*, and French C. Chadwick of the *New York*.

The plan of making a direct attack upon Havana had been fully discussed by the naval authorities² at Washington several weeks prior to the opening of hostilities. On April 6 the Secretary of the Navy, John D. Long, sent the following instructions to Admiral Sampson :

“In the event of hostilities with Spain the Department wishes you to do all in your power to capture or destroy the Spanish war vessels in West Indian waters, including the small gunboats which are stationed along the coast of Cuba.

“The Department does not wish the vessels of your squadron to be exposed to the fire of the batteries at

¹ See maps 1, 3, and 4.

² See footnote, page 71.

Havana, Santiago de Cuba, or other strongly fortified ports in Cuba, unless the more formidable Spanish vessels should take refuge within those harbors. Even in this case the Department would suggest that a rigid blockade and employment of our torpedo boats might accomplish the desired object, viz., the destruction of the enemy's vessels, without subjecting unnecessarily our own men-of-war to the fire of the land batteries.

"There are two reasons for this :

"First. There may be no United States troops to occupy any captured stronghold, or to protect from riot and arson, until after the dry season begins, about the first of October.

"Second. The lack of docking facilities makes it particularly desirable that our vessels should not be crippled before the capture or destruction of Spain's most formidable vessels.

"The Department further desires that, in case of war, you will maintain a strict blockade of Cuba, particularly the ports of Havana, Matanzas, and, if possible, of Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, and Cienfuegos. Such a blockade may cause the Spaniards to yield before the rainy season is over. . . .

"Should the Department learn that the Spanish fleet had gone to Porto Rico, it is possible that the Flying Squadron may be sent thither, in which case some of your vessels may be needed to reënforce that squadron.

"The Department hopes to be able to cut the cable off Santiago de Cuba, even if it has to employ a special cable vessel for this purpose, and it also has under consideration the practicability of cutting the cable near Havana and connecting the end to one of the vessels of

your command, so that you can always be in communication with the Department. Whether or not this plan is feasible has not yet been determined. Please consider it."

Notwithstanding these instructions¹ Admiral Sampson was still eager to carry out his aggressive policy and hoped to obtain permission to do so. Accordingly, on April 9 he wrote the Secretary of the Navy:

"I sympathize with all you say about guarding our big ships against a possibly serious loss while the enemy's fleet is still intact. At the same time I regard it as very important to strike quickly and strike hard as soon as hostilities commence. Havana is well defended by three or four batteries to the eastward of the entrance, mounting guns from 6 to 12-inch calibre. On the western side of the entrance there are three batteries, the guns varying in calibre from 8 to 12-inch, and two mortar batteries. All the batteries face seaward, and those to the west of the entrance are quite near the shore. All are open batteries with heavy traverses between the guns. The guns and people who serve them are quite unprotected.

"These batteries are well calculated to keep off a fleet from seaward, which approaches to within a moderate distance of a few thousand yards. I do not think they are well placed to resist an attack (for instance the western batteries) from the westward and close in shore, where

¹ In this history such portions of instructions, orders, and despatches as have no direct bearing upon the matter in hand are omitted.

the batteries would be exposed to a flank fire, or to the fire of our big ships at short range, where the secondary batteries would have full effect. Even under these circumstances the ships must have such a heavy fire that the men in the batteries would be overwhelmed by its volume. Before the *Puritan* and *Amphitrite* arrived I was not entirely sanguine of the success of such an attack. Since their arrival yesterday I have little doubt of its success.

“Although the monitors are weak in secondary fire, I expect to put a cruiser with heavy secondary fire in the interval between each two of them. In this way I do not think the Spaniards would be able to fire. They would be driven away from their guns and kept away, while the fire of the ships would so injure the guns or mounts that they would be unserviceable. Although the defences west of the entrance are stronger than those east, the first has the advantage for us that all the projectiles which miss the batteries will fall in the city and furnish an additional inducement for the surrender of the city.

“In the memorandum which I furnished to the commanding officers of ships I provided that if our ships were not numerous enough, or the Spaniards proved better than I expected, we were at once to haul off and substitute for the direct attack a close blockade of the port, which was to be extended east and west to adjoining ports as quickly as possible. Having silenced the western batteries, it would be quite practicable to shell the city, which I would do only after warning given twenty-four hours in advance.

“I see the force of your reasoning that we would have no troops to occupy the city if it did surrender, yet, Mr.

Secretary, it will be very unfortunate, besides a great loss of time, if we must delay until the rainy season is over. Probably a close blockade would terminate the trouble before October.

"I shall do my utmost to carry out your wishes as set forth in your letter. At the same time I hope you will consider the plan I have here outlined. I have discussed the matter freely with Captain Evans, Taylor, and Chadwick, and all unite with me that the direct attack is sufficiently promising to warrant its trial.

"I don't think the plan of cutting the cable at Havana and taking the end on board ship would succeed, for a ship could not anchor off Havana."

On April 21 Admiral Sampson received from the Secretary of the Navy orders which began the war. In these orders the final decision as to making a direct attack upon Havana was set forth :

"The Department's instructions of April 6 are modified as follows :

"You will immediately institute a blockade of the north coast of Cuba, extending from Cardenas on the east to Bahia Honda on the west ; also, if in your opinion your force warrants, the port of Cienfuegos, on the south side of the island. It is considered doubtful if the present force at your command would warrant a more extensive blockade.

"If it should become necessary for the army to embark for Cuba, the navy will be required to furnish the necessary convoy for its transports. For this reason it does

not seem desirable that you should undertake at present to blockade any more of the island than has been indicated. It is believed that the blockade will cut off Havana almost entirely from receiving supplies from the outside.

"The Navy Department is considering the question of occupying the port of Matanzas by a military force large enough to hold it and to open communications with the insurgents, and this may be done at an early date if part of the army is ready to embark. If this operation is decided upon, you are directed to coöperate with the army and assist with such vessels as are necessary to cover and protect such a movement.

"If you obtain any information of the movements of the Spanish ships of war in any part of the West Indies you will, if practicable, inform the Department.

"In conducting the other operations you will be governed by the instructions contained in the Department's letter of April 6.

"The Department does not wish the defences of Havana to be bombarded or attacked by your squadron."

These instructions to Admiral Sampson were modified by the Secretary of the Navy on April 26.


"The orders under which you are acting do not prevent the use of some of your vessels in scouring the coast of Cuba north and south, and capturing or destroying such Spanish vessels of war as may be in those waters. It would be within your discretion to send monitors with these vessels if you thought proper. While the Department does not wish a bombardment of forts protected by

heavy cannon, it is within your discretion to destroy light batteries which may protect vessels you desire to attack if you can do so without exposure to heavy guns."

In order to carry out his instructions as effectively as possible, Admiral Sampson divided his command so as to cover all the ports connected with Havana by railroad. The main portion of his fleet was kept on the north side of the island, off the harbours of Havana, Mariel, Matanzas, and Cardenas, while a division under Commander B. H. McCalla, United States Navy, consisting of the cruiser *Marblehead*, gunboat *Nashville*, and converted yacht *Eagle*, blockaded Cienfuegos.

At this time only a small number of Spanish war vessels were in Cuban waters. There were at Havana the small iron cruiser *Conde de Venadito*, and two or three torpedo gunboats; at Santiago de Cuba, the protected cruiser *Reina Mercedes*; at Nipe Bay, the small wooden cruiser *Forge Juan*; and at Manzanillo, Cienfuegos, and other ports, a few gunboats; but none of these vessels made any effort to attack the American ships, or offered any serious resistance to Admiral Sampson's blockade.

It is not the purpose here to give an account in detail of the minor incidents of the blockade, such as the capture of the *Buenaventura*, *Catalina*, *Miguel Fover*, *Panama*, and other prizes; the shelling of the batteries at Matanzas on April 27; the cutting of the cable at Cienfuegos on May 11 by Lieutenant C. M. Winslow, United States Navy,



with a loss to the Americans of one killed and eight wounded; or the spirited fight made by Lieutenant John B. Bernadou, United States Navy, at Cardenas on the afternoon of the same day, in which action Ensign Worth Bagley and four men were killed and Lieutenant Bernadou and two men were wounded; but simply to state that the blockade was maintained with ability, zeal, and good judgment.

The situation was materially changed, however, by the approach of Cervera's squadron. News was received at Washington on April 29 that on that very day the four cruisers, *Maria Teresa*, *Cristobal Colon*, *Almirante Oquendo*, and *Viscaya*, and the three torpedo-boat destroyers, *Pluton*, *Furor*, and *Terror*, had sailed westward from St. Vincent, Cape Verde Islands. This information was with the greatest possible despatch forwarded to Admiral Sampson. The destination and purpose of the Spanish admiral now became a matter of the greatest concern. Was his objective Cuba, or Porto Rico, or the coast of the United States? Would he attempt to intercept the *Oregon*, which at this time was on its way to join Admiral Sampson, or would he move directly upon Cienfuegos or Havana and attempt to raise the blockade of western Cuba?

It was supposed by the American government that Cervera would arrive in the West Indies about May 8; and that, being short of coal after his long

voyage, he would seek a port where a fresh supply could be obtained, and most probably one that could be used as a base of operations. For these purposes it seemed most likely that the Spanish port of San Juan on the north side of Porto Rico would be chosen.

In view of these facts, Admiral Sampson, with the approval and concurrence of the Navy Department, decided that he would sail with a squadron to the Windward Passage between Cuba and Hayti for the purpose of observation, with the intention of going farther eastward to San Juan, should future events make that plan advisable. Accordingly, leaving behind a number of his smaller vessels to maintain the blockade as best they could, Admiral Sampson, on the night of May 4, with his flagship, the cruiser *New York*, the battleships *Iowa* and *Indiana*, the monitors *Terror* and *Amphitrite*, the small cruisers *Detroit* and *Montgomery*, the torpedo boat *Porter*, the tug *Wompatuck*, and the collier *Niagara*, sailed eastward along the north coast of Cuba towards San Juan. As the maximum speed of the monitors was only about half that of the battleships, the squadron necessarily steamed very slowly. To avoid as much delay as possible from this cause, the two monitors were taken in tow by the *New York* and the *Iowa*. On the morning of May 8 the Admiral arrived with his squadron off Cape Haytien, on the north coast of Hayti. Here he learned from the Navy Department that

no information had yet been received as to the whereabouts or destination of Cervera's squadron. After stopping long enough to coal the monitors from the collier *Niagara*, he proceeded eastward towards San Juan, where he arrived early on the morning of May 12.

Immediately upon his arrival he began an attack on the forts of the harbour. But as it soon became evident that Cervera's squadron was not there, he decided to discontinue the attack and return to Havana. The reasons for this decision are thus stated in his official report:

"It was clear to my own mind that the squadron would not have any great difficulty in forcing the surrender of the place, but the fact that we should be held several days in completing arrangements for holding it; that part of our force would have to be left to await the arrival of troops to garrison it; that the movements of the Spanish squadron, our main objective, were still unknown; that the Flying Squadron was still north and not in a position to render any aid; that Havana, Cervera's natural objective, was thus open to entry by such a force as his, while we were a thousand miles distant, made our immediate move towards Havana imperative."

Upon leaving St. Vincent Cervera received orders to sail for the West Indies. It was suggested that upon his arrival in those waters he should obtain information of the enemy's whereabouts before entering port in either Cuba or Porto Rico. But he was given complete freedom of action as to what

route to take, what port to enter, and the circumstances under which he might seek or avoid battle. Owing to the foul bottom of the *Vizcaya* and the necessity for taking in tow the torpedo-boat destroyers, Cervera's progress was so slow that he did not arrive off the island of Martinique, a French possession about nine hundred miles southeast of Cuba, until the afternoon of May 11. He had sent forward Captain Villaamil with the *Furor* to Fort de France, Martinique, to seek information as to the whereabouts of the enemy, and as to whether coal could be obtained at that port. Villaamil returned at midnight of May 11 with despatches, from which it was learned that the bulk of Admiral Sampson's fleet was still blockading the western part of Cuba from Cardenas to Cienfuegos; that Santiago de Cuba was free from blockade; and that just then, according to unofficial but probably reliable information, a number of the enemy's vessels, with Admiral Sampson at their head, were off Porto Rico, and were to bombard San Juan that very day, May 11. Though this information anticipated by a day the bombardment of San Juan, and created the erroneous impression that larger naval forces were in the waters of western Cuba than were actually there, nevertheless, on the whole, it gave Cervera a fairly correct idea of the situation.

On receiving this information Admiral Cervera immediately assembled his captains to acquaint them with the situation and to seek their opinion

as to what was best to be done. This council took place on board the Admiral's flagship, the *Maria Teresa*, off Fort de France, Martinique, on May 12. In the minutes of this council, signed by Admiral Cervera and all his captains, the conditions that confronted the squadron are clearly set forth:

"Having carefully studied the situation of the squadron, which is extremely critical, owing to the scant supply of coal, the governor of Martinique having refused to give aid in that direction, and it having been learned that there is no coal in San Juan, nor probably at Santiago, and in view of the bad condition of the boilers of the destroyers, those of the *Terror* being practically unserviceable, so that it became necessary to send her back to Fort de France this morning to await orders from the government, these officers seeing no other solution — on penalty of placing the squadron in a position where it will be unable to move and will hence become an easy prey for the enemy — except to go to Curaçao, in hopes of finding there the coal announced by the Minister of Marine in his telegram of April 26."

In accordance with the decision reached at this meeting, Admiral Cervera, at about 8 A.M. of April 12, almost at the exact time that Admiral Sampson discontinued his attack on the forts of San Juan, set sail for the island of Curaçao, which lies off the north coast of Venezuela. Arriving there on May 14, he found himself greatly embarrassed by the lack of coal. As no supply ships accompanied

his squadron and as the steamer from which he expected to obtain coal had not arrived, he made an effort to get a supply from the Dutch officials of the island; but they, insisting on a strict observance of the neutrality laws, furnished him only six hundred tons.

A number of vessels laden with coal had been sent to San Juan, Porto Rico, and other ports of the West Indies. It so happened, however, that none of these vessels succeeded in reaching the squadron. Two or three days after Cervera's departure from Martinique, the steamer *Alicante* arrived there loaded with coal; and two days after he had left Curaçao, the steamer *Restormel*, carrying twenty-four hundred tons of coal, put into that port; but, finding that the squadron had gone, proceeded thence to Santiago, where she was subsequently captured.

On the night of May 15 Admiral Cervera sailed from Curaçao and shaped his course northwest towards Cuba. On the morning of May 19, at about eight o'clock, he arrived in Santiago Harbour, the last port his squadron was destined ever to enter. Here, in the very storm centre of the conflict, while the cyclone of war was closing in around him, the heroic admiral, with his brave sailors about him, forebodingly yet undismayed, remained during the six eventful weeks which preceded the destruction of his squadron.

On May 15, while Admiral Sampson was

returning from the attack at San Juan to the blockade of Havana, the torpedo boat *Porter* brought him official information of Cervera's arrival at Curaçao on May 14. The same telegram informed him that the Flying Squadron had been ordered to Key West, and directed him to return to that point with all possible speed.

On May 13 the Flying Squadron, consisting of Commodore Schley's flagship, the armoured cruiser *Brooklyn*, the battleships *Massachusetts* and *Texas*, the collier *Merrimac*, and the converted yacht *Scorpion*, sailed from Hampton Roads to Charleston, and thence to Key West, where it arrived on May 18, one day in advance of Admiral Sampson's squadron. In the meantime the *St. Louis* had been directed to cut the cables at Santiago and Guantanamo, and the *Minneapolis*, *St. Paul*, *Harvard*, and *Yale* to scout for the enemy in or near the passages separating Cuba, Hayti, Porto Rico, and Jamaica from one another.

On the morning of May 19, almost at the very moment that Cervera was entering Santiago Harbour, the Flying Squadron started for Cienfuegos, and on the 20th it was followed by the battleship *Iowa*, the gunboat *Castine*, and the collier *Merrimac*. About midnight of the 21st Commodore Schley arrived off the harbour of Cienfuegos. On the 22d he was joined by the *Iowa*, and on the following morning by the *Castine* and *Merrimac*.

On May 19, a few hours after the Flying Squadron had left Key West for Cienfuegos, the Navy Department learned through General A. W. Greely, of the United States Signal Corps, that Cervera had on that morning arrived in Santiago Harbour. This information was immediately forwarded to Admiral Sampson in these words:

"The report of the Spanish fleet being at Santiago de Cuba might very well be correct, so the Department strongly advises that you send word immediately by the *Iowa* to Schley to proceed at once off Santiago de Cuba with his whole command, leaving one small vessel off Cienfuegos, Cuba, and meanwhile the Department will send the *Minneapolis*, now at St. Thomas, and *Harvard* to proceed at once off Santiago de Cuba to join Schley, who should keep up communications via Nicolas Mole, or Cape Haytien. If *Iowa* has gone, send orders to Schley by your fastest despatch vessel."

Admiral Sampson, doubting at first the reliability of this piece of news, replied to the Secretary of the Navy that he thought it advisable for the Flying Squadron to remain at Cienfuegos, but that he had instructed Schley to communicate with the auxiliary vessels in the vicinity of Santiago and learn for a certainty whether the Spanish fleet was there.

When, on May 22, Commodore Schley received these instructions, which were forwarded in duplicate by the *Iowa* and *Dupont*, he at once detached the *Scorpion* to make inquiries of the

scouting ships off Santiago. Along with these instructions Admiral Sampson sent the following private letter:

“DEAR SCHLEY, — The *Iowa* leaves this morning at 11 o'clock, bound for Cienfuegos. The *Marblehead* and the *Eagle* will be ready to depart to-night and join you. Enclosed is a telegram¹ received at Key West, May 19, marked “A.” After duly considering this telegram I have decided to make no change in the present plan — that is, that you hold your squadron off Cienfuegos.

“If the Spanish ships have put into Santiago, they must come either to Havana or Cienfuegos to deliver the munitions of war which they are said to bring for use in Cuba. I, therefore, am of the opinion that our best chance of success in capturing these ships will be to hold the two points — Cienfuegos and Havana — with all the force we can muster.

“If later it should develop that these vessels are at Santiago, we could then assemble off that port the ships best suited for the purpose and completely blockade it.”

Meanwhile Admiral Sampson, through information received from Washington and Havana, having become almost convinced that the news was correct, sent on May 21 the following despatch to Schley by the *Marblehead*:

“Spanish squadron probably at Santiago de Cuba — four ships and three² torpedo-boat destroyers. If you are

¹ This was the telegram just quoted.

² As a matter of fact, only two destroyers were there; Cervera had left the *Terror* at Martinique.

satisfied that they are not at Cienfuegos, proceed with all despatch, but cautiously, to Santiago de Cuba, and if the enemy is there, blockade him in port."

And a few hours later he sent by the *Hawk* a duplicate of this despatch with an added paragraph to this effect:

"It is thought that the inclosed instructions ¹ will reach you by 2 o'clock A. M., May 23. This will enable you to leave before daylight (regarded very important), so that your direction may not be noticed, and be at Santiago A. M. May 24. It is thought that the Spanish squadron would [will] probably be still at Santiago, as they must have some repairs to make and coal to take."

This second despatch, which arrived on the morning of the 23d, was the first to reach Commodore Schley, but as he doubted the correctness of the news even more strongly than Admiral Sampson had at first done, and as the instructions were conditional, he replied on May 23:

"I would state that I am by no means satisfied that the Spanish squadron is not at Cienfuegos. The large amount of smoke seen in the harbor would indicate the presence of a number of vessels, and under such circumstances it would seem to be extremely unwise to chase up

¹ After sending these instructions to Commodore Schley, Admiral Sampson sent the Department at Washington the following telegram:

KEY WEST, FLORIDA, May 24, 1898.

SECRETARY OF NAVY, WASHINGTON:

Schley has been ordered to Santiago de Cuba.

SAMPSON.

a probability at Santiago de Cuba, reported via Havana, no doubt as a ruse. . . . I am further satisfied that the destination of the Spanish squadron is either Cienfuegos or Havana. This point, being in communication with Havana, would be better for their purposes if it was left exposed, and I think that we ought to be very careful how we receive information from Havana, which is no doubt sent out for the purpose of misleading us."

And on the same day he wrote again to the admiral giving additional reasons why he thought the Spanish squadron was at Cienfuegos, and ended the letter with these words:

"I think I have them here almost to a certainty."

Admiral Sampson received these replies on May 26, and on the next day sent the *Wasp* to Commodore Schley with the following instructions:

"Every report, and particularly daily confidential reports, received at Key West from Havana, state Spanish squadron has been in Santiago de Cuba from the 19th to the 25th instant inclusive, the 25th being the date of the last report received.

"You will please proceed with all possible despatch to Santiago to blockade that port. If, on arrival there, you receive *positive* information of the Spanish ships having left, you will follow them in pursuit."

But in the meantime, before these instructions reached Commodore Schley, Commander McCalla of the *Marblehead*, having landed and communicated with some Cuban insurgents, had learned

that the Spanish squadron was not in the harbour. Immediately upon the receipt of this information on the afternoon of May 24, Commodore Schley sailed eastward towards Santiago, taking with him the *Brooklyn*, *Iowa*, *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, *Marblehead*, *Vixen*, *Eagle*, and the collier *Merrimac*. Owing to a rough sea, the *Merrimac's* broken engines, and the *Eagle's* lack of speed, he did not arrive off Santiago Harbour until 6 P. M. of May 26. A few minutes after his arrival he sighted the *Minneapolis*, *St. Paul*, and *Yale*, which had been ordered there in search of the Spanish squadron. None of the captains of these vessels, however, had any definite knowledge of Cervera's whereabouts; but on the previous day the *St. Paul* had captured the coal-laden steamer *Restormel* just as she was about to enter the harbour, which circumstance pointed strongly to Cervera's being in that port.

But Commodore Schley was not convinced. He still doubted, and his doubts were strengthened by his failure to secure any positive information; and not being able on account of the rough sea to coal his ships from the collier *Merrimac*, he determined to sail for Key West. Accordingly, on the evening of the very day of his arrival, without attempting to blockade the harbour or to ascertain whether Cervera was inside, he signalled the vessels of his squadron to sail for Key West by way of the Yucatan Channel.

That night Commodore Schley started westward, but, owing to an accident to the *Merrimac*, he had gone only a short distance when the *Harvard* overtook him with a pressing despatch from the Secretary of the Navy. This despatch informed him that all reports indicated that Cervera was at Santiago, and urged him to secure positive information on the subject. But even this did not cause him to countermand his orders. He telegraphed the Secretary of the Navy:

"*Merrimac's* engine is disabled, and she is helpless; am obliged to have her towed to Key West. Have been absolutely unable to coal the *Texas*, *Marblehead*, *Vixen*, and *Brooklyn* from collier, owing to very rough seas and boisterous weather since leaving Key West. *Brooklyn* is only one in squadron having more than sufficient coal to reach Key West. Impossible to remain off Santiago in present state of coal account¹ of the squadron. . . . It is to be regretted that the Department's orders cannot be obeyed, earnestly as we have all striven to that end. I am forced to return to Key West, via Yucatan Passage, for coal. Can ascertain nothing certain concerning enemy."

And yet, after all, he did not continue his voyage to Key West. During the 27th and 28th the sea

¹ The proceedings of the Schley Court of Inquiry in 1901 show that at noon on May 27 the *Brooklyn* had coal enough to have remained on blockade duty off Santiago de Cuba for twenty-six days, the *Iowa* for sixteen, the *Massachusetts* for twenty, the *Texas* for ten, the *Marblehead* for five, and the *Vixen* for twenty-three. On this point the unanimous opinion of the Court was that "His official reports regarding the coal supply and the coaling facilities of the Flying Squadron were inaccurate and misleading."

became sufficiently calm for the *Texas* and *Marblehead* to take coal from the collier *Merrimac*; and about noon of the 28th he signalled his fleet to turn about and sail for Santiago, where he arrived about dark. On the following morning he made a reconnoissance near the entrance of the harbour with a number of his ships and discovered four of the Spanish vessels inside the harbour, which fact he communicated to the Secretary of the Navy in the following despatch:

OFF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 29, 10 A. M.

Enemy in port. Recognized *Cristobal Colon*, *Infanta Maria Teresa*, and two torpedo-boat destroyers moored inside Morro, behind point. Doubtless the others are here. I have not sufficient coal. Making every effort to get coal in.

On May 31 Commodore Schley transferred his pennant temporarily to the *Massachusetts*, and accompanied by the *Iowa* and *New Orleans*, steamed to within about five miles of the harbour entrance, where he began a bombardment of the forts, and the *Colon*, which could be seen in the bay. The Spanish batteries and the *Colon* both replied to the fire of the warships; but the range was so long, and so few shots were fired, that no casualties or damage resulted to either side.

Meanwhile Admiral Sampson, who had become practically convinced as early as May 21 that the Spanish squadron was in Santiago Harbour, left Key West on that date for Havana, where

he collected a squadron consisting of his flagship, the *New York*, the battleship *Indiana*, the monitors *Puritan* and *Miantonomoh*, the cruisers *New Orleans*, *Detroit*, and *Montgomery*, and several gunboats and torpedo boats. With this squadron during the following week he cruised slowly back and forth along the north coast of Cuba in the vicinity of Nicolas Channel, watching for the Spanish squadron, which he believed might sail out of Santiago Harbour before the arrival of Schley, and, rounding the eastern end of Cuba, make for Havana along the north coast of the island. On May 25 the cruiser *Cincinnati*, the monitor *Amphitrite*, and the dynamite gunboat *Vesuvius* joined the admiral; and on May 28 the *Oregon*, which had arrived off the coast of Florida on May 24, after her long and successful voyage, also joined him.

On May 28 Admiral Sampson telegraphed the Secretary of the Navy that the promptest and most efficient use of every means was demanded to prevent the escape of the Spanish squadron from Santiago Harbour. Shortly after sending this message he learned through the Navy Department that the Flying Squadron was returning to Key West for coal. It was a time of great anxiety to Sampson, for he felt certain that Cervera's squadron was in Santiago Harbour, and he was very desirous of having it blockaded there until sufficient warships could assemble to destroy it.

On the 29th he telegraphed the Secretary of the Navy:

“The failure of Schley to continue blockade must be remedied at once if possible. There can be no doubt of presence of Spanish division at Santiago.”

But on the same day he received a despatch from Commodore Schley, stating that a part of his vessels had succeeded in taking coal from the *Mer-rimac*, and that his squadron was then blockading Santiago, and would remain on that duty as long as his coal supply permitted him to do so with safety.

In the meantime the Navy Department had decided to send Admiral Sampson himself to Santiago. Accordingly he began preparations, and having placed Commodore John C. Watson in command of the blockade of western Cuba with the vessels remaining in those waters, he started eastward on May 30 for Santiago with his flagship, the *New York*, the battleship *Oregon*, the converted yacht *Mayflower*, and the torpedo boat *Porter*. *En route* thither he met the *Yale* and *St. Paul* sailing westward on the north side of Cuba, the latter with despatches, among which was one from Commodore Schley stating positively that he had recognized the *Cristobal Colon*, *Maria Teresa*, and two torpedo-boat destroyers in Santiago Harbour, and that doubtless the others were there. On the morning of June 1 Admiral Sampson arrived off Santiago and assumed personal command of the

blockade of that port; and here, amidst the stirring and tragic events of the war, he was to remain until the destruction of Cervera's squadron — the last and greatest act of that fierce battle drama.

COMMENTS

It was necessary for the United States to gain permanent control of the sea in West Indian waters before land operations could be safely undertaken against Cuba or Porto Rico; for so long as hostile warships were in that vicinity, transporting troops to those islands would have been extremely hazardous, and a decisive Spanish victory on the sea would not only have compelled the United States government to abandon any troops that might have landed in the islands, but would have completely neutralized its vast resources for land warfare.

But the control of the sea, though of the first importance, could not be brought to an immediate issue so long as the Spanish naval forces remained absent from West Indian waters. Accordingly, at the beginning of the war the Navy Department issued orders to Admiral Sampson to blockade Havana and the ports of western Cuba. Under the circumstances, this was undoubtedly the wisest course to pursue, for, prior to the arrival of Cervera's squadron, the blockading of the seaports of western Cuba offered the United States the best

chance of injuring Spain. By destroying the commerce between these ports and the mother country, this blockade not only deprived a large portion of the army of its regular supplies, but it caused the people affected by it to demand relief from the home government. These circumstances doubtless had considerable weight in influencing the home government to send Cervera's squadron to Cuba, where, under most unfavourable conditions, it was finally obliged to fight against greatly superior forces. Moreover, as long as the Spanish naval forces remained away from West Indian waters, this portion of the island, in which lay not only the capital and the important seaports of Matanzas, Cardenas, and Cienfuegos, but also the bulk of the Spanish army, was the strategical centre of the theatre of war.

The Navy Department acted wisely in refusing to grant Admiral Sampson the permission, which he so urgently sought, to attack the fortifications of Havana with his armoured ships. In the first place, the primary object of battle fleets is not to attack fortifications, but to gain control of the sea by making offensive war against the enemy's sea forces. Armoured ships and land fortifications do not contend on equal terms. In land fortifications heavier guns can be mounted, better protection can be given them, and when damaged they can be more easily repaired or replaced. Moreover, guns on land can almost always be put in an

elevated position, which gives them not only greater range and power, but better protection against the enemy's fire. Resting, too, on a firmer foundation, they can be more accurately aimed.

Naval and military men have long since recognized the fact that guns ashore are much more destructive than guns afloat. "There is an old French saying," says Captain Seaton Schroeder, United States Navy, "that 'Un canon sur la terre vaut un navire sur la mer,' which is, perhaps, an exaggeration, although the slight effect produced by the guns of Admiral Sampson's fleet upon the earthworks at Santiago made me think at the time that it was not far from true. The relative value of guns afloat and ashore is largely, of course, a matter of personal opinion and appreciation, but my own personal opinion would be that a gun on shore is fully equivalent to three afloat."

Since there were in the seashore fortifications of Havana more than one hundred¹ guns that could have been directed against the seventy-two guns of Sampson's armoured ships, and since there were more guns of large calibre in the fortifications than there were in Sampson's squadron, it would have been, of course, utterly impossible for him to capture Havana by attacking the fortifications of the city. That Admiral Sampson and three of his captains should have believed that they could in this way capture the city seems remarkable;

¹ See footnote, page 82, section 18, 2d paragraph.

especially so, since his letter to the Secretary of the Navy discussing the matter clearly shows that he was well informed as to the number of the sea-coast fortifications and their armaments.

Secondly, inasmuch as the control of the sea was of the first importance in this campaign, it would have been extremely unwise for Admiral Sampson to attack the fortifications of Havana while the Spanish naval forces remained undefeated. Such a plan would most probably have resulted in the serious injury or loss of one or more of his armoured ships, and have given Spain right at the start superior forces on the sea. Prior to the struggle for naval supremacy, no plan of operations should have been adopted that would have risked a single armoured ship. While engaged in making the blockade as effective as possible, Admiral Sampson should have husbanded his strength for the purpose of bringing a stronger force against his enemy in the sea battle which sooner or later was bound to occur. This was the one central thought that should have controlled all his movements, for no matter how successful he might have been in the execution of any other plan, if he had finally lost control of the sea in these waters, the United States with all her vast military resources would have been powerless to invade Spanish territory.

Thirdly, even if Admiral Sampson had succeeded in destroying the seacoast fortifications of Havana, he could not by any possibility have captured the

city until the Spanish army occupying the land fortifications and intrenchments had been captured or destroyed. But the United States government had at the time no troops available for this purpose, and even if it had had, an undertaking of such magnitude could not have been safely entered upon while the control of the sea in these waters was still undecided. What would have been involved in such an undertaking can, perhaps, be better appreciated if it be remembered that the city had on the land side and around the harbour strong fortifications armed with nearly a hundred heavy guns; that the harbour was mined and several lines of torpedoes were placed across its entrance; and that the intrenchments and fortifications immediately around the city were occupied by sixty thousand¹ Spanish soldiers with one hundred and thirty-four pieces of field artillery, not to mention the large number of additional troops and guns that could in an emergency have been quickly transported to the scene of action from Matanzas, Cardenas, Cienfuegos, and the interior.

In the blockade of Havana and the ports of western Cuba Admiral Sampson had to keep two objects constantly in view: first, the vessels of his fleet had to be distributed in such a way as to make the blockade² as effective as possible; and,

¹ See footnote, page 83, last paragraph.

² For blockading purposes all kinds of warships may be used; but for offensive warfare, for obtaining control of the sea, each power has to rely almost exclusively on its armoured vessels.

secondly, the armoured vessels of his fleet had to be kept united in order that he might be able to meet with equal or superior forces any attack made by the enemy.

Even though armoured vessels were greatly needed to blockade Cienfuegos, which with its railroad connection is virtually a back door to Havana, Admiral Sampson could not spare any for this purpose. To have divided his fleet, which at this time consisted of only two battleships, three monitors, and one armoured cruiser, would have been to tempt fortune and court defeat, for it would have given Cervera the chance of defeating each part in detail with superior forces. Campaigns are won not by dispersing one's fighting forces, but by keeping them united, or, if separated, by concentrating them before the battle hour arrives.

Nor would it have been expedient for Admiral Sampson to concentrate all his armoured vessels before Cienfuegos, even though it seemed more probable that Cervera would attempt to enter that port rather than that of Havana, for such a movement would not only have left entirely unguarded Matanzas, Cardenas, and Havana, the most important city of all, but would have uncovered his base at Key West and exposed it to an attack of the enemy coming from the east through the Nicolas Channel.

Accordingly all the armoured vessels of Sampson's fleet were kept on the north side of the island

in the vicinity of Havana, while a small division, consisting of but one unarmoured cruiser and two other small vessels, was held before Cienfuegos. Though this division was effective in stopping commerce between Cienfuegos and the outside world, it would have been of no use whatever in preventing even a single armoured ship of Cervera's squadron from entering the harbour.

The result of Cervera's entering this harbour with his squadron would have been not only to raise the hopes of the Spanish soldiers and people of Cuba who were suffering from the effects of the blockade, but to draw the American soldiers thither and cause the fighting to take place around this port as a centre, where with the large number of Spanish soldiers near at hand and the railroad connection with Havana and the interior the chances of Spanish victory would have been greater than at any other West Indian port except Havana. In fact, this portion of the island lying between Cienfuegos on one side, and Havana, Matanzas, and Cardenas on the other, was not only the strategical centre of the theatre of war, but the stronghold of the Spanish West Indian possessions. Here the only preparations worthy of the name had been made to meet the enemy. Here was the only strongly fortified city. Here was the bulk of the Spanish army.

Had Cervera entered this harbour, which, like the harbour of Santiago, had a narrow entrance,

the campaign would doubtless have been much more prolonged than it was at Santiago; for as the American navy would hardly have been able to force its way through the entrance, the destruction of Cervera's squadron could not have been accomplished without a long and difficult land campaign.

It will be remembered that this harbour was not closed to Cervera until the arrival of the Flying Squadron about midnight of May 21, more than sixty hours after he entered the harbour of Santiago. Had he sailed directly there from Martinique, or even from Curaçao, he could easily have entered without opposition. Why he did not do so will be described later, but it should be noted in passing that, prior to his arrival at Santiago, neither Spain nor the United States had any reason to believe that the decisive struggle would take place in the eastern province of Cuba. Referring to this subject, Major Nuñez of the Spanish army, in his history of this war, says:

"The idea certainly did not occur to the United States in their plan of campaign, that the eastern department of the island of Cuba would be the field of decisive conflict.

"The secret of success in modern war consists in giving battle under conditions superior to those of the enemy, and the Americans would hardly have supposed that the Spaniards would proceed so foolishly as to make Santiago de Cuba a decisive point, since it was a weak place, lacking in modern defences, far from the real base of operations,

Havana, and completely separated from the principal defending forces. Such considerations, which are applicable to offensive wars, are much more important in a conflict such as this, in which we were forced to take the defensive, and consequently matters should have been skilfully arranged in such a manner as to develop the struggle at the point where we had our greatest force."

The strategical situation demanded that the Flying Squadron should have been sent to Cienfuegos at the beginning of the blockade; for, in the first place, if stationed there, it would have rendered the blockade much more effective, and at the same time have been in a position where, in an emergency, it could unite with Sampson's squadron, or Sampson's squadron with it, in a much shorter time.

Secondly, if Cervera had attempted to enter this harbour, Schley's squadron, reënforced by a battleship from Sampson's squadron, would have been strong enough to have kept him out. In this case Cervera would have been compelled either to return to Spain or to seek some open port where the Spaniards had made little or no preparations to resist attack, where they had no modern defences, and where their land forces were few in number.

Of course Cervera might have fought either American squadron, or have made an attack upon the Atlantic seaboard cities, but he would have been in no condition to do either without first seeking some West Indian port as a base of operations.

Thirdly, the delay in closing in on Cervera's squadron at Santiago would have been in great part avoided, for Commodore Schley would then have known that Cervera's squadron was not in the harbour of Cienfuegos, and could have started for Santiago early on the morning of May 23, immediately after receiving Admiral Sampson's despatch. He could in that case have arrived at Santiago at least two days earlier than he did.

It will be remembered that Cervera's squadron entered Santiago on the morning of May 19, but that the Flying Squadron did not arrive at Santiago until the evening of the 26th, and on that very evening Commodore Schley, not knowing that Cervera was in the harbour, sailed in the direction of Key West, and did not return to begin the blockade until the evening of the 28th. During these ten days, with the exception of a few hours, the Spanish squadron could have sailed out of the harbour without meeting a single armoured ship.

Had Commodore Schley been positive that the Spanish squadron was not at Cienfuegos but was at Santiago, he doubtless would have sailed immediately and begun the blockade of Santiago Harbour on May 24, at least four days earlier than he did. The importance of his early arrival there can hardly be overestimated, for Cervera's escape would have changed the entire plan of subsequent operations and made the strategical situation much more difficult for the Americans.

It should be remembered that Commodore Schley at first believed that Cervera's squadron was in the harbour of Cienfuegos. Doubtless this belief was in great measure based upon the fact that he perceived, and rightly, that either this port, or that of Havana, should have been Cervera's objective. Moreover, he was undoubtedly strengthened in this belief by the report that Cervera's squadron was bringing to the Cuban troops munitions of war, which would naturally have to be delivered at either Havana or Cienfuegos for distribution.

It remains to notice what effect the sending of the Flying Squadron to Cienfuegos at the beginning of the blockade might have had upon the Atlantic seaboard cities. Undoubtedly a number of them were vulnerable to an attack by the Spanish warships; but the probability that Cervera would have assailed any of them was extremely remote, for the reason that, however successful he might have been in such an effort, no great gain to the Spanish cause would have followed. At best he could have done no more than capture a few coasting vessels and shell one or two cities before the American squadrons would have been upon him. But with his coal allowance running low, he would scarcely have dared to incur the hazard of attempting an attack of this kind without first obtaining a base of operations at San Juan,¹ Porto

¹ Though San Juan Harbour is hardly large enough to have accommodated all of Cervera's vessels at one time, it would have

Rico, or at some other port in that locality. Even had he made a sudden dash in order to spread terror along the coast and deceive the American authorities as to his real intentions, he would, on his withdrawal, have found great difficulty in eluding the American squadrons, which in all probability would have immediately advanced upon him, and in so doing would have come between him and the very port or ports he wished to enter.

Had Cervera entered San Juan Harbour in an attempt to carry out this or any other plan, the American scouting vessels in that vicinity could have quickly reported the fact; and the battleships and armoured cruisers of Sampson's and Schley's squadrons could then have advanced eastward from Havana and Cienfuegos along both the north and the south side of the island, with the strong probability of closing in upon him before he could have refilled his coal bunkers. With Schley's squadron at Cienfuegos, the two American squadrons could have united more speedily and safely for an attack on Cervera at San Juan, Porto Rico, than they could have done if Schley's squadron had been at Hampton Roads. First, because Cienfuegos is three hundred and forty-six miles nearer San Juan than is Hampton Roads, and, secondly, because the two squadrons, after passing eastward of Cuba, answered very well for a temporary base of operations. There were, however, in that locality a number of other places, such as Fajardo or Culebra that Cervera could have used as a base of operations had he been accompanied by colliers.

could with little delay have united about five hundred miles west of Porto Rico, and thence have proceeded to San Juan. But had the Flying Squadron sailed direct from Hampton Roads to San Juan, it could have made no junction with Sampson's squadron until it reached its destination; in which case the chance, in all probability, would have been given Cervera of fighting one squadron before the other arrived. Or if he had been able to sail forth before the arrival of either, he could have met one or the other singly. As Cervera's four cruisers were about equal in fighting power to the two battleships and the single cruiser of each American squadron, he would in such a battle have had a fair chance of victory.

Upon this strategical plan Captain Mahan comments most interestingly as follows:

"The writer assumes that, had our coast defences been such as to put our minds at ease concerning the safety of our chief seaboard cities, the Flying Squadron would from the first have been off Cienfuegos. He is forced to assume so, because his own military conviction has always been that such would have been the proper course. Whatever *coup de main* might have been possible against a harbor inadequately defended as were some of ours, — the fears of which, even, he considered exaggerated, — no serious operations against a defended seaboard were possible to an enemy after a transatlantic voyage, until recoiled. . . .

"Consider the conditions. The Spaniards, after crossing

the Atlantic, would have to coal. There were four principal ports at which they might do so, — Havana, Cienfuegos, Santiago, and San Juan de Puerto Rico. The first two, on the assumption, would be closed to them, unless they chose to fight a division so nearly equal to their own force that, whatever the result of the battle, the question of coaling would have possessed no further immediate interest for them. Santiago and San Juan, and any other suitable eastern port open to them — if such there was — were simply so many special instances of a particular case; and of these San Juan was the most favorable to them, because, being the most distant, it insured more time for coaling and getting away again before our divisions could arrive. After their departure from Curaçao was known, but not their subsequent intentions, and while our divisions were proceeding to Havana and Cienfuegos, measures were under consideration at the Navy Department which would have made it even then difficult for them to escape action, if they went to San Juan for coal; but which would have raised the difficult close to the point of the impossible had our divisions from the first been placed before Havana and Cienfuegos, which strategic conditions dictated, but fears for our own inadequately defended coast prevented.

“To insure this result the contemplated method, one simply of sustained readiness, was as follows. Adequate lookouts around Puerto Rico were to be stationed, by whom the enemy’s approach would be detected and quickly cabled; and our two divisions were to be kept ready to proceed at an instant’s notice, coaled to their best steaming lines, as far as this was compatible with a sufficiency of fuel to hold their ground after arriving off

San Juan. Two of our fastest despatch vessels, likewise at their best steaming immersion, were to be held at Key West ready to start at once for Cienfuegos to notify the squadron there ; two, in order that if one broke on the way, one would surely arrive within twenty-four hours. Thus planned, the receipt of a cable at the Department from one of the lookouts off Puerto Rico would be like the touching of a button. The Havana division, reached within six hours, would start at once ; that at Cienfuegos, eighteen hours after the former. Barring accidents, we should, in five days after the enemy's arrival, have had off San Juan the conditions which it took over a week to establish at Santiago ; but allowing for accidents, there would, within five days, have been at least one division, a force sufficient to hold the enemy in check.

“ Five days, it may be said, is not soon enough. It would have been quite soon enough in the case of the Spaniards after a sea voyage of twenty-five hundred miles, in which the larger vessels had to share their coal with the torpedo destroyers. In case of a quicker enemy of more executive despatch, and granting, which will be rare, that a fleet's readiness to depart will be conditioned only by coal and not by necessary engine repairs to some one vessel, it is to be remarked that the speed which can be, and has been, assumed for our ships in this particular case, nine knots, is far less than the most modest demands for a battleship. . . . Had not our deficiency of dry docks left our ships very foul, they could have covered the distance well within four days. Ships steady at thirteen knots would have needed little over three ; and it is *sustained* speed like this, not a spurt of eighteen knots for twelve hours, that is wanted. No one, however, need be at pains

to dispute that circumstances alter cases; or that the promptness and executive ability of an enemy are very material circumstances. Similarly, although the method proposed would have had probable success at San Juan, and almost certain success at any shorter distance, it would at two thousand miles be very doubtfully expedient."

Why then was the Flying Squadron not sent to Cienfuegos at the beginning of hostilities? Largely, no doubt, because the people of the Atlantic seaboard were in a state of unreasonable terror lest their cities and harbours should be captured or destroyed. The inadequateness of coast defences and the prevailing ignorance as to the true military situation caused the people to demand protection, and to protest with all their might, through their representatives in Washington, against their coasts being left defenceless. Such a demand upon the authorities as this, even when known by them to be in great part unreasonable, is, in a republic where the people are sovereign, often most difficult to resist. The people see only their own interests; their vision extends no farther than their own shores; they do not grasp the strategy of the situation; they do not perceive that campaigns are won by a concentration of effort upon the vital centres of the theatre of war; they do not apprehend that in war the battle is the end to be sought, and that everything depends upon the destruction of the enemy's fleet or army or both; they do not realize that the primary purpose of battle fleets is offensive,

not defensive action, and that in the long run the best and only sure protection for their cities and harbours is the destruction of the enemy's battle fleets. Nor do they realize that it is only by subordinating minor issues, and striking a decisive blow at the very heart of things, that great victories have been won on either land or sea.

History affords numerous examples in which the unreasonable clamour of a people and the demand of their representatives have prevented the execution of correct strategic plans and frequently brought about disaster. Such political considerations in the great Civil War led to the federal disaster of the first Bull Run. Such considerations forced Marshal MacMahon in 1870 to attempt the relief of Marshal Bazaine at Metz by a flank march which was foredoomed to failure, and which terminated in the disaster of Sedan. Such considerations caused General Kuropatkin in the Russian-Japanese War to commit the serious blunder of sending an army under General Stakelberg past the flank of General Kuroki's army of twice the size to the relief of the beleaguered city of Port Arthur. "Our records at the beginning of the nineteenth century," says an able British authority,¹ "teem with instances of the military incompetency of our rulers. Unable to grasp the elementary fact that concentration of effort is

¹ Lieutenant-Colonel Walter H. James, P.S.C., editor of the Wolseley Series.

supremely important in war, they frittered away our strength in countless minor expeditions of no value for their great aim, the overthrow of Napoleon, but which cost the country millions of money and thousands of lives. The expeditions to South America, the second expedition to Egypt, the dismal failure of Walcheren, the aimless wanderings of Bentinck in Italy, were of no possible advantage to the main object of the war. But the diversion of troops and treasure from Wellington in the Peninsula, where he sadly needed both, prolonged the struggle with Napoleon at least one year and possibly two. The history of the war in Spain is one long record of the foolishness of British methods of administration, which was only overcome by the iron will and steadfast purpose of the great Duke."

But this subject will scarcely be appreciated in the proper light unless it is remembered that the deficiency in coast defences was the principal cause of the demand of the people for protection of their defenceless cities. Had they, through their representatives, been as insistent in time of peace for the speedy construction of coast fortifications as they were clamorous in time of war for the protection of their defenceless coasts, the plan of campaign which the strategical situation demanded could have been carried out. "The great evil of our deficiencies in coast armament," says Captain Mahan, "was that they neutralized temporarily a

large part of our navy; prevented our sending it to Cuba; made possible that Cervera's squadron, during quite an interval, might do this or that thing of several things thus left open to him, the result of which would have been to encourage the enemy, and possibly to produce political action by our ill-wishers abroad. Directly upon this consideration — of the use that the Flying Squadron might have been if not held up for coast defence — follows the further reflection how much more useful still would have been a third squadron; that is, a navy half as large again as we then had. Expecting Cervera's force alone, a navy of such size, free from anxiety about coast defence, could have barred to him San Juan de Puerto Rico as well as Cienfuegos and Havana; or had Cámara been joined to Cervera, as he should have been, such a force would have closed both Cienfuegos and Havana with divisions that need not have feared the combined enemy. If, further, there had been a fourth squadron, — our coast defence in each case remaining the same, — our evident naval supremacy would probably have kept the Spanish fleet in Europe. Not unlikely there would have been no war, in which event the anti-imperialists may observe there would, thanks to a great and prepared navy, have been no question of the Philippines, and possibly none of Hawaii."

The sailing of Admiral Sampson's squadron of

armoured vessels on May 4 to the Windward Passage and thence eastward to San Juan, Porto Rico, was a mistake. First, because nothing definite was known as to the whereabouts or even the destination of the Spanish squadron. Although it was supposed by the American government that Cervera would arrive in the West Indies about May 8, and would probably seek the harbour of San Juan, Porto Rico, as a base of operations, there was nothing to indicate with any degree of certainty that he would take this course. Indeed, there were, as has already been pointed out, excellent reasons why he should have attempted to enter the harbour of Cienfuegos or of Havana.

Secondly, this movement lessened to a great extent the effectiveness of the blockade, which at this time was of the first importance. Serious injury was being inflicted upon Spain by this blockade, and any relaxation of it in order to seek the Spanish squadron, whose destination was not yet known, was exchanging a certainty for a probability, and in direct violation of that oneness of purpose which lies at the foundation of all sound strategy.

In a nutshell, the correct strategy for the American naval forces was this: until the arrival of the Spanish squadron in West Indian waters, and until its exact whereabouts became known, the blockade of Cuba was of the first importance; after that the destruction of the Spanish squadron became of

the first importance. Such being the case, every effort should have been made to make the blockade as effective as possible until the arrival of the Spanish squadron; then, immediately, every available armoured vessel should have been directed to the destruction of that squadron.

Thirdly, owing to the inequality of the speed of the vessels composing Sampson's squadron, in which there were two monitors, it was impossible for him to overtake the four swift cruisers of Cervera's squadron or to fight them advantageously on the high seas. An eight-knot squadron going in chase of a squadron of twice that speed presented a spectacle as absurd as that of a bulldog attempting to catch a greyhound. Admiral Sampson took the monitors with him in order to obtain the necessary superiority in fighting power, for without them he might have had to fight the four Spanish cruisers and three destroyers with his two battleships, one armoured cruiser, and one torpedo boat, in which case the Spaniards would have outnumbered him in ships and had practically the same number of guns. Of course the monitors would have been of great use in blockading purposes had he succeeded in catching the Spanish squadron inside a harbour, or they would have been very helpful had his adversary forced the fighting and compelled him to defend himself. But for offensive action on the high seas they were utterly useless, because the Spanish admiral could have sailed away and

fought only that portion of the American squadron which had sufficient speed to keep in touch with him.

In view of what we now know as to the fighting qualities and speed of the Spanish war vessels, it might seem that even with his two battleships and one armoured cruiser Admiral Sampson would have been victorious. But there was no reason to think so at that time, and even had there been, it would in any case have been a strategical error to fight a battle — especially such an important one, upon the result of which would have hinged to a great extent the fate of the whole campaign — with inferior or equal forces, when it was possible to bring the armoured cruiser and two battleships of Schley's squadron in addition to those of his own upon the battlefield. The best that could be said of such a battle, even if successful, is that it would have showed good tactics but poor strategy.¹

That this opportunity for combination would have been given Admiral Sampson for the asking appears clearly from the following paragraph of the instructions sent to him on April 6:

“Should the department learn that the Spanish fleet had gone to Porto Rico, it is possible that the Flying

¹ “The employment of troops in the fight belongs to tactics and forms its chief object. The decision as to when and for what object battle shall be joined, the assembly of the necessary forces, and the reaping of the proper result, is the business of strategy.” — Blume's “Strategy.”

Squadron may be sent thither, in which case some of your vessels may be needed to reënforce that squadron."

Fourthly, this movement on San Juan, Porto Rico, uncovered the strategical centre of the theatre of war. It left both Havana and Cienfuegos open to Cervera's squadron at the very moment when it was most important that they should have been closed. Had Cervera proceeded on the morning of May 12 directly from Martinique to Havana instead of to Curaçao at the average speed with which he sailed to Curaçao, eleven knots an hour, he could have covered the distance of 1655 miles in one hundred and fifty hours, and have entered the port of Havana about noon of May 18, twenty-four hours before the return of Sampson's squadron to its naval base at Key West, thirty-six hours before the reassembling of the squadron in front of Havana, and while the Flying Squadron was still at Key West just after its voyage from Hampton Roads. Again, had Cervera sailed on the evening of May 15 from Curaçao to Cienfuegos, instead of to Santiago de Cuba, even at the low rate of speed of eight knots an hour, which was about the speed of his squadron in going from Curaçao to Santiago, he would have covered the distance, nine hundred miles, in one hundred and thirteen hours, and have arrived at Cienfuegos thirty-six hours in advance of the Flying Squadron.

On the morning of May 12 Cervera's squadron was just on the point of sailing from Martinique,

Admiral Sampson's squadron was bombarding San Juan, Porto Rico, and the Flying Squadron was at Hampton Roads, Virginia. The distance of Havana from Fort de France, Martinique, is 1655 miles, from San Juan, Porto Rico, 984 miles, and from Hampton Roads, Virginia, 967 miles. The faultiness of this situation with respect to the American squadrons will perhaps be more clearly seen if it be remembered, first, that at the time Admiral Sampson, knowing nothing of the foul bottom of the *Vizcaya*, believed that the speed of the Spanish squadron was considerably greater than it really was. Secondly, that Cervera at Martinique, with a squadron whose rated trial speed of each vessel was twenty knots an hour and whose rated service speed of each vessel was sixteen knots, was much nearer to Havana in time than was Sampson at San Juan with a squadron containing two monitors whose service speed was eight knots. Thirdly, that Cervera at Martinique with a squadron the speed of whose slowest vessel, the *Vizcaya*, was about thirteen knots, was as near Havana in time as was Sampson at San Juan with a squadron whose speed was only eight knots. Fourthly, that Havana, being the most important port of the West Indies, and strongly fortified and defended by a large number of Spanish troops, was the very place where the Spaniards were prepared to make their strongest defence. Fifthly, that the result of Cervera's squadron entering that port and

of the American squadrons closing in upon it, would have caused the decisive struggle to take place at that point. And with the fortifications of Havana protecting the Spanish warships, the defeat of the Spanish troops in that vicinity would have been absolutely necessary before Cervera's squadron could have been captured or destroyed. Had Cervera entered Havana Harbour and been blockaded there by the American squadrons, the situation would not have been unlike that which has since occurred at Port Arthur in the Russian-Japanese War, where on both sides were displayed such desperate fighting and heroic courage. Though the fortifications on the land side of Havana were greatly inferior to those of Port Arthur, the Spaniards had a much larger army in western Cuba than the Russians had on the Laio Tung peninsula, and the chances were that the Spaniards, with the facilities for easy concentration offered by the railroads leading from Havana to the important ports and interior of the island, and with their usual splendid courage on the defensive, would have made a desperate, sanguinary, and perhaps prolonged defence, which would have taxed severely for a year or more the military power of the United States.

The reasons which Admiral Sampson gave in his official report¹ for discontinuing the attack on San Juan and returning to Havana were conclusive;

¹ See page 159.

but one fails to see why these same reasons should not have applied with equal force against his going there at all.

In this movement to San Juan, Porto Rico, as well as in the desire to attack the seacoast fortifications of Havana, Admiral Sampson seems to have displayed an eagerness for battle that was not justified by the circumstances. When occasion demands it, every commander should be ready to take risks, for victories can seldom be won without them; but nothing can be said in justification of any plan that gives an enemy an equal or better chance of victory when there are superior forces in the theatre of operations that can readily be brought upon the battlefield. The commander who has the greater force should take as few risks as possible. He should not permit his courage to outrun his caution. It is never wise to underestimate the strength of an enemy. "The better part of valour is discretion."

It is difficult to understand why the Navy Department, instead of allowing Admiral Sampson to make this movement, did not carry out its original plan of sending Schley's squadron, reënforced by one or two of Admiral Sampson's swifter vessels. Though even this plan, while Cervera's destination was still unknown, would have been faulty, it would have been less open to criticism; first, because the Atlantic seaboard cities could have been uncovered with much less risk than could

Havana and the naval base at Key West, and, secondly, because the commander of the Flying Squadron would have had swifter vessels with which to intercept or search for the Spanish squadron. Moreover, had the Navy Department contemplated the sending of the Flying Squadron no farther than the Windward Passage, it would in this position not only have still covered the Atlantic seaboard cities from an attack of Cervera's squadron coming, as it most probably would, through the Windward Passage, but it would also have been much nearer to both Havana and Cienfuegos. In this position, too, it would have been much more favourably situated for hastening to San Juan, Porto Rico, should it have been necessary to go there to meet the Spanish squadron.

It was a mistake to send Cervera's squadron to the West Indies; but having decided upon this course, the Spanish government should have done everything possible to facilitate the movements and increase the strength of the squadron. Had supply ships been sent with the squadron or been sent ahead to meet it at Martinique, had Cervera's four swift cruisers each been put in perfect fighting trim, as they might easily have been at the expense of a very little forethought and energy, the efficiency of the squadron would have been enormously increased.

The possibilities open to such a squadron were many. It might have succeeded in intercepting

the *Oregon*, which passed near Martinique on its way to join Admiral Sampson's forces. It might have sailed boldly to some Spanish West Indian port and, finding there only unarmoured vessels, or even a number of armoured ones, might have been able to fight them with superior forces, or, being the swifter squadron, could, if it met the enemy in superior force, have avoided a battle. Or it might have sailed boldly to Havana, perhaps have entered that port without opposition, and in this way have made sure that the decisive struggle would take place at that point, where the Spaniards could make their strongest defence. Though blockaded in that harbour by all the armoured vessels of the American navy, the Spanish squadron, protected by the fortifications of the city, would have continued to be a serious menace to the American forces, and under favourable conditions might perhaps have sallied forth at an opportune moment for the purpose of destroying American transports or for attacking some weakly defended portion of the blockading coast-line. "The control of the sea, however real," says Captain Mahan, "does not imply that an enemy's single ships or small squadrons cannot steal out of port, cannot cross more or less frequented tracts of ocean, make harassing descents upon unprotected points of a long coast-line, enter blockaded harbours. On the contrary, history has shown that such evasions are always possible, to some extent, to the weaker

party, however great the inequality of naval strength."

Havana was Cervera's proper objective. Why then did he not sail for that port? Two reasons may be assigned. First, he was doubtless led to believe that Havana as well as Cienfuegos and San Juan, Porto Rico, were closed against him; for he had received at Martinique about midnight of May 11 information that the bulk of the enemy's¹ ships were blockading the western part of Cuba from Cardenas to Cienfuegos, and that Admiral Sampson with a number of his vessels was off Porto Rico, and was expected to bombard San Juan, Porto Rico, that very day, May 11. And, secondly, his coal supply was limited. He had not been able to obtain any coal at Martinique, and only six hundred tons at Curaçao, and though he had more than sufficient to carry him from Martinique or Curaçao to San Juan, Porto Rico, and probably an abundance to carry him to Cienfuegos, it is doubtful whether he had enough to reach Havana. But even if he had had, it would have been extremely hazardous to appear at Havana, the very centre of active operations, with his coal bunkers nearly empty, for he surely could not have expected to enter that port without meeting equal or superior forces. And yet, it is a remarkable fact that had the Spanish squadron

¹ "Que los buques enemigos bloquearon la parte O. de Cuba, desde Cardenas á Cienfuegos, con el grueso de su Escuadra."

been properly supplied with coal, and the bottom of the *Viscaya* been clean, Cervera could have sailed from Martinique on the morning of May 12, and with no great effort could have safely entered any one of the four principal ports of the Spanish West Indian possessions. With the exception of a single monitor, only unarmoured vessels could have barred his way to Havana or Cienfuegos; Santiago de Cuba would have continued to remain free from blockade; and at the time Cervera's squadron would have reached San Juan, Sampson's squadron was off the north coast of Hayti sailing westward towards Havana.

But even more remarkable still, perhaps, is the fact that, under the conditions as they actually existed, Cervera could have sailed from Curaçao on the evening of May 15 at a rate of speed not exceeding seven and a half knots an hour and entered without opposition any one of the four principal harbours of Cuba or Porto Rico except Havana.

His next best objective was Cienfuegos. He had plenty of coal to reach that port, which lies almost directly on the route from Curaçao to Havana. Even if he had found no coal there, which was highly improbable, he could in an emergency have obtained a supply by rail from Havana. Cienfuegos being the back door of Havana, offered strategically several advantages that Havana itself offered. Here Cervera could have received the

coöperation of the Spanish troops of western Cuba. Here in telegraphic communication with all the principal West Indian ports, he could have informed himself of the exact whereabouts of the enemy's forces, and had the opportunity arisen, could have quickly slipped out of the harbour and perhaps have reached Havana.

Nothing could have been more fortunate for the Americans than Cervera's entrance into Santiago Harbour. His going there transferred the determining centre of war from Havana to Santiago, eliminated from the contest that portion of the Spanish army occupying western Cuba, and caused the decisive struggle to take place where the Spaniards were especially weak. Santiago was poorly fortified, inadequately defended, and scantily supplied with provisions and coal. Moreover, the harbour had a long narrow entrance, which would necessitate Cervera's vessels going out one by one, thus giving a blockading squadron the opportunity of concentrating an overwhelming fire upon each vessel as it came out.

Although Cervera doubtless believed from the information he had received at Martinique that the ports of Cienfuegos, Havana, and San Juan, Porto Rico, were each closed against him by a division of armoured vessels, yet this very information, indicating that the American armoured vessels were divided and widely separated, was in itself a strong additional reason for his going to

Cienfuegos instead of to Santiago de Cuba; because, under these conditions, he might with reason have expected to find the blockading forces in front of Cienfuegos inferior to his own. In that case he could have fought a battle with the chances of victory in his favour. His only hope of success was in attacking and defeating in succession the fractional parts of the American navy; but if he could not do this, he might still hope to prolong greatly the conflict by taking refuge in the harbour either of Havana or of Cienfuegos.

As a matter of fact, had Cervera sailed on the evening of May 15 directly from Curaçao to Cienfuegos, at an average speed of eleven knots an hour, he could have entered Cienfuegos early on the morning of May 19 just a few hours before the Flying Squadron sailed for that port, and two days before Admiral Sampson's squadron returned to Havana. Here he could easily have learned that no armoured ships were then blockading Havana; and, allowing his vessels forty-eight hours to take on more coal, he could have sailed out of that port for Havana unopposed on the morning of May 21. If he had pursued this course, he would have met, about 3 P. M. of that same day, the Flying Squadron, which consisted of the *Brooklyn*, *Massachusetts*, and *Texas*. In the battle which would have occurred, Cervera would have outnumbered his adversary in armoured ships and guns; and he certainly would have had

a fair chance of victory. Pressing on towards Havana, he would, early on the morning of the next day, have met the *Iowa* on its way to reinforce the Flying Squadron. In this battle the advantages would have been overwhelmingly in his favour. Again pushing forward, he would have found the *New York*, *Indiana*, and three or four monitors blocking the entrance to Havana Harbour. Though this squadron was superior to his own in the number of ships and guns, the inequality in speed of the vessels composing it would have given Cervera a great tactical advantage.

Of course, it seems hardly probable that such successes as here indicated could have occurred, for after fighting the Flying Squadron it is very doubtful whether Cervera would have been in a condition to press on to new victories; nevertheless he had a good fighting chance; it was entirely possible that these very things might have happened. In discussing supposititious battles, in which both sides are assumed to be equally brave and skilful, victory must of course be given to that side which succeeds in bringing a preponderating force upon the battlefield.

Having been ordered to sail to the West Indies in spite of his protests, Cervera and his brave officers, though feeling that their voyage was futile and their squadron doomed, should not only have faced the situation with courage, as they actually did, but should have striven with every means in

their power to do as much injury to the enemy as possible. Cervera should therefore have adopted a bold policy, for as long as his squadron was able to strike a telling blow there was some chance of victory. "I know," said Lucius Marcius on assuming command after the death of the two Scipios, "that the measure appears to you daring; but it is when your circumstances are so difficult as to be almost desperate that the boldest counsels are the safest." As Cervera's only hope lay in fighting, he should have assumed the aggressive at every favourable opportunity. In the game of war victory is not always to the stronger. By rapidity of action and brilliancy of strategical combination battles and campaigns have often been won when the last lingering ray of hope had all but vanished. "Fortune," says Napier, "always asserts her supremacy in war, and often from a slight mistake such disastrous consequences flow that in every age and in every nation the uncertainty of arms has been proverbial."

After Admiral Sampson received the information that Cervera's squadron had arrived at Curaçao, he made no more strategical mistakes. He then hurried to Key West and immediately took measures for preventing Cervera from entering either Cienfuegos or Havana. For this purpose he sent the Flying Squadron to Cienfuegos, and on the following day the *Iowa*; and with the remaining armoured vessels of his own squadron he then

took up a position off Havana. In reënforcing the Flying Squadron with the *Iowa*, Admiral Sampson weakened his own squadron considerably ; but nevertheless this action was wise, as Cienfuegos was Cervera's most probable objective, and as this reënforcement would enable Commodore Schley to meet the Spanish squadron with superior forces.

Meanwhile, the entrance of Cervera's squadron into Santiago Harbour changed the determining centre of the theatre of war. The problem now was to blockade this squadron there with superior forces, or, if it should succeed in getting out, to capture or destroy it, or at least prevent it from entering either Cienfuegos or Havana. With this end in view, Admiral Sampson ordered the Flying Squadron to Santiago, while with his own squadron he cruised slowly back and forth in the vicinity of Nicolas Channel ready to meet the Spanish squadron should it in the meantime escape from Santiago and attempt to reach Havana by going around the eastern end of the island.

But when he heard that the Flying Squadron, after arriving at Santiago, had suddenly turned back and sailed for Key West, he saw that his plans were about to end in failure, just at the very moment when he had reason to expect success ; he saw the opportunity of a great and decisive victory slipping from his grasp. No wonder that he was worried and telegraphed to the Secretary of the Navy, "The failure of Schley to continue

blockade must be remedied at once if possible." No wonder that the Navy Department in its anxiety decided to send Admiral Sampson himself to Santiago.

But fortunately Commodore Schley, having reconsidered his determination to sail for Key West, returned to Santiago before Cervera escaped. Luckily this movement rectified what promised to be a disastrous blunder and gave Admiral Sampson the opportunity of bringing overwhelming forces against the Spanish squadron. He immediately hastened to Santiago with the *New York* and *Oregon*, and several days later he was joined by the *Indiana*, which had been acting as an escort to General Shafter's Corps. Sampson had now collected at Santiago all the battleships and armoured cruisers of the American navy. He now had superior forces upon the battlefield, and was ready to fall upon Cervera's ships one by one as they issued from the mouth of the harbour. The strategy of the campaign had ended, and the tactical manœuvres of the greatest sea battle in American history were soon to begin.

CHAPTER IX

THE BLOCKADE OF SANTIAGO HARBOUR¹

THE Minister of Marine at Madrid, having received the news of Admiral Dewey's victory in Manila Bay, sent on May 12 the following despatch to Admiral Cervera, whose squadron was then in the vicinity of Martinique:

"Situation changed since your departure. Your instructions amplified so that if you do not believe that your squadron can operate there successfully may return to Peninsula, choosing route and destination, preferably Cadiz. Acknowledge receipt and indicate decision."²

And on May 15, after it had been learned that Cervera had not received the above despatch, the Minister of Marine cabled the Commandant at San Juan, Porto Rico:

"Use every means possible to get to Admiral of squadron, who is at Curaçao, the telegrams you have for him, as also information on situation [of] hostile squadron, and arrange for immediate departure of English steamer *Roath*, if she has coal on board for squadron."

¹ See Maps 5 and 6.

² Another despatch, sent Cervera on the same day, but not received, was in part as follows: "Steamer *Alicante* must have arrived at Martinique, and an English steamer with three thousand tons [of coal] is to make that harbour under orders of Captain of *Alicante*. Both vessels at your disposal."

But Cervera did not receive the despatch of the 12th until his return to Spain after the destruction of his squadron. He was, however, informed of its purport on the 20th of May, the day after his arrival at Santiago. Meanwhile, Captain-General Ramón Blanco, having learned of the instructions contained in the despatch, was greatly disturbed, and on May 17 telegraphed his government :

“Have asked Commandant of Navy whether he has received news of our squadron. He tells me [that he] received from San Juan confidential cipher message saying that telegram has been sent to commander-in-chief of squadron at Fort de France that his instructions are amplified, and if he cannot operate there successfully may return to Peninsula. If this should happen, situation here would be wholly untenable, and I could not prevent bloody revolution in this capital and whole island, feeling being already overmuch excited by delay in arrival of our squadron. Therefore, beg your excellency to tell me whether it is true that order has been issued to squadron to return to Peninsula, and if so does government realize significance of such a decision, which might be the cause of a bloody page staining our history, and of final loss of this island and the honour of Spain. If our squadron is defeated, it would increase here determination to vanquish or die ; but if it flees, panic and revolution are certain.”

On the receipt of this communication the Minister of Marine sent, on May 19, the following despatch to the Naval Commandant at Santiago de Cuba :

“If possible to communicate with Admiral [of] our squadron, notify him that government cancels telegram as to return to Spain.”

When Cervera arrived in Santiago his warships were very much in need of coal. About thirty-four hundred tons of Cardiff and Cumberland coal were found there; but as the facilities for putting it on board were wholly inadequate, the work of supplying the squadron progressed very slowly. Moreover, provisions and water, being very scarce in the city, were obtained with great difficulty. Nevertheless, by continuous exertion day and night, a sufficient amount of coal, water, and provisions was got aboard to enable the squadron to reach any other harbour in the West Indies.

It was a time of great anxiety to Admiral Cervera, for he realized that he could not remain long at Santiago without being blockaded by a large number of the armoured ships of the American navy. Accordingly, on May 23, he decided to sail the next morning for San Juan, Porto Rico. But having received during the night information which led him to doubt the wisdom of his immediate departure, he called together his ranking officers for a discussion of the matter. He told them that since the preceding evening he had been informed that Admiral Schley's squadron had left Key West on the 20th instant, bound for the south side of Cuba; that Admiral Sampson's squadron had been sighted off Cienfuegos, and that, in his judgment,

the correctness of this information was strongly confirmed by the fact that four ships had remained in front of the harbour of Santiago throughout the preceding day. He stated also that either of the enemy's squadrons was superior to his own.

In view of this information, taken in connection with the following considerations developed during the discussion, namely, that the ships had only about one-third their coal supply; that owing to the foul bottom of the *Viscaya* the maximum speed of the squadron was calculated to be only fourteen knots; and that the narrow channel at the harbour entrance made it necessary for the sortie to be made by the ships one at a time, all the officers thought that the few advantages which might be derived from reaching the harbour of San Juan, Porto Rico, would not counterbalance the dangers which might be incurred in going out. They therefore decided that it was better to remain at Santiago for the present, replenish their supplies as far as possible from the stores there, and await a more favourable opportunity for leaving the harbour.

On the next day Admiral Cervera, in a letter to General Arsenio Linares, commander of the Spanish forces at Santiago, explained his reasons for not going out:

HONOURED SIR, — I have the honour of acknowledging the receipt of your two official and confidential letters on the movements of the hostile fleets, for which I thank you

very much. It is much to be regretted that the squadron did not go out yesterday while it had all the fires lighted. But information received from the government confirmed the report that Schley's fleet had started for Santiago on the night of the 20th, and that Sampson was following with his fleet, and for that reason all the captains of this squadron were unanimously of opinion that the sortie was impracticable, and, owing to the scarcity of our coal, I ordered three-fifths of the fires to be put out.

As these ships require a number of hours to get up steam, they would not be ready before night, and that would be too late, especially in view of the rapid consumption of coal. For these reasons there is no other course open at present but to take up positions, as we agreed yesterday, to defend the harbour and city in case an attempt should be made to force the entrance. The *Colon* is already at her post and the *Teresa* will be there shortly. The others will not be there until to-night or to-morrow, as they have to get water for their boilers. If another opportunity presents itself, I intend to try and take advantage of it, but as I cannot hope with these scant forces to attempt any definite operations, it will only be a matter of changing this harbour for another, where we would also be blockaded.

It is to be regretted that bad luck brought me to this harbour, which is so short of everything we need, and I had chosen it in preference because, not being blockaded, I supposed it to be well supplied with provisions, coal, and stores of every kind. Although I always thought that it would be blockaded, I flattered myself that I could keep the greater part of the hostile fleet busy here, which is the only effective service that can be expected of this small

and poorly equipped squadron. I beg that you will transmit these explanations to his excellency the captain-general, as the highest representative of the nation in this island, so that he may know the causes of my apparent inaction.

Yours, etc.,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

On May 26 the ranking officers of the squadron were again assembled for a discussion of the same matter. The conclusions arrived at are set forth in the proceedings of the meeting:

“PROCEEDINGS

“The second in command of the squadron, the captains of the battleships, the chief of staff, and the commander of the torpedo-boat flotilla, being convened by the Admiral, assembled in his cabin on May 26, 1898.

“The Admiral acquainted the officers with recent information received relative to the movements of the hostile fleets, and asked for their opinions as to the expediency of going out that day, taking advantage of the bad weather prevailing. It was unanimously decided that the squadron should proceed to San Juan, and orders were issued to spread the fires of all the boilers and be ready by 5 o'clock P. M.

“At 2 o'clock the semaphore signalled the presence of three hostile ships. In view of this fact, in connection with the circumstance that the weather was clearing, the Admiral again convened the officers aforesaid. Doubts as to whether the prevailing swell would permit the going out of the ships were expressed more forcibly than at the meeting in the morning.

"To settle this question, Pilot Miguel was called, who had piloted in the flagship, and who, in the opinion of the captain of the harbour, is the most intelligent of the pilots (with the exception of the chief pilot, who is ill).

"Miguel stated that with the weather prevailing there would be no trouble whatever about taking out the *Teresa*, *Viscaya*, and *Oquendo* any time, day or night, their draught being only from 23.3 to 23.6 feet, but that the going out of the *Colon*, whose draught is 24.9 feet, might present difficulties on account of a flat rock in the water off Point Morrillo, where the water is only twenty-seven and one-half English feet deep.

"The pilot was sent to the harbour entrance to form a more exact opinion on the state of the sea, and returned, saying that he thought it very probable that, owing to the swell, the *Colon* might touch bottom on the flat rock referred to. Under these circumstances the Admiral propounded the following question, on the assumption that the whole squadron should go out together, leaving only the torpedo-boat destroyers in the harbour: Is it expedient to risk the *Colon* being injured, or should the sortie not be effected, awaiting more favourable circumstances?

"The question being put in this form, Captains Concas and Bustamante were in favour of the sortie, for reasons hereinafter set forth, and all the other officers were in favour of not going out, with the exception of the Admiral, who reserved his opinion. Upon his instructions the foregoing proceedings were drawn up.

"JOSÉ DE PAREDES.
ANTONIO EULATE.
JUAN B. LAZAGA.
EMILIO DÍAZ MOREU.
FERNANDO VILLAAMIL."

SEPARATE OPINIONS

"My reasons for expressing the opinion that the squadron should go out immediately, in spite of the statement of Pilot Miguel, are as follows: My impression on the probable situation of the hostile squadrons is the same as that formulated by the Admiral. To-day we are certain that they are not off this harbour; they are almost sure to be there to-morrow. On this basis, which I believe to be well founded, I reason as follows: Our squadron, blockaded by far superior forces, has very little prospect of going out united by forcing the blockade. For each ship to go out alone, at a venture, does not seem practicable in my opinion, and would expose us to the loss of one or more ships.

"To go out openly and accept battle seems to me almost inhuman, because our defeat would be certain, and unwise, because it would be preparing an easy triumph for the enemy. Outside of this there seems to me no other recourse than to capitulate with the city when, in a month from now or little more, we shall find ourselves without provisions, since we are completely cut off by land and sea. This last solution is to my mind even more inadmissible than any of the former.

"This is, in my opinion, the situation of the squadron at the present time, and in view of its terrible gravity, I am in favour of saving three of the ships, even at the risk of losing the fourth ship, as I do not believe such loss very probable, since pilots always leave a margin of safety, and so do hydrographers. The *Colon's* draught, according to her captain, is 7.60 meters, that is to say 24.93 English feet. The rock, according to the pilot,

has 27.50 feet of water and is of very little extent (he says considerably less than the width of the Admiral's cabin). Hence there would be a margin of two and one-half English feet, and the swell did not seem excessive to me this morning, when I was at the mouth of the harbour and the wind was blowing harder than it is now. Moreover, the *Colon* might pass over the rock without being struck by any sea, and even if she should be struck it would not be at all certain that the resulting injury would disable her from continuing the voyage.

"Above all, I repeat, within the range of possibilities, I believe it preferable for the *Colon* (which, in my mind should be the last to go out) to remain disabled at the harbour entrance than for us to await what I fear is in store for us. This is my opinion. I sincerely hope that I may be mistaken, but my conscience dictates it to me, and I cannot hold it back.

"JOAQUÍN BUSTAMANTE."

"Concurring entirely in the opinion of Captain Bustamante, I wish to add that the hostile squadron which is coming from Cienfuegos and which we expected this morning, having probably been detained by the storm, may be here at daybreak, and the blockade we should have to run in that case would be immensely superior even without counting the other squadron which is reported to be coming by the way of the Old Channel.

"In order to realise the seriousness of the situation of the city, it should be remembered that eleven months' pay is due the army as well as the navy ; that the army owes for its provisions for almost the same length of time, and that commercial enterprise does not care to increase

the debt, there being back in the minds of all the thought that with the autonomy of the island the treasury will pass out of our hands. Consequently the city of Santiago de Cuba, being blockaded by land and sea, is besieged by itself, which is the most effective kind of blockade, for there are no provisions and no one is doing anything to supply any. Therefore the capitulation will become necessary in a very short space of time, and will drag the squadron along with it.

"The same as Captain Bustamante, I do not believe the loss of the *Cristobal Colon* at all probable, and while under ordinary circumstances we should not go out and probably should not have entered, to-day circumstances demand our running the risk even of total loss, which I consider very remote, however. A delay of twenty or twenty-five days, which is all that remains to us, is not sufficient to warrant a hope of a favourable opportunity or a change of circumstances.

"VÍCTOR M. CONCAS.

"SANTIAGO DE CUBA, May 26, 1898."

"I do not consider the circumstances so extreme as to make it necessary to risk the loss of the *Colon* at the rock where the *Gerona*, of less draught than the former, lost part of her false keel, and in hopes that the sea will calm down and that another opportunity will present itself the sortie is deferred.


"CERVERA."

This was his last opportunity. The arrival of Commodore Schley on May 28 and of Admiral Sampson on June 1 so completely closed the door

of escape that, unless a storm or hurricane should disperse the American warships, there was no longer a possibility of Cervera's getting out without having to fight his way through the concentrated strength of the American navy.

When Admiral Sampson arrived off Santiago, he found the vessels of Commodore Schley's squadron in position just westward of the mouth of the harbour. On the next day he issued an order of battle, which had for its object not only the close blockade of Santiago, but the attack and destruction of the Spanish squadron, should it attempt to escape. In accordance with this order the fleet was divided into two squadrons: the *first* under the direct command of the admiral, was composed of the *New York, Iowa, Oregon, New Orleans, Mayflower*, and *Porter*; the *second*, under the command of Commodore Schley, was composed of the *Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, Marblehead*, and *Vixen*. The first squadron was ordered to take position on the east side of the entrance; the second, on the west side. The warships were to form in a semicircle off the mouth of the harbour, to remain within about six miles of the Morro in the daytime, and move in three or four miles nearer at night. Should the enemy appear, they were to close in at once, regardless of the shore batteries, which were not deemed of sufficient power to do any material injury, and endeavour to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore. Accompanying the

order of battle was the following diagram, showing the blockading positions assigned to the different vessels:¹



Though the attacks made upon the forts of the harbour and the temporary withdrawal of vessels for coaling and other purposes necessitated from time to time a different arrangement, yet, in general, the positions indicated above were maintained throughout the blockade.

In order to prevent the enemy from escaping at night, the *Iowa*, *Oregon*, and *Massachusetts* were ordered to take turns of two hours each in keeping a searchlight directly on the entrance of the harbour; at the same time the *New York* and *New Orleans* on the eastern side of the entrance, and the *Brooklyn* and *Texas* on the western side, were to take turns in using their lights to sweep the coast-line and the horizon.

¹ The *Indiana* later had a place in the cordon.

On June 3 Admiral Sampson was informed by a reliable Cuban that all four armoured cruisers and two torpedo-boat destroyers of Cervera's squadron were inside Santiago Harbour; and on that same day he received a despatch from Washington, saying that the torpedo-boat destroyer *Terror*,¹ the only missing vessel of the squadron, was then in San Juan Harbour, Porto Rico, in a greatly damaged condition. The receipt of this information put an end to any doubt that may have lingered in the mind of Admiral Sampson as to the exact whereabouts of Cervera's entire squadron.

Santiago Bay is a landlocked harbour extending about five miles inland. On the east side of the head of the bay is the city of Santiago, the capital of Santiago Province. The entrance to the bay is through a long, narrow channel varying in width from three hundred and fifty to four hundred and fifty feet. On the east side of the entrance, upon a huge rocky point lying along the south shore, Morro Castle rises two hundred and sixty feet above the sea level, — old, rugged, imposing, and seemingly formidable, but armed only with a few obsolete cannon. A few yards east of the castle, on the crest of this huge rocky point, was an earthwork, known as the Eastern or Morro Battery. This battery was armed with two obsolete 8-inch iron howitzers and five 6.3-inch bronze guns, made

¹ On May 25 the *Terror* sailed to San Juan, Porto Rico, from Martinique, where Cervera had left her for repairs.

in the years 1718, 1768, 1769, 1779, and 1783 respectively. Occupying the heights on the opposite side of the entrance was Upper Socapa Battery, armed with three obsolete 8-inch iron howitzers, and two 6.3-inch Hontoria guns taken from the Spanish cruiser *Reina Mercedes*, which was lying in the harbour at the outbreak of the war. Directly behind Morro Castle, on the east side of the neck of the channel and about a quarter of a mile from its mouth, was Estrella Battery, in which were mounted two short, obsolete 4.7-inch bronze guns, two obsolete 8-inch iron howitzers, and two 3-inch breech-loading Placentia guns. On the opposite shore, near the water's edge, was the Lower Socapa Battery, an earthwork armed with four 1.5-inch Hotchkiss revolving cannon and two Nordenfelt rapid-fire machine guns, which were taken from the *Reina Mercedes*. Farther up the bay on the east side, about a mile from the Morro, was Punta Gorda Battery, in which were mounted two modern 6-inch Meta howitzers, two 3.5-inch breech-loading Krupp guns, and two Hontoria 6.3-inch guns taken from the *Reina Mercedes*. This battery, lying directly in line with the channel, completely commanded the narrow entrance.

Prior to the declaration of war there was not a single modern gun at the mouth of the harbour, nothing but obsolete ordnance, nearly every piece of which was more than one hundred years old. The four batteries, Morro or Eastern, Upper

Socapa, Lower Socapa, and Punta Gorda, were all hastily and imperfectly constructed after hostilities began. The two Krupp guns and two Meta howitzers on Punta Gorda were placed in position between April 21 and 27. Of the four Hontoria guns taken from the *Reina Mercedes*, two were carried to the Upper Socapa Battery, where the first was mounted on May 18, and the second on the 28th; the other two were mounted at Punta Gorda on June 2 and 17 respectively. These old forts and batteries were occupied by regular soldiers, who were reënforced on June 22 by a company of sailors from Cervera's squadron, but the guns taken from the *Reina Mercedes* were served by officers and sailors from that ship.

Early in April the Spaniards began placing submarine mines in the channel, and by the end of the month this work was practically completed. The firing stations for these mines, which were arranged to explode by electric currents, were the Upper and Lower Socapa and Estrella batteries, and the island of Cay Smith, opposite Soldados Point.

Before sailing from Key West to Santiago, Admiral Sampson had seriously considered the practicability of obstructing the narrow entrance to the harbour by sinking a large vessel across the channel. With this object in view, he had on May 27 sent the *New Orleans* to convoy the collier *Sterling* to Santiago with instructions to Commodore Schley to sink the collier across the entrance to the harbour.

But as the vessels did not reach Santiago until May 30, only two days before Sampson's arrival, the orders regarding the *Sterling* were not carried out.

In the meantime Admiral Sampson had decided to substitute the collier *Merrimac* for the *Sterling*; and for the execution of this desperate undertaking he selected Assistant Naval Constructor Richmond Pearson Hobson, U. S. Navy, with whom he had been in consultation as to its details during the voyage from Key West. Out of a large number of volunteers, the following crew was chosen: Osborn Warren Deignan, coxswain of the *Merrimac*; George F. Phillips, machinist of the *Merrimac*; Francis Kelly, water tender of the *Merrimac*; George Charette, gunner's mate of the *New York*; Daniel Montague, chief master-at-arms of the *New York*; Randolph Clausen, coxswain of the *New York*; and J. E. Murphy, coxswain of the *Iowa*.

As the channel opposite Estrella Point was only three hundred and fifty feet wide and the *Merrimac* three hundred and thirty-three feet long, the harbour entrance could be completely obstructed by sinking the vessel athwart the channel at this point. The plan as worked out by Hobson was to steam into the channel just before daylight until opposite Estrella Point, then swing the big vessel around directly across the channel, drop the anchors at bow and stern, and sink her by opening her sea valves and exploding ten torpedoes fastened along the port side.



The intention was to enter the harbour on the morning of June 2, and the start was actually made then; but owing to the delay in completing the preparations, the break of day was so close at hand that Admiral Sampson decided to recall the *Merrimac* and postpone the undertaking until the next morning.

About half-past three o'clock on the morning of June 3, while the moon was shining brightly above the western horizon, Lieutenant ¹ Hobson, standing on the bridge of the *Merrimac*, directed her course straight for the Morro. The big vessel approached the mouth of the harbour. Save the muffled throbbing of her engines no sound broke the awful stillness until she was within about four hundred yards of the old castle, when suddenly from a picket boat near the shore on the west side of the entrance a shot flashed forth that sounded ominous in the deep silence. Another flash! Another shot! But untouched the *Merrimac* passed into the mouth of the harbour. A moment more and there was a crash from the Socapa Battery, followed almost immediately by a terrific fire from both sides of the channel. Yet the big ship moved on; and amidst the storm of shot and shell the heroic Hobson coolly and courageously gave his orders, which were as coolly and courageously responded to by the brave helmsman of his valiant crew. "That is

¹ An Assistant Naval Constructor, United States Navy, has the relative rank of *Lieutenant*.

Estrella, Deignan. Steer for Estrella!" "Steer for Estrella, sir," is the response. "Watch the helm!" "Watch the helm, sir." "A touch of port helm!" "A touch of port helm, sir." "Steady!" "Steady, sir." "Starboard!" "Starboard, sir." "Starboard, I say!" "The helm's a starboard, sir." "Hard a port!" "Hard a port, sir." "Hard a port, I say!" "The helm is hard a port, sir, and lashed."

Meanwhile the engines had been stopped, and as the *Merrimac* neared the spot where she was to be sunk, her valves were thrown open and Hobson gave the order to explode the torpedoes. Only two of them could be discharged; the electric wires of the others had been broken by the enemy's fire. But the explosion of the two was not sufficient to sink the ship fast enough, nor could she be swung across the channel, for her steering gear had been shot away and one of her anchor chains cut by a shell. The dreadful fire of the batteries was augmented by a hail of bullets from Mausers and machine guns. From the *Reina Mercedes* and the destroyer *Pluton* torpedoes were discharged, and three mines were exploded in the channel, one of which tore a great hole in the ship. The crew lay flat upon the deck to escape if possible the tempest of deadly missiles that crashed through the sides or swept the vessel from stem to stern. The ship's momentum and the strong tide meanwhile swept her on through and beyond the narrow

channel, until she finally sank at a point where she offered little obstruction to the harbour entrance. None of the crew had been killed and only two slightly wounded; and as the ship went down they gathered about and clung to an old catamaran attached by a line to the hulk. Here, with only their heads above the water, their teeth chattering, and their bodies shivering with cold, they remained until just after sunrise, when a launch carrying Admiral Cervera and a number of Spanish soldiers came down the harbour. As it passed near, Lieutenant Hobson hailed it, and surrendered himself and crew as prisoners of war.

On June 6, from 7.30 A.M. until 10 A.M., a tremendous fire was delivered by the American fleet against Socapa and Morro batteries, and Fort Aguadores, which was about three miles farther east. Nearly two thousand shells were fired. The warships began the bombardment at a distance of about three miles from the Spanish batteries and gradually worked up to within about two thousand yards. The batteries were frequently hit, but little or no injury was done to the guns. Most of the shells struck the rocks of Morro or Socapa, a few pierced the walls of the old castle, and many passed over the heights into the bay beyond, or fell upon Cay Smith, where much damage was done. A village on the island was destroyed, and the *Reina Mercedes* anchored near by was struck thirty-five times. On this vessel Commander Emilio de Acosta

of the Spanish navy and five sailors were killed and twelve wounded, and in the batteries ten men were killed and one hundred and eighteen wounded.¹

The batteries offered but a feeble resistance to this attack. The guns of the Upper Socapa Battery fired forty-seven shots, but those of the Punta Gorda, since they commanded but a small space of the open sea through the narrow channel, fired only seven. One shot from a Spanish battery struck the *Massachusetts* without doing her any injury, but no other American vessel was hit.

Immediately following the bombardment of June 6, Admiral Sampson turned his attention to securing a harbour near Santiago where his warships could in an emergency receive slight repairs, obtain coal with less difficulty than from colliers, or seek refuge from the hurricanes, which were frequent in those waters during that season of the year. He found such a harbour at Guantanamo Bay, which lies thirty-seven nautical miles east of Santiago Bay. It consists of a large deep outer basin and a large shallow inner basin, connected by a channel running through a group of islands. Just beyond the channel, on the southwest side of the inner basin, is the small town of Caimanera, connected by a railroad with the city of Guantanamo, which lies twelve miles inland. The bay was defended by the small Spanish gunboat *Sandoval*, by an old fort on Toro Key, on the east side of the

¹ See Appendix M.

narrowest part of the channel, and by a blockhouse near Caimanera and another at the cable station of Playa del Este on the east side of the outer basin.

From a reconnoissance made on May 19 by Captain Casper F. Goodrich, U. S. Navy, while at Guantanamo on a cable-cutting expedition, it was learned that the Spanish defences there were very weak, and on May 29 the Secretary of the Navy recommended the seizure of the bay.


On June 7 Admiral Sampson sent the *Marblehead* and the auxiliary cruiser *Yankee* to take possession of the outer basin of the harbour. As the two warships approached the entrance they were fired upon by the gunboat *Sandoval*, and by one or two guns at the blockhouse near Playa del Este; but a few shots from the warships quickly drove the gunboat into the inner basin and scattered the Spaniards occupying the blockhouse. This having been accomplished, the *Yankee* returned to Santiago, but the *Marblehead* remained to hold possession until the harbour could be permanently occupied by a battalion of marines, which was then en route from Key West on the transport *Panther*. This battalion was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel R. W. Huntington, U. S. Marine Corps, and consisted of five companies of infantry and one of artillery, having four 3-inch rapid-fire guns, in all twenty-one officers and six hundred and fifteen enlisted men.¹

¹ See Appendix N.

The *Panther* arrived on June 10, and with her came the *Oregon* and several smaller vessels from Santiago to protect the disembarkation. The marines landed and established their camp¹ without opposition, near the old cable station of Playa del Este.

The fire of the warships had forced the Spaniards to withdraw, but on June 11 they returned and began firing at the marines, and for two or three days continued at intervals to attack and harass them. In meeting these attacks the marines had to fight at first in an unsheltered open space, but the Spaniards, using smokeless powder and concealing themselves in the brush and behind hillocks, were able to pour in a terribly annoying fire without betraying their positions. Nevertheless, the marines held their positions and, finally, having intrenched themselves, were able with their machine guns, aided by the guns of the *Marblehead*, to repulse successfully every attack. It was learned from the Cuban scouts that the Spaniards had a sort of temporary base about three miles distant, where a well furnished them their only supply of drinking water. This point was attacked on the 14th by two companies of marines aided by about fifty Cubans. After an engagement, in which a number of the Spaniards were killed and wounded and eighteen captured, the well was destroyed.

¹ In honour of the captain of the *Marblehead* the encampment was called *Camp McCalla*.



As the *Sandoval* continued to bring reinforcements across the bay from Caimanera to Toro Key, Sampson on June 15 detached the *Texas* and *Suwanee* to join the *Marblehead* in an attack upon the fort and gunboat. The fort was destroyed, but owing to mines in the channel the *Sandoval* could not be reached. On the 17th the warships again bombarded the shores of the channel and the points of the harbour from which the Spaniards had fired upon the marines. With the destruction of the fort on Toro Key and the Spanish station at the well, the fighting practically ceased, but the marines continued to remain in the harbour until after the Spanish surrender. Their entire loss was six killed and sixteen wounded. The loss of the Spaniards is not accurately known.

The dynamite gunboat *Vesuvius*, which had been sent to Santiago at Admiral Sampson's request, arrived on June 13, and from that time on until the surrender she would nearly every night run close in to the harbour entrance, and from her three guns fire three dynamite shells at the fortifications. The tremendous explosion of these shells created great terror, and produced awful destruction¹ wherever

¹ Lieutenant José Müller, Spanish Navy, in his "Battles and Capitulation of Santiago de Cuba," says: "Every night with great regularity, the *Vesuvius* threw her three bombs at the batteries at the mouth of the harbour. . . . For that purpose she would come close to the coast, accompanied by another ship, usually a battleship, — for the mission of the *Vesuvius* is only offensive, she has no defensive qualities, — and as soon as she was within convenient distance she would discharge three tubes at regular

they struck, but, on the whole, they did little real damage to the fortifications, owing to the limited range of the guns and the difficulty of aiming them with accuracy.

On June 14 the *New Orleans* moved in close to the entrance and engaged Morro and Socapa batteries; and though both replied to the attack, the cruiser was not hit. On June 16 the two batteries were again bombarded by the *New York*, *Brooklyn*, *Oregon*, *Iowa*, *Massachusetts*, *Texas*, and *New Orleans*; but the reply of the batteries was feeble and ineffective. In these attacks three men in the Socapa and Morro batteries were killed, and three officers and twenty-two men were wounded. During the blockade the warships also threw a few shells into the city of Santiago, and made one or two other brief attacks against the batteries at the entrance of the harbour, and against the landing-places on each side of the Morro, for the purpose of preparing the way for the disembarkation

intervals. If the projectiles dropped close to a battery its ruin was certain, for one must see the effects of one of these projectiles to understand them. . . . One of the projectiles, which fell on the northern slope of the Socapa, tore up trees right and left for a distance of sixty-five feet. Another made an excavation not very deep but very wide; I was told that it would hold twenty horses. Still another dropped into the water, but close to one of the destroyers which was violently shaken, as also the *Mercedes*, anchored at a short distance." Again he says: "The *Vesuvius* had discharged two bombs the preceding night (May 25), one completely destroying the house of the lighthouse keeper, the other seriously damaging the fortress, wounding three sailors of the *Mercedes* and a soldier of the garrison."

of the land forces which arrived on June 20. The total casualties resulting from all these bombardments, as obtained from Spanish sources,¹ were twenty-four sailors and soldiers killed and two hundred and nine wounded. But though approximately five thousand projectiles were fired, more than half of which were of large or medium calibre, the only damage done the Spanish guns was the dismounting of one piece in the Morro Battery and the disabling on July 2 of one Hontoria gun in the Upper Socapa Battery.

On June 18 the Navy Department was advised that Admiral Camara's squadron, consisting of the battleship *Pelayo*, the armoured cruiser *Emperador Carlos V*, six converted cruisers, and four destroyers, had started by way of the Suez Canal for the Philippines. About a week before this information reached Washington, the *Monterey* had sailed from San Diego, California, to reënforce Admiral Dewey at Manila, and on June 23 the *Monadnock* left San Francisco for the same purpose. But as the speed of these monitors was very slow, it seemed hardly probable that they would arrive at their destination in advance of Camara's squadron. Accordingly, the Navy Department deemed it wise to send some of the ships of Sampson's fleet to reënforce Admiral Dewey. Commodore John C. Watson was relieved of the command of the blockading forces of western Cuba

¹ See Appendix M.

and ordered to Santiago, where he was to assume command of the *Oregon*, *Iowa*, *Newark*, *Yosemite*, *Yankee*, and *Dixie*. A number of steam colliers loaded with forty thousand tons of coal were assembled at Hampton Roads preparatory to joining these vessels in the Azores Islands. It was intended that this squadron should cross the Atlantic, enter the Mediterranean, and follow Camara.

The real destination of this squadron was kept secret; but as the departure of Camara's squadron had left the coast of Spain practically without naval defence, the authorities in Washington announced that the destination of Watson's squadron was the coast of Spain, "with a view primarily to alarm Spain and cause the recall of Camara, and secondarily to awaken Europe to the fact that the republic of the western hemisphere would not hesitate to carry war, if necessary, across the Atlantic."

But Admiral Sampson was very reluctant to part with any of his armoured ships; he informed the department that the force he then had insured the capture or destruction of Cervera's squadron; and that this would, in his opinion, end the war. Notwithstanding these representations, the Navy Department decided to make no change in the plan; but in order that the vessels which would be left at Santiago might for a longer period maintain their position in the blockading line, Sampson was authorized to postpone the sailing of the

squadron until all his armoured ships could fill their coal bunkers.

Camara reached Port Saïd on June 26, but was delayed there several days in efforts to obtain coal. This delay indicated that proper provision had not been made for supplying his ships with fuel for such a long voyage, and suggested some doubts as to whether the Philippines were his real destination. On July 2 the squadron began its passage through the Suez Canal, but before all the ships reached the Red Sea Cervera's squadron was destroyed; and as this left the armoured vessels of Sampson's fleet free to cross the Atlantic, Camara was compelled to return to the defence of Spain.

The bottling up of Cervera's squadron in Santiago Bay gave the American army an opportunity to coöperate with the navy in the destruction of the Spanish squadron, and gave the navy an opportunity to coöperate with the army in the capture of the garrison and city of Santiago. As early as May 24 the Navy Department had instructed Admiral Sampson to be prepared to convoy an army from Tampa, Florida, to Cuba. On May 27 the Secretary of the Navy telegraphed Sampson:

"If the Spanish division is proved to be in Santiago de Cuba, it is the intention of the department to make descent immediately upon that port with ten thousand United States troops, landing eight nautical miles east of that port. You will be expected to convoy transports,

probably fifteen or twenty, going in person and taking with you the *New York* and *Indiana* and the *Oregon*, and as many smaller vessels with good batteries as can possibly be gathered, to guard against possible attack by Spanish torpedo-boat destroyers."

But on the 29th Sampson, acting under the orders of the department, sailed from Key West to Santiago with the *New York* and *Oregon*, leaving the battleship *Indiana* behind to act as a convoy for the troops when they should be ready. In the meantime the War Department, having determined to send the Fifth Corps, then at Tampa, Florida, under the command of General Shafter, to Santiago de Cuba, orders were issued on May 30 and 31 to that effect. On June 3 Admiral Sampson was informed that General Shafter expected to start from Tampa on June 4 with eighteen thousand men. Sampson replied on the same day:

"Have received reliable information from Cuban officers that the Spanish force in this vicinity consists of seven thousand men intrenched in Juraguacito (Siboney) and Daiquiri; five thousand men in Santiago de Cuba; in Morro de Cuba four hundred men; at other points in the bay one hundred men, with small rapid-fire guns and submarine mines at various points. With superior force and insurgent force, which is ready, though mostly needing arms, Santiago de Cuba must fall, with ships in port, which cannot be entered against obstruction and mines."

And immediately following the bombardment of the forts at the mouth of the harbour on June 6,

he telegraphed a report of the same to the Secretary of the Navy, adding:

“If ten thousand men were here city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate army movement; if delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from the fleet.”

But the almost inextricable confusion at Tampa, and the receipt of a false report that two Spanish cruisers and a torpedo-boat destroyer had been seen in the Nicolas Channel, delayed the departure of the Fifth Corps for about two weeks. Finally, on June 14, the expedition, convoyed by the *Indiana* and several smaller ships, set sail for Santiago de Cuba.

It is not the intention at this time to describe in detail the sailing and disembarkation of General Shafter's army; that is reserved for another chapter. But it may be remarked here that this army arrived at Santiago on June 20, and in conjunction with the navy was then ready to strike the blows which were to decide the fate of Cuba and end the war. The delay at Tampa was but the lull before the storm.

COMMENTS

No sooner had the naval authorities of Spain received positive information of Admiral Dewey's

victory in the Philippines, than they felt the need of having a strong naval force in home waters. Accordingly, the despatch of May 12 authorizing Cervera's return was sent; and so anxious were they that this despatch should reach Cervera before he arrived in any Cuban or Porto Rican port that three days later the commandant at San Juan, Porto Rico, was directed to use every possible means to forward it to the admiral, who was then at Curaçao. As Admiral Cervera did not receive the despatch until his return to Spain several months later, and as he did not even learn that such a despatch had been sent until May 20, the day after it was cancelled by the Spanish government, there was of course no opportunity for him to take advantage of the permission granted therein. It appears, however, that the despatch arrived at Martinique only a few hours after his departure for Curaçao. Had he remained off Martinique a day longer, he doubtless would have received not only this despatch, but also the other one sent on the same day, informing him that the steamer *Alicante* loaded with coal was then due at that port. A delay of three or four days would have enabled the vessels of the squadron to take on sufficient coal to carry them back to Spain; or, after receiving the despatch of the 12th, Cervera could have sailed to Curaçao, where he expected to find coal, and where, after a short wait, he could have obtained it from the *Restormel*, which arrived

there on the 17th. In either case he doubtless would have been able to coal his ships and return to Spain without meeting any of the armoured vessels of the American squadrons. Though the return of the squadron without fighting would have weakened greatly the prestige of Spain, nevertheless it would have been the best solution of the strategical problem. Such a manœuvre would have made practicable the execution of the plan which Cervera and his captains had so persistently advocated, and would have placed the squadron in a position where it could have formed a junction with Camara's squadron against any attack made by either of the American squadrons in European waters. In short, Spain would have regained the advantage of strategical combination, which she had lost in despatching Cervera's squadron to the West Indies.

In war, seemingly the most trivial matters often lead to momentous results. An error of judgment, a sleeping sentinel, a delayed despatch, a broken wire, an omitted word, may cause the loss of a battle or of a campaign — may even change the destiny of a nation, and write anew the map of the world. Had the despatch of May 12 been forwarded to Cervera a few hours earlier, or had he remained a few hours longer at Martinique, the strategy of the entire campaign would have been changed, and the course of the war would have been vastly different from what it was. There

would have been no Las Guasimas, no El Caney, no San Juan Hill. On another field the great struggle would have taken place. Around Havana, doubtless, the conflict would have centred; and it would have been bloodier and much more prolonged, for the Spaniards behind their fortifications and intrenchments would have fought with that superb courage that they have always shown on the defensive; and the Americans with their characteristic aggressiveness and determination would have carried on the war until victory crowned their efforts, regardless of hardships, setbacks, and bloodshed.

No sound strategical reason can be assigned for Captain-General Blanco's protest against Cervera's return to Spain. What could have been his object? Did he desire that the squadron should measure strength in the open sea with the American squadrons? This would have been rash indeed, for the naval forces of the United States in American waters were far superior in fighting strength not only to Cervera's squadron, but to any aggregation of vessels that Spain could then have possibly sent against them. The defeat which would have been the almost certain result of such a battle would, to say the least, have crippled the squadron to such an extent that it would no longer have been of any service either as a menace to American transports, or as a means of communication with Spain.

Did Blanco intend that the squadron should enter the harbour of Havana? He must have known that there was only a remote possibility of such a thing, for the harbour had been closely blockaded from the start; and though just at this time a number of the armoured vessels of the blockading fleet were absent, the squadrons of Sampson and Schley were near enough to reach the scene of action in a very short time. But suppose the squadron had succeeded in eluding the blockading vessels and had entered the harbour without the slightest injury, it no doubt would, in a few hours, have been as hopelessly shut in as it shortly afterwards was at Santiago, and as powerless to prevent the landing of American troops on Cuban soil as the Russian fleet, blockaded at Port Arthur, was to prevent the landing of Japanese troops on the Liao Tung Peninsula.

Good strategy demanded the withdrawal of the squadron from Cuban waters to some point beyond the danger of its being blockaded or destroyed, where it would have been a constant menace to American transports. If Blanco had clearly grasped the situation, and had urged the return of Cervera's squadron to Spain, instead of protesting against it, he would have been spared the humiliation of seeing, as a result of his protest, the decisive battles of the war fought around Santiago with inadequate forces, while the great bulk of his army was too far away to extend a helping hand;

and the still greater humiliation of seeing the flower of the Spanish navy annihilated at a single blow.

Since the vessels of the squadron had by May 23 taken on board a sufficient supply of coal to enable them to reach any West Indian port, there was no valid reason for remaining in the harbour of Santiago. The principal reason given by Cervera for not going out on May 24 was, that he had received information on the evening of May 23 that Schley's squadron had left Key West on the night of May 20, and that Sampson, following with his squadron, had arrived off Cienfuegos. This, evidently, was a good reason for not going westward; but as Cervera had planned to go to San Juan, it was not only a poor reason for not going out, but was indeed the very best reason why he should have gone out. Since he believed that Schley's squadron was on the south side of Cuba, eastward of Cienfuegos, and that Sampson's squadron was then at Cienfuegos, surely the desperateness of the situation demanded that he should leave Santiago Harbour before these two squadrons could arrive and blockade him in port. The other reasons given for not going out on the 24th, namely, that the squadron had only one-third its coal supply, that its maximum speed, owing to the foul bottom of the *Vizcaya*, was only fourteen knots, and that the long narrow entrance to the harbour made it necessary for the sortie to be

effected by the vessels one by one, were really not worth serious consideration. In the first place, the squadron had more than sufficient coal to carry it to San Juan; secondly, the maximum speed of the squadron could not have been increased in the least by any further delay at Santiago; and, thirdly, it mattered not how long he remained there, the narrowness of the channel would have made it necessary for his vessels to go out one by one. Nor was there any valid reason why the squadron should not have gone out on the 26th as was subsequently planned. There was of course a bare possibility that, owing to the swell prevailing at that time, the *Colon* might have been injured by striking on the rock at the mouth of the harbour; but even so, would it not have been far more prudent to take such a risk than to have to go out in the face of the armoured vessels of the American squadrons? The truth of the matter is that, with the exception of a few hours between the 23d of May and the evening of the 28th, when Schley's squadron arrived and took up a permanent position before the harbour, there was not an hour that the squadron could not have escaped without encountering opposition.

Cervera, on arriving at San Juan, would have found an abundance of coal and copies of all despatches that had not yet reached him; and, as his government at this time was still seriously

considering his recall,¹ he might have been directed to return to Spain.

In the light of these circumstances it can easily be seen how fortunate it was for the Americans that Cervera and his captains twice changed their minds about sailing out of the harbour, and how Schley's retrograde movement, which left a way clear for Cervera to escape on the 26th, 27th, or 28th, might have had a far-reaching and momentous influence upon the conduct of the campaign.

Cervera, not having received any word from the Spanish government authorizing his return, was acting under his original instructions, which compelled him to remain in West Indian waters, but left him free to enter any harbour he pleased, and to accept or decline battle as he deemed best. His plan was to leave Santiago Harbour and to sail for San Juan, Porto Rico. But having been led to believe that both American squadrons were on the

¹ On June 3 the Spanish Minister of War at Madrid cabled Captain-General Blanco: "Very serious situation in Philippines compels us to send there ships and reënforcements of troops as early as possible. To be able to cope with hostile squadron at Manila it will be indispensable to send an equally strong fleet there. At present [we have] only two warships [to send] there, and one of them I believe cannot pass through canal. The only thing we can do is to send all the ships of Cervera's squadron that can get out of Santiago. But before deciding the government wishes to know your opinion as to [the] effect the withdrawal of Cervera's squadron might produce in Cuba. This movement would be only temporary, and as soon as object is attained in Philippines, the squadron would return to Cuba without loss of time and strongly reënforced."

south side of Cuba, advancing upon Santiago, he thought that his going to San Juan would not lessen to any appreciable extent the difficulties confronting him, for he felt sure that his movement eastward would be reported by the American scouting vessels, and that Sampson and Schley would at once hasten to San Juan and blockade him in port. This view of the situation no doubt had great weight in causing Cervera and his captains to change their minds about sailing out of the harbour. Feeling that the plan of going to San Juan offered no opportunity of escaping the American squadrons, and that, at best, it would only postpone for a few days longer the destruction of the squadron, they were undecided, timid, and vacillating at the very time when they should have been decided, bold, and aggressive.

It is a well-established maxim of war that when a commander has an inferior force in the theatre of operations his only hope of success is to adopt an aggressive policy. The enemy's advantage in numbers must be counterbalanced by boldness of manœuvre, rapidity of movement, and skill in combinations. It was thus that Bonaparte in his first Italian campaign defeated six Austrian armies sent successively against him, every one of which outnumbered his own. It was thus that Stonewall Jackson in the valley of the Shenandoah won for himself an imperishable renown.

Did the circumstances at Santiago justify such a policy? Let us see. If both American squadrons were on the south side of Cuba advancing upon Santiago, as Cervera believed them to be, Havana was uncovered, or at most defended only by a few monitors and unarmoured vessels. Here, then, was Cervera's opportunity. By sailing for Havana by way of the Windward Passage, he would probably have been able to reach that port ahead of either American squadron; for if the American squadrons were then advancing upon Santiago, it would have been most natural for them to follow him, rather than to turn back to cover Havana, in which case he might reasonably have expected to beat them to Havana. Having arrived there, he could have destroyed the weaker blockading vessels, evaded or attacked the monitors as he saw fit, and entered the harbour.

If it be replied to all this that as a matter of fact Sampson was not on the south side of Cuba, but was cruising back and forth with a powerful squadron in the vicinity of Nicolas Channel, eastward of Havana, expecting that Cervera might make this very movement, the answer is that even then the chances of battle would not have been unfavourable to Cervera. Sampson's armoured vessels consisted at this time of the cruiser *New York*, the battleship *Indiana*, and the monitors *Puritan*, *Amphitrite*, and *Miantonomoh*. The *Oregon* joined him on May 28, but had Cervera sailed for Havana on the

morning of May 24, at an average speed of twelve¹ knots an hour, he could have covered the distance, six hundred and thirty-nine miles, in about fifty-three hours, and arrived at his destination at noon of May 26, about forty-eight hours before the *Oregon* joined Sampson's squadron. He would then have had a fair chance of success, for the only armoured vessel of Sampson's squadron swifter than Cervera's slowest vessel was the *New York*. He might have evaded the monitors, kept out of the reach even of the *Indiana*, and had the *New York* followed him he could have turned upon her with his four cruisers. Having sailed around or slipped by the slower vessels of Sampson's squadron, he could have driven away or destroyed the unarmoured blockading vessels off the harbour of Havana. Even had he found the American armoured vessels in position around the entrance of the harbour, the powerful guns of the fortifications, which extended several miles on either side of the entrance of the harbour, would have kept these vessels so far out at sea that he probably could have gained the shelter of the land batteries by breaking through the line of defence at some unprotected or weak point.

This plan would have enabled Cervera to evade for a time one of the American squadrons and to bring against the other his entire force, while the

¹ According to Cervera's statement, the maximum speed of his squadron was fourteen knots.

enemy would have been compelled to fight with only a part of his forces, — a part, too, that contained but two armoured vessels that were really fit to be pitted against the vessels of the Spanish squadron; and it would also have enabled him to fight in the open sea, where he would have had the full power of manœuvre, and where, if the battle were drawn or his vessels were crippled, he could have sought shelter behind the fortifications of Havana. No other plan offered him the opportunity of accomplishing at practically the same time the two important objects which he should have constantly kept in mind, namely, to bring an equal or superior force upon the battlefield; or, if that were not possible, to take refuge in the harbour of Havana.

By remaining at Santiago, Cervera gave the Americans the chance of bringing an overwhelming force against him on the battlefield, and of attacking one by one the vessels of his squadron as they issued from the mouth of the harbour. In other words, he allowed the Americans both the strategical and tactical advantages of the situation, thus giving them the opportunity of practically ending the campaign before the greater part of the land forces of either combatant had a chance to fire a shot.

One of the great principles of strategy, applicable alike on the sea and on the land, is: *The offensive alone promises decisive results.* On first thought it might seem that this principle could hardly ever

be followed by the weaker combatant; but the chances for offensive action and bold manœuvres are so numerous in every war that there is rarely lacking to a commander of inferior forces an opportunity to strike his enemy a telling if not a destructive blow. "A general," said Bonaparte, "always has troops enough if he knows how to employ those he has." The really great commander perceives the situation in all its bearings, and knows how with the forces at hand to produce a maximum effect upon a vulnerable or vital point of his adversary.

Cervera had a clear conception of the general strategical situation, but he depreciated the difficulties of his adversary and exaggerated his own. He had great courage, but he was lacking in boldness and aggressiveness. Though he commanded a squadron peculiarly fitted for offensive action, he remained constantly on the defensive. Had he acted upon the principle that *the offensive alone promises decisive results* and taken the risks that the desperateness of the situation justified, he might have struck a more powerful blow for his country and won for himself a greater name.

The attempt to close the entrance to Santiago Harbour by sinking the *Merrimac* in the channel has been adversely criticised; it will therefore not be out of place to examine the subject somewhat in detail. As the channel opposite Estrella Point was only three hundred and fifty feet wide and the

Merrimac three hundred and thirty-three feet long, it is evident that the sinking of the vessel across the channel at this point would have completely obstructed the entrance. The undertaking would have probably been successful had not the steering gear, the torpedo connections, and one of the anchor chains been shot away. At any rate, the fact that the ship entered the channel and passed beyond the narrowest point before sinking proves that the undertaking was at least feasible.

Had the channel been obstructed, the Spanish vessels could not possibly have gone out, nor could the American vessels have entered. In that case the burden of destroying Cervera's squadron would have been shifted from the navy to the army, and the fate of the squadron would have depended upon the success or failure of the American land campaign against the Spanish forces surrounding the city and harbour. But as the army had not yet left the United States, as there was no certainty that it would be able to land, or be victorious if it should land, and as Sampson's forces at the mouth of the harbour were strong enough to destroy the Spanish squadron should it attempt to escape, it might seem on first thought that there was nothing to be gained by blocking the channel. But Sampson was looking forward not so much to a great naval victory as he was to the certain success of the campaign, however it might be accomplished. He purposed to do what in his opinion offered the

best chances of final success, regardless of whether he himself or some soldier should reap the glory. As long as the channel was open, there was always a chance that a part or even all of Cervera's vessels might escape. No one could foresee with certainty the result of a battle. It seemed hardly probable that the entire squadron would be destroyed should it go out in the daytime, and still less probable should it go out at night; nor did it seem probable that Cervera would sail out of the harbour either in the daytime or at night without sinking, or at least damaging, some of the American ships. Moreover, there was danger that a storm or hurricane might at any time disarrange the blockading line or drive the American ships away from the harbour and give Cervera an opportunity to escape.

But with the channel closed, even if the American army had not been successful, Cervera would have continued to be locked in like a prisoner in a dungeon; and Sampson could have ignored the squadron almost as completely as if it had been captured and sent into some American port. One or two vessels left off the mouth could have easily prevented the Spaniards from opening the channel. The corking up of Santiago Harbour would, therefore, not only have rendered nugatory the vessels of Cervera's squadron, but would have set free most of the vessels of Sampson's fleet, and in this way have given the Americans a much greater preponderance in naval force.

The bearing that the closing of the harbour entrance might have had upon the strategical situation will perhaps be more clearly perceived when it is remembered that from the outset the United States had greatly felt the need of more battleships and armoured cruisers. Such vessels were greatly needed in the Philippines to reënforce Admiral Dewey's squadron, which at the beginning of the war contained only unarmoured cruisers. Before Cervera's whereabouts were known, a squadron of battleships and armoured cruisers was needed off Cienfuegos, and another off San Juan, Porto Rico, to prevent his entering either of those ports. Even after he was blockaded at Santiago, more ships were needed to look after Camara's squadron, which might have appeared at any time in West Indian waters. Again, when Camara's squadron started for the Philippines by way of the Suez Canal, the need of battleships in Asiatic waters became so great that the United States naval authorities decided to withdraw two battleships from the blockading squadron at Santiago, even against Sampson's protest.¹ Indeed, from the beginning

¹ "The Spanish reserve fleet arrived at Port Saïd on June 26, and the fact was cabled to Dewey. Sampson was also advised of the distance it had made, but he was loath to part with any of his ships because of his opinion that the force he then had 'insures a capture which I believe will terminate the war.' But the department could not leave Dewey with an inferior force. Our supremacy in the Pacific, with all that it meant, must be maintained; the troops en route to Manila must be protected. So, disregarding Sampson's views, it was decided not to change the plan with

of the war until the destruction of Cervera's squadron, there was not a moment when the American authorities did not feel the need of more battleships and cruisers, and would not have willingly paid two or three prices for vessels of this kind:

In connection with these facts it should be noticed that the relative strength of the American navy—and relative strength is, after all, what counts in war—would have been increased enormously by closing the mouth of Santiago Harbour. It may be assumed that the relative strength of the armoured vessels of the United States and of Spain at the time the *Merrimac* sailed into the harbour entrance was in the proportion of about three to two, and that Cervera's squadron represented more than half the armoured strength of the Spanish navy. But with Cervera's squadron eliminated, the ratio would have been at least three to one, instead of three to two. That is to say, the armoured strength of the American navy would by this act have become relatively twice as powerful as it was before; or, in other words, the closing of the entrance of Santiago Harbour would have been equivalent, strategically, to increasing the American navy by two armoured cruisers, five battleships, and six monitors.

respect to Watson's squadron. The departure of the battleships was delayed, however, in order that the remaining armored vessels might fill their coal bunkers and maintain, for as long a time as possible without recoaling, their position off Santiago."—John D. Long, Secretary of the Navy.

Again, with the channel closed, the fall of Santiago would have resulted in the capture of the squadron, which, unless the Spaniards themselves had destroyed it, would have become a valuable acquisition to the American navy — an acquisition which would have made still more overwhelming the American preponderance in naval strength.

The situation at Santiago with Sampson's squadron blockading the Spanish squadron was very similar to the situation at Port Arthur in the Russian-Japanese War, when Admiral Togo's squadron was blockading the Russian squadron. In both cases the attempt was made to close a harbour; and in both cases the admirals had the same great strategical object in view. The persistent efforts that Admiral Togo made to close Port Arthur Harbour show what importance he attached to the accomplishment of this undertaking. He had an eye for great results. He saw clearly that closing the entrance would increase enormously the relative fighting strength of the Japanese navy, and leave him a comparatively free hand to deal with the Russian Baltic squadron upon its arrival in Asiatic waters.

It is somewhat remarkable that although several thousand projectiles were fired at the batteries at the mouth of Santiago Harbour the only damage done was the dismounting of one piece in the Morro Battery and the disabling of one Hontoria gun in the Socapa Battery. In commenting upon

the effects of these bombardments, Commander Jacobsen of the German navy says:

“A systematic blockade had been established, and in this connection the main object, namely, the destruction of Cervera’s squadron, was never lost sight of. Thanks to the intelligent dispositions of the commander-in-chief of the fleet and the skill of the American officers and crews, this object was attained with complete success. Incidentally the batteries of the Morro, Socapa, and Punta Gorda were bombarded by the American fleet, and these bombardments offer so much that is of interest and so many points of discussion for naval officers that I shall have to speak of them somewhat more at length. How much has been said of these bombardments! How many times have the batteries of the Morro and Socapa been placed out of action, the guns dismounted, the fortifications levelled to the ground! Batteries which even did not exist, as, for instance, Morro Castle proper and Estrella Battery, were said to have returned the galling fire, the latter completely destroyed, the former nothing but a heap of ruins. Such were the newspaper reports, of the inaccuracy of which I had an opportunity of convincing myself personally on the scene of events. . . .

“The final result of the numerous bombardments was but one gun placed out of action in the Morro Battery and one in the Socapa Battery. The loss in human life was a few killed and wounded. Punta Gorda Battery, the only important position in a question of forcing the harbour entrance, remained uninjured. As I have already said, I am unable to state the total number of projectiles which the American ships fired in order to attain this

modest result. In any event, the number is out of proportion to the result, and has proved once more a fact well established by the history of naval wars, namely, that coast fortifications are extremely difficult to place out of action, even with an expenditure of large quantities of ammunition. The American method of firing may perhaps be susceptible of improvement—that is not for me to say. But the American naval officers may take comfort in the thought that other seafaring nations would not have done any better in their place—perhaps not so well; for no navy, with the exception of the French, has made it a point in time of peace to make the bombardment of coast fortifications, fortified cities, etc., the subject of thorough practical study.

“As for the fire of the Spanish batteries, I have read of but one case where a Spanish projectile hit an American ship. It was in a fight with the Socapa Battery that the battleship *Texas* received a hit probably from one of the 6.3-inch guns taken from the *Reina Mercedes*. The projectile struck the port side about twenty feet abaft the bow and exploded, after passing through a stanchion between decks, killing one man and wounding six. The American officer who took charge of the battery at Morro Castle also told me the following amusing incident: There was a bombardment of the Morro Battery at night, and one of the American ships was throwing her searchlight on the battery. The Spaniards answered the fire part of the time. The ship with the searchlight was not hit, but the battleship *Iowa*, lying quite a distance away in the dark, was unexpectedly struck by an accidental hit from one of the Spanish howitzers. The projectile passed through the deck, entered the officers’

mess room, exploded there, and caused some minor damages to the rooms; but none of the crew was hit. But what could be expected of the kinds of guns the Spaniards had at their disposal. It must surely have given the American officers who took charge of the battery a slight shock when they saw the dates 1668, 1718, etc., on the guns which they had been fighting. Part of the mediæval howitzers still had charges in them when the American officer took possession of the Morro Battery. He therefore desired to fire them, which gave him an opportunity of establishing the fact that even with the greatest elevation the range was only eight hundred yards. It is possible that the cartridges had suffered from humidity; but, on the other hand, it is quite probable that this was their greatest range. One thousand meters was not a bad performance for guns of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. No wonder that the Spaniards could not reach the hostile ships with these guns!

“But now another question. Did the American fleet really allow itself to be deceived by these batteries? In the beginning, perhaps. And why not? I do not hesitate to acknowledge that I had the same experience, together with several other officers. When we inquired into the nature of the batteries, we had no idea of the venerable age of those guns, but set them down as 4.7-inch and 6.3-inch guns. It is true that we did not go through a fight with the batteries, and that is the essential factor for estimating their efficiency. From observations made at the Spanish batteries I judge that the Socapa Battery was the main objective of the Americans. They seem to have known that the only serviceable guns, namely, the 6.3-inch Hontoria guns from the *Reina Mercedes*, had

been set up there ; but the Morro Battery too was fired upon quite a number of times. Would the Americans have done this had they known what miserable guns their enemies had? Hardly. So there can be no doubt that in the beginning at least the Americans were deceived as to the strength of the foe, whom they overestimated, as is usually the case in war. Moreover, there was no occasion for the American commander of the fleet, even if the Spanish batteries had been recognized as efficient and dangerous, to attack them under prevailing circumstances. If the harbour entrance was to be forced, neither the Morro nor the Socapa Battery need have been considered, because they could not sweep the narrow entrance with their guns. The Punta Gorda Battery was the only one that controlled the entrance, and owing to the great distance, and the difficulty of observing the fire, it was almost impossible to place this battery out of action from the sea. Then, why the bombardments of the batteries and the immense expenditure of ammunition, especially since the American commander-in-chief did not intend to force the entrance, but on the contrary was desirous of obstructing it, as is plainly shown by Hobson's attempt? A simple blockade, without any further attack on the fortifications, would have had exactly the same result. I cannot possibly believe that the American commander-in-chief had nothing more in view than to harass the enemy by the numerous bombardments and to reassure the home press. My idea is that Admiral Sampson, as a practical and experienced gunner, had a very definite object in view in these bombardments. I have no proofs to offer in support of this assumption, but I have an idea that there is something in it. After the batteries had

been brought out all the subsequent bombardments were nothing more or less than target practice. The Admiral wanted to accustom his officers and men to sharp firing. The whole crews were made to practise at regular intervals — the commanders in the manner of handling their ships, the officers in conducting and superintending the firing, the gun captains in training and aiming, the gun and ammunition crews in serving the guns and passing the ammunition, and all these under conditions of actual war, in fights with coast batteries. When the decisive day arrived,— the battle on the high sea, ship against ship,— the American fleet was well prepared and able to achieve its task in a brilliant manner and in the shortest possible time.

“Whether I am right or wrong in this assumption, whether it was a question of actual bombardment or of target practice, the final result remains the same. Even at target practice each one fires as well as he can. Therefore we are still confronted with the fact that the coast fortifications, in spite of vastly superior naval artillery and the expenditure of immense quantities of ammunition, were not placed out of action. What lessons are we to derive from this?

“Aside from the forcing of harbour entrances, where the assailant must eventually expose himself for a short time to the hostile fire, cases may arise in war where it becomes necessary prior to such forcing, or for other reasons, to destroy certain forts. The history of war teaches us that this is one of the most difficult problems. It should therefore be made a subject of study in time of peace, the same as any other problem. Of the necessity of studying tactics and strategy and their

practical application, every one is convinced, from the commander-in-chief to the youngest lieutenant. Immense sums are being expended for coal alone, in order to have the ships of the fleet pass through all manner of evolutions in tactics and strategic manœuvres. Money should also be devoted to target practice under exactly the same conditions as in actual war. For what is it that decides a naval battle? The tactics of the commander-in-chief of the fleet and the commanders of the different ships are certainly of some influence on the battle, but nothing more. The decision will always be dependent on the good training of officers and men for the fight and the good firing of gun captains and officers. That is what the naval battle of Santiago has once more plainly demonstrated.”¹

If the Spanish batteries at the mouth of the harbour had been armed with heavy modern cannon, Cervera would have had a much better chance of escape, especially at night; for the American vessels could not then have maintained positions sufficiently near the shore to throw a blinding light into the channel.

The bombardments of the shore batteries at Santiago most naturally raise the question, What chances under the conditions of modern naval warfare have guns afloat against guns ashore? The history of recent wars certainly shows that under

¹ “Sketches from the Spanish-American War,” by Commander Jacobsen, of the German navy, translated from the German by Office of Naval Intelligence, United States Navy Department.

almost any imaginable condition a large preponderance of guns afloat is necessary to put out of action the guns of shore batteries. Indeed it may be stated as a fact that coast defences well prepared, well equipped with modern guns, properly manned, and efficiently commanded, are sufficient to withstand greatly superior forces at sea. If it were possible to state with any degree of accuracy the relative effectiveness of guns afloat and guns ashore in the form of a ratio, such information would be very valuable. However, as the conditions are different in every case, close approximation to accuracy is impossible. Very little has been written by experts on this subject; but the following extract from a letter to the author by one of the ablest officers¹ of the United States army, who has given the subject much study and thought, is instructive:

“I believe that your navy friend's ratio of *three to one* is not unfair to the navy, and is fairly accurate for guns at about the same level afloat and ashore. Mortars, however, are supreme. Against them the navy is almost without effect, unless it can take the pits in reverse; and the mortar shell attacks the ship at its weakest point, the deck, which rarely has over four inches of best steel protection. The weak point of mortars is their doubtful accuracy as compared with direct-fire rifles, or long guns, but their accuracy is sufficient and greater than usually supposed;

¹Lieutenant-Colonel John P. Wissar, Artillery Corps, United States Army.

moreover, they are as accurate at twelve thousand yards as at four thousand — a most important point, since they come into play at long ranges before the enemy can act — and we can fire salvos from pits of four pieces, or batteries of eight or sixteen pieces, thus securing greater chances of hitting.

“Direct-fire guns (rifles) on high sites are better protected from guns afloat, and have a better action on ships. On sites from sixty to one hundred and twenty feet a gun ashore is worth about four afloat; and on sites from one hundred and twenty to two hundred feet about five or six.

“These are very conservative ratios; but it is not wise to claim too much for guns ashore, because guns afloat can very often take up advantageous positions, which counteract the protection of the shore guns. If the fleet succeeds in passing the forts, it may even take the latter in reverse, as was the case in the navy-coast artillery manoeuvres at New London in 1902. Moreover, there may be dead angles on the water not covered by the range finders ashore, in which case the shore guns would be temporarily helpless.

“There is no doubt that Abbott’s ratio¹ is too low at present, much too low, but an accurate ratio can hardly be given. The above ratios are fair to the navy, but in my opinion a future war will show that these ratios should be much higher for guns ashore. I would be willing to fight a fort having one-fifth the number of direct-fire guns which a fleet could bring to bear against me, assuming no advantage of height of site, particularly with guns on disappearing carriages.”

¹ Abbott’s ratio was two to one for guns at about the same level afloat and ashore.

Nothing in this campaign is more deserving of praise than the conduct of the blockade of Santiago from the arrival of Admiral Sampson on June 1 until the destruction of Cervera's squadron on July 3. The success of the undertaking required great vigilance, tireless efforts, and a clear conception of the problems to be solved. It was necessary to place and maintain the blockading vessels in such positions as would best enable them to cope with the enemy if he attempted to escape; to keep the ships of the squadron in coal; to prevent, if possible, Cervera's sailing out of the harbour at night; to bombard the forts at the mouth of the harbour and give his gunners target practice; to aid in the landing of Shafter's army; and to keep a watchful eye upon the movements of Camara's squadron. In the narrative part of this work it has been shown, or will be shown, how Sampson accomplished these things; how he issued the order of battle on June 2, under which the squadron fought on July 3; how he attempted to block the channel and came within a hair's breadth of success; how he kept an electric light directed into the channel, thus making it much more difficult for Cervera to go out by night than by day; how he captured Guantanamo Bay and established there a coaling and refitting station; how he bombarded the coast batteries and aided in the disembarkation of the Fifth Corps; and how, while attending to these details, and many more too numerous to mention, he kept by night

and by day a superior force upon the vital point, — the mouth of the harbour, — ready to overwhelm and crush his enemy the moment he appeared. What particularly deserves praise is not that with a superior force he won the battle — that was to be expected; but that during more than thirty days of weary watching, of tireless efforts, of vigilance seldom if ever surpassed, he maintained in the face of most trying difficulties a preponderating force off the mouth of Santiago Harbour. To concentrate upon the vital point a superior force and to maintain it there under so many unfavourable conditions, ever ready for action, day after day and week after week until the battle hour arrived, was a military operation worthy of Nelson's genius. "The history of the time — now nearly a year — that has elapsed since these lines were first written," says Captain Mahan, "impels the author, speaking as a careful student of the naval operations that have illustrated the past two centuries and a half, to say that in his judgment no more onerous and important duty than the guard off Santiago fell upon any officer of the United States during the hostilities; and that the judgment, energy, and watchfulness with which it was fulfilled by Admiral Sampson merits the highest praise. The lack of widely diffused popular appreciation of military conditions, before referred to in these papers, has been in nothing more manifest than in the failure to recognize generally, and by suitable national reward,

both the difficulty of his task, and that the dispositions maintained by him ensured the impossibility of Cervera's escaping undetected, as well as the success of the action which followed his attempt at flight. . . . This it is which constitutes the claim of the American Commander-in-chief upon the gratitude of his countrymen; for to his skill and tenacity in conducting that operation is primarily due the early ending of the war, the opportunity to remove our stricken soldiery from a sickly climate, the ending of suspense, and the saving of many lives."

Admiral Sampson's objection to detaching two battleships and other vessels from his squadron and to sending them to the Philippines to reënforce Admiral Dewey was, from a strategical point of view, well founded. There were several reasons why this movement should not have been made.

First: The battleships could not be spared from the blockading line. Not to mention the smaller vessels on either side, Sampson had seven vessels to oppose Cervera's four. To prevent the escape of Cervera and to insure his defeat in case he should sail out of the harbour, Sampson's force was none too large. "A committee of very distinguished British Admirals a few years since," says Captain Mahan, "reported that having in view the difficulty of the operation in itself, [namely, the blockading of an enemy's squadron] and the chances of the force detailed falling below the *minimum* by

accidents, or by absence for coal or refits, British naval supremacy, vital to the Empire, demanded the number of five British battleships to three of the fleet thus to be controlled."

Had a single armoured vessel of Sampson's squadron been sent away, the ratio of his forces to those of the enemy would have fallen below the ratio which these British officers thought to be necessary for success under such conditions. Had two of Sampson's battleships been taken away, and had the conditions been similar on the day of battle to what they actually were on July 3; that is to say, had one of the remaining five vessels been absent coaling, as was the *Massachusetts*, and another so far away as to be able to take hardly any part in the fight, as was the case with the *New York*, Sampson would have had only three vessels to meet Cervera's four, a ratio which, to say the least, would have made the result of the battle uncertain.

But with the blockading line remaining as it was, the destruction or capture of Cervera's squadron was practically assured. Even if two of Sampson's vessels should have been absent on the day of battle, as practically was the case, he would still have had five vessels to oppose four, a proportion which, taken in connection with the fact that the vessels of Cervera's squadron would be obliged to sail out of the harbour one by one, gave him sufficient strength to count on almost certain victory.

If Cervera had escaped as the result of the withdrawal of two of the battleships of Sampson's squadron, the damage that would have been done to the Americans could not have been counter-balanced by any good that would have resulted from Watson's sailing to the Philippines. As the avowed purpose of the war was the expulsion of the Spaniards from Cuba, the control of the sea in West Indian waters was absolutely essential to success. Without such control all the land forces and all the resources of the United States would have availed nothing. The vital centre of the war was in the West Indies. Here the armoured strength of the American navy should have been concentrated, and here it should have remained until the control of the sea was assured.

Second: The withdrawal of two battleships from Sampson's forces would have played into the hands of the enemy. As early as June 1 Admiral Cervera telegraphed the Minister of Marine at Madrid: "To make successful running of blockade possible, attempt should be made to draw off armoured cruisers *Brooklyn* and *New York*." On June 3 the Minister of War at Madrid telegraphed Governor-General Blanco: "Very serious situation in the Philippines compels us to send there ships and reinforcements of troops as early as possible. To be able to cope with hostile squadron at Manila, it will be indispensable to send an equally strong fleet there. . . . The only thing we can do is to

send all the ships of Cervera's squadron that can get out of Santiago. . . ." On June 9 Admiral Cervera, in a telegram to his government giving the views of his captains as to the practicability of his squadron's sailing out of the harbour, stated that Captain Concas of the *Teresa* was of the opinion that in case one of the rapid cruisers, *Brooklyn* or *New York*, should at any time disappear, the sortie should be attempted immediately. On June 20 Captain-General Blanco telegraphed the Minister of War: "Seventy American vessels with landing corps [are] off Santiago. General Linares states if government does not have the means to help them by sending a squadron against United States coasts, [with the] object to draw off part of the United States fleet which attacks them, so that our squadron can go out, or squadron to arrive from Spain [to] run the blockade in coöperation with Cervera's sortie, circumstances will take care of solving conflict."

Thus, as the desperateness of the situation increased, it became more and more apparent to the Spanish officials that Cervera's only hope of escape was for the Spanish government to make some move which would cause the withdrawal of a part of Sampson's warships from the blockading line. Such was the situation of affairs when Camara's squadron was ordered to the Philippines. Just what the Spanish authorities had in mind in ordering this movement is not definitely known,

but undoubtedly one of the objects was to cause the Americans to weaken their blockading forces off Santiago, and thus give the principal Spanish squadron a chance to escape.

If to this reasoning it be replied that neither Admiral Sampson nor the naval authorities in Washington knew at this time the contents of the above telegrams, the answer is that the very situation of the opposing forces at Santiago was sufficient to convince any one that the Spaniards were extremely anxious to have a part or all of Sampson's vessels withdrawn.

Third: The destruction of Cervera's squadron would have given the American navy absolute control of the sea in West Indian waters. Even if, regardless of consequences, Camara's squadron, which contained but two armoured vessels, had been sent to those waters, it would doubtless have been at once destroyed, or at any rate it would have been absolutely powerless to interfere with the movements of American transports. With an open sea the United States could have sent any number of men to Cuba, and kept them supplied with food, clothing, and ammunition. On the other hand, the condition of the Spanish armies in Cuba and Porto Rico would have been utterly hopeless, for armies that lose permanently their communications are doomed. Like rudderless ships adrift on the ocean, their fate is only a question of time. In order to fight, soldiers must

have ammunition, clothing, and food. No greater calamity can befall an army than to be cut permanently from its base of operations and lose its source of supply, for in the end this of itself means starvation and death. It may mean, and often does mean, too, death without fighting — death without the opportunity of showing courage and patriotism amidst the gloom of sanguinary strife.

It would therefore have been the height of folly for Spain to have continued the war after Cervera's squadron was destroyed. There was much to be lost by persisting in such a course, and nothing whatever to be gained, except, perhaps, to exhibit to the world some further proofs of valour, which could have had no effect on the final result. "The object of military operations is final success and not proofs of valour."

That the destruction of Cervera's squadron would end the war was apparent to nearly all thoughtful students of strategy. In the early part of the blockade, when urging the American government to hasten the arrival of the land forces in order to make Santiago Bay untenable for Cervera's squadron, Sampson telegraphed, "The destruction of this squadron will end the war." On June 7, in a memorandum to his captains setting forth the necessity of a close blockade of the port, especially at night, Sampson said, "The escape of the Spanish vessels at this juncture would be a serious blow to our prestige and to a speedy end

of the war." And on June 26, after receiving the order to send the *Oregon*, *Iowa*, *Newark*, *Yosemite*, *Yankee*, and *Dixie* to the Philippines under Admiral Watson, Sampson informed the Secretary of the Navy that the force he then had "insures a capture which I believe will terminate the war." "The moment Admiral Cervera's fleet was destroyed," said the *London Times*, in its issue of August 16, "the war was practically at an end, unless Spain had elected to fight on to save the point of honour." "Even granting," said Captain Victor M. Concas, commander of the armoured cruiser *Maria Teresa* and chief of staff of Cervera's squadron in the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba, "that we had had the rare good fortune of forcing our way through, it would have been with such injuries and losses that our squadron would have been rendered useless for the rest of the campaign, which would have ended the war for Spain, for the war was the squadron, and nothing but the squadron. To suppose, as it was supposed at that time, that the hostilities could be continued after the loss of the ships shows a sad lack of knowledge of our military situation and of the meaning of modern squadrons." And upon this point Commander Jacobsen of the German navy wrote as follows:

"I have information from reliable sources that on August 12 the military administration of Havana had provisions on hand for three months longer, outside of what

the blockade runners had brought into the country and what was hidden away in the houses of the city. One can therefore understand the indignation of Captain-General Blanco when he heard that the peace protocol had been signed. But of what use would have been a further resistance on the part of the Spanish garrison? The United States only needed to make the blockade more rigid. That would necessarily have sealed the fate of Havana sooner or later. A fortress in the ocean, cut off from its mother country, can be rescued only with the assistance of the navy. The enemy who has control of the sea need only wait patiently until the ripe fruit drops into his lap."

Though it would have been a great mistake to send any of the armoured vessels of Sampson's squadron to the Philippines while Cervera's squadron remained undefeated in the West Indies, it was nevertheless good strategy to try to make the Spaniards believe that a squadron would be sent to Spain; for this threatened movement against the commerce and coast cities of the Peninsula would have had a powerful effect in causing the Spanish people to insist on the return of Camara's squadron.

Though the Navy Department of the United States seemed to be particularly anxious that Camara's squadron should not continue its voyage to the Philippines, there was from a strategical point of view no good reason for such anxiety. In the first place, this movement, which took

from the home waters practically all the remaining armoured vessels of the Spanish navy, left the Americans free to destroy the commerce and blockade the seaports of Spain. Secondly, it took the squadron still farther away from the strategical centre of the war, and henceforth made the possibility of Camara's uniting his squadron with Cervera's still more remote. Thirdly, in case Cervera's squadron were destroyed, Camara's squadron would have been in a most hopeless and dangerous situation; for there was little probability, in case the war were continued, that the squadron would ever have been able to remain in the Philippines or to return to Spain without encountering an overwhelming force of American warships that would have been free to leave West Indian waters immediately after the destruction of Cervera's squadron. Fourthly, such a movement would have been nothing more than a wild-goose chase to the other side of the earth for the purpose of seeking an enemy who could easily, by a little strategical skill, have avoided battle until the fate of Cervera's squadron was determined.

It is due, however, to the Spanish authorities to say that this movement was in all probability nothing more than a feint—a bluff carried to its extreme limit—made for the purpose of causing the American naval authorities to withdraw from off Santiago a number of Sampson's armoured vessels in order to facilitate Cervera's escape; and

though it failed of this purpose, it is very instructive to note how near it came to succeeding. That the movement failed in this object was due, first, to Sampson's well-founded opposition to the plan of sending a part of his forces to the Philippines; and, secondly, to the early destruction of Cervera's squadron.

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